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1 The Politics of Public Hearings 
 
1. The Politics of Public 
Hearings 
Public discussions about political goals lie at the heart of parliamentary democracies. Advice 
to politicians about which goals to pursue and how to pursue them is inextricably linked to 
political leadership. The idea of the public use of reason can be traced back to Immanuel 
Kant but has most vigorously been put to detail by Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. At the 
heart of Rawls’ “Political Liberalism” (1993) lies the idea that public reason, i.e. the public 
justification of political power, builds the foundation of a just and stable society (Quong 
2014). According to Rawls, “Public reason is the characteristic of a democratic people: it is 
the reason of citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their 
reason is the good of the public: what the political conception of justice requires of society’s 
basic structure and institutions and of the purposes and ends they are to serve” (Rawls 1993, 
213). These public uses of reason are connected to governmental and quasi-governmental 
arenas, such as parliaments, the administration, party politics, and the judiciary (Rawls 1993, 
215f; c.f. McCarthy 1994, 50). In a similar vein, Habermas focused on “the institutionalization 
of political autonomy, that is, of the public use of reason in the legal-political domain.” 
 
2 The Politics of Public Hearings 
(McCarthy 1994, 48). In Habermas’ own words, “the power available to the administration 
emerges from a public use of reason” (Habermas 1994, as quoted in McCarthy 1994, 49, 
footnote 12). Although Habermas and Rawls have markedly different views on the 
convergence of conclusions after free discussion, they share an important idea: It is the 
publicity of political discussion that enhances the quality of the “good of the public”.  
Historically, political decision making has been inextricably associated with advice, 
sometimes publically, more often in private. According to Yehezkel Dror, “Rulers and 
advisers belong to the Ur-core-components of human governance, as developed some 5,000 
years ago or perhaps earlier” (1987, 186). Germany, the country to be studied in this project, 
has extended experience with advisory bodies, some of them dating back to the beginning of 
the nineteenth century (Mayntz 1987, 7). Otto von Bismarck criticized his ministers for 
working too hastily on proposals and taking too little account of advice from existing 
advisory bodies (e.g. the “Volkswirtschaftsrat”, Böhret 2004, 373). During Prussian 
monarchy, advisory committees were initiated to “advise the ministerial administration in 
fundamental issues and to expound the meaning of scientific insights for administrative 
practice” (Eggers 1969, 58, my translation). In the 1960’s, scientific advice in the German 
political system was primarily interested in supporting the problem solving capacities of the 
state while until the mid seventies it supposedly cooperated to actively solve society’s 
problems (Willems 1993, 50, Müller Rommel 1984, Jann 1985, c.f. von Thienen 1990, 174f.).  
Today, a number of scholars argue that in a time of heavy information load, short time 
horizons and regular exogenous shocks, political actors are in dire straits without “good” 
advice (e.g. Boswell 2009, Kusche 2008, Siefken 2003). Von Bismarck already saw the 
difficulties of reconciling scientific arguments and political practice. A contemporary critique 
posits that scientific advisors are mere “pawns” or “fig leaves” for legitimizing already 
defined policies (e.g. Hoffman-Riem 1988, Böhret 1981, 306, skeptical accounts also in 
Landfried 1986, Scharpf 2006, Patzelt 2003, Wewer 2003). Schneider heavily attacks 
politicians for “selectively using scientific evidence to legitimize programs in 
retrospective…under false pretenses” (Schneider 1989, 318, my translation). Both experts 
and politicians involved strike us with a puzzle regarding political advice, “if it is not used, 
why do we produce so much of it?” (Shulock 1999). 
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This dissertation thesis is about how elected officials in a parliamentary democracy utilize 
public hearings to further political goals. A public hearing both entails the public use of 
reason and advice to politicians. I do not want to sketch out the philosophical foundations of 
public hearings or the contested relationship between politicians and advisors. Rather, I 
intend to show that the exchange of arguments between politicians and experts in a public 
hearing also serve goals previously neglected: By generating publicity in the first place, 
public hearings help government partners keep their coalition promises and enable the 
opposition to delay lawmaking. Altogether then, public hearings can be for the “good of the 
public”, if by “good of the public” we mean making governments stick to their electoral 
promises and having the opposition keep an eye on policy proposals possibly detrimental to 
a substantial share of the population. As the following examples will show, the relationship 
between (scientific) advice and politics in public hearings is far from harmonious in Germany 
– but this does not mean that it is arbitrary.  
Kill Bill: Public Hearings and Coalition Conflict 
Public hearings can serve as an instrument of coalition partners to monitor and scrutinize 
undesired ministerial bill proposals. In the following example a public hearing even killed the 
ministerial bill proposal. In early 2009, several cases of child abuse shook the German public. 
Then minister for family affairs in the grand coalition of SPD and CDU Ursula von der Leyen 
(CDU) pushed forward a proposal to tighten a law on child safety. Her hasty reaction was not 
greeted well by the government partner, the German social democrats (SPD). The ensuing 
dispute between CDU and SPD culminated in a heated public hearing1. Opening the Q+A 
session of the public hearing on May 25th 2009, the chair of the committee Michaela Noll 
(CDU/CSU) commented: “The last thing that experts working in the field of child safety need 
is a publically fought out party conflict.” Nonetheless, the public hearing markedly showed 
differences between the coalition partners: The SPD MPs scrutinized the proposal much 
more in depth by asking controversial questions to the invited experts.  
Questioned by the CDU on the proposal Dr. Rudolf Lange (Kreisgesundheitsamt Mettmann) 
stated that the regulations proposed were “sensible, appropriate and successful”. Answering 
to the same question by Michaela Noll (CDU/CSU), Professor Dr. Jörg Fegert commended the 
proposal. Marlene Rupprecht (SPD) opened the Q+A for the Social Democrats with the 
                                                          
1 The quotations are taken from the session protocol 16/90 for BT-Drucksache 16/12429, downloaded online 
March 2013, http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1247&id=1134 (my own translation) 
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trenchant remark: “I would be thankful if someone could cite scientific research and 
evaluations of current laws to name a gap so that we don’t use a shotgun while aiming at a 
bull’s eye.” Interrogated by the SPD, law Professor Dr. Helga Oberloskamp, then chair of a 
commission on child safety heavily criticized the proposal at the public hearing saying that it 
was not “the kind of law you should pass…it is almost crazy to pass something like that...it 
really isn’t great.” Social Democrat Caren Marks later on directly attacked the minister 
responsible for the proposal, “unfortunately the ministry has not submitted an evaluation 
[of the current law], but a torso of a law proposal without scientific analysis and evaluation. I 
believe the parliament should have received a decent evaluation beforehand…” Additionally, 
Britta Haßelmann (Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen) bitingly commented on the intragovernmental 
conflict: “We have heard a lot now on the weaknesses of this law proposal. I am convinced 
that this law is not going to be passed this way.” Henriette Katzenstein, an expert on child 
safety, agreed on this, saying that “the proposal in its current form has not yet matured 
enough.” During the public hearing it became clear that the coalition partners SPD and CDU 
were attacking each others’ position through the expert’s statements. Consequently, 
minister von der Leyen had to withdraw the proposal.  
Django Unchained: Public Hearings and Opposition Conflict 
Current research suggests that the opposition has no substantial role in the parliamentary 
process regarding the monitoring and scrutiny of government bill proposals (Martin and 
Vanberg 2011). Contrary to these findings, I suggest that public hearings are an ideal 
instrument of the opposition to generate publicity on controversial issues and delay 
government decision making. The “Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz”, essentially a 
package of economic instruments, was proposed by the CDU/CSU-FDP government at the 
end of 2009. During the first sessions of the finance committee dealing with the bill it soon 
became clear that the opposition clearly disagreed with the bill (which actually was in line 
with the coalition contract). Especially the reduction of value added tax for hotel 
accommodation was criticized by the opposition parties the Greens, the SPD and the Left for 
being “simple interest group politics”. While both members of government and the coalition 
parties in parliament defended the bill, the committee decided to stage a public hearing. In 
preparation for this hearing the 16 invited experts sent written commentaries of the 
proposal, only one of them favoring a reduction of vat for hotel accommodation. While this 
instrument was only one aspect of a whole bunch of economic measures it clearly became 
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the most controversial one during the public hearing. The coalition in government eventually 
passed the bill, even though it became public that a large hotel chain (Mövenpick) had 
supported the liberal party FDP with substantial campaign funding.2 In the aftermath, the 
coalition was heavily attacked in various media outlets.  
Public Hearings and Audience Costs 
These examples aren’t typical. As Martin and Vanberg (2011) aptly state, “For most coalition 
governments, most of the time, legislative initiatives do not end in disaster.” In the 
aforementioned cases, they did. Regarding the child safety bill, the public hearing turned out 
to be the last-ditch effort to successfully kill the bill. Astonishingly, the most fervent 
opponents of the proposal weren’t the opposition parties but rather MPs and invited experts 
of a coalition partner. The public hearing set the ideal stage for the SPD to voice their dissent 
on the proposal during the committee stage, bolstering their critique with expert’s 
statements. The public hearing of the “Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz” fueled the public 
debate about interest group politics of the conservative-liberal coalition, generating a 
substantial number of newspaper articles, op-eds and commentaries biased against the 
governmental decision. 
The central argument of this thesis is straightforward: public hearings serve as a mechanism 
within parliamentary committees to monitor and scrutinize ministerial bill proposals. 
While the opposition can only monitor the content of a bill and try to delay its adoption, it is 
up to the coalition majority in a committee to actually change its content through scrutiny. 
Expertise is deliberately used, it is not primarily for the sake of information gathering or 
“enlightened” decision making. While the three predominant schools of thought on the U.S. 
Congress (informational, distributional, partisan) stress different modes of political 
incentives in committees to address different audiences, I argue that public hearings can 
serve as a basis for principal-agent control by signaling unfaithfulness or incompetence of a 
coalition partner. As the example of the child safety bill shows, this control may relate to 
within-government differences. In addition, public hearings may also serve as instrument of 
the opposition to reduce information asymmetries vis-à-vis coalition parties and, in the end, 
punish a government minister through imposing audience costs vis-à-vis the electorate by 
delaying lawmaking. Delaying lawmaking can be beneficial to the opposition by signaling 
                                                          
2 Spiegel Online, 24.02.2011, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/umstrittene-subvention-fdp-will-
hotelsteuer-privileg-wieder-abschaffen-a-747388.html (retrieved July 2014)  
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conflict, incompetence or inactionability of the government coalition to the electorate. 
Several questions thus occur: Why are public hearings called for in the first place? How do 
public hearings affect the policy proposals involved, i.e. do they influence the duration of a 
proposal in parliament or the number of amendments to the initial bill? And do public 
hearings generate publicity for a relevant audience? To answer these questions, we need a 
theoretical framework that not only explains the causes of public hearings, but also their 
effects.  
Public Hearings in Comparative Perspective 
Hearings serve as an instrument of information gathering in many Western European 
parliaments. In Finland, work on a policy proposal in a committee generally begins with a 
hearing of experts. The number of experts to be heard varies with the importance and size of 
legislative projects. In the Italian Camera dei Deputati the committees exercise informational 
scrutiny by means of hearings (Rule 143, § 2)3. The standing committees of Norway’s 
Stortinget allows for hearings in the legislative proceedings that must be held in public 
unless otherwise decided. To enhance decision making the Public Bill Committees of UK’s 
House of Commons may take “written and oral evidence from officials and experts outside of 
Parliament”. The standing rules of Iceland’s Althingi allow for “open meetings for the 
purpose of obtaining information on parliamentary business that has been referred to the 
committee or on matters that the committee addresses on its own initiative”. This is 
identical to the standing rules on public hearings in the German Bundestag. As in the 
Bundestag, a minimum of one fourth of the members of a committee in the Althingi may 
request such a public meeting with experts. Public hearings have been introduced in the 
German Bundestag in 1951; other European countries have followed only lately (Belgium in 
1985, Sweden in 1989, Finland and France in 1991, cf. StrØm 1998, 54).  
While this quick glance on public hearings in comparative perspective is by no means 
conclusive, all the mentioned standing orders have something important in common: public 
hearings are associated solely with information gathering. But in practice public hearings 
can do much more – public hearings can serve as a strategic instrument to generate 
amendments on a proposal or delay policymaking. Both government partners and 
                                                          
3 Information on the availability of public hearings for Western European parliaments was assembled from the 
standing orders or current parliamentary websites, see Appendix 1.A. 
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opposition parties can benefit from public hearings in other ways than simply reducing 
informational asymmetries. One of the main tasks of this book is to show how. 
Approach of the Study 
The approach I take in this study builds on transaction cost theory, especially its sub-branch 
of principal-agent-models. Transaction costs occur because of ending information capacities 
of political actors, institutional and legal constraints, and policy conflict. Through public 
hearings, political parties economize on transaction costs of various kinds. Rooted in 
transaction cost theory, I propose facilitating the framework of “audience cost theory” taken 
from the International Relations literature on interstate conflicts to explain why public 
hearings are public. In particular, I propose that Public hearings can serve as a punishment 
mechanism in a principal-agent-relationship between a cabinet and a minister by imposing a 
specific kind of transaction cost, the loss of public support for backing down from a coalition 
compromise and thus being perceived as incompetent or unfaithful. Since this publicity on a 
coalitional conflict can be detrimental to all coalition partners, the instrument of public 
hearings will only be used in the presence of very large conflict. Thus, I adopt an outlook that 
centers on the strategic costs and benefits of public hearings in the parliamentary arena.  
At the beginning I would like to stress what the approach is not about: I do not argue that 
public hearings in the German Bundestag are solely an instrument of political punishment. 
As a matter of fact, only when several political facts coincide (policy conflict in government 
and a public hearing and an attentive mass media) will the punishment mechanism be 
plausible. I choose to study the German Bundestag because Germany stands out as a 
political system with a strong parliament, i.e. far-reaching rights and modes of influence. The 
German committee system is exceptionally well crafted. If public hearings are not even used 
by the opposition in a system that explicitly allows for it, there is little reason to believe an 
opposition is going to be better off elsewhere. If the opposition does make use of public 
hearings in Germany, it can serve as an example on how institutional rules strengthen 
opposition rights in a parliamentary system. Extending an analysis on the strength of 
parliamentary scrutiny in Western Europe, I propose that public hearings are one of many 
instruments and mechanisms not just in the German Bundestag but in many Western 
European parliaments to enhance their policing strength. The findings of this study should 
therefore be similar in countries with strong parliaments (e.g. Austria, Netherlands, 
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Denmark). The approach taken in this book is “positive”, in the sense that I am 
predominantly concerned with how public hearings work in practice and how they are 
strategically employed by political parties in parliamentary committees. While my approach 
rests on an empirical evaluation I nonetheless discuss its normative implications at the end 
of the book, i.e. what we can learn from how public hearings are being used to whether 
public hearings ought to be institutionalized in general.  
Plan of the Study 
In chapter two I review the development of public hearings in the German Bundestag, 
especially the reform of standing procedures which turned public hearings into a strategic 
instrument. I lay out the foundations of transaction cost theory. Public hearings are one 
possible solution to economize on transaction costs in a political market. In chapter three I 
show why public hearings are used in the first place by relating general governance 
structures within parliamentary democracies to public hearings. Extending data from 
previous research on parliamentary governance (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005) I find 
strong empirical support that public hearings are systematically related to both the 
complexity of a proposal and partisan conflicts in the German Bundestag. In the presence of 
coalitional conflict, public hearings are less likely, especially if the proposal has financial 
implications. Conflicts between government and opposition make public hearings more 
likely. To explain what public hearings are good for, a specific focus will be put on the recent 
coalition governance model and empirical results by Martin and Vanberg (2011) in chapter 
four. In public hearings, government partners scrutinize each other only if alternative 
monitoring and control mechanisms have not resolved the conflict. Consequently, the 
existence of junior ministers to mirror ministerial behavior reduces the likelihood of a public 
hearing to occur. In the event that an intracoalitional conflict is debated in a public hearing 
this substantially increases the number of amendments to a proposal. The opposition 
employs public hearings to delay policy proposals that are relatively more important but 
uncontroversial. As the empirical results suggest, contrary to previous research (Martin and 
Vanberg 2004) intra-coalitional conflict on important issues does not seem to increase 
legislative delay. Instead, public hearings on proposals important to the opposition 
significantly delay lawmaking. Finally, I borrow audience cost theory (ACT) from the 
International Relations literature on interstate conflicts and apply it to public hearings to 
explain the reasons for a hearing being public in chapter five. Against theoretical 
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expectations, minsters do not “tie their hands” to a bill to credibly commit to implementing 
proposals important to their electorate. Instead, public hearings create audience costs by 
increasing the number of newspaper articles on policy proposals that divide government 
partners. The concluding chapter closes with broader normative implications of the findings. 
  
 
10 The Politics of Public Hearings 
  
 
11 Foundations of Public Hearings 
 
2. Foundations of Public 
Hearings 
 
Public Hearings in the committees of the German Bundestag have been imported from the 
US-Congress in 1951 (Schüttemeyer 1998, 246)4. Karl Mommer (SPD), then chair of a 
committee on the development of a standing order for the German Bundestag (GOBT), 
successfully argued in favor of “public information sessions” in the committees which were 
laid down in § 73 of the standing order of 19515. His colleague Ritzel (SPD) suggested this 
was “the complete adoption of the American system of public hearings” (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 119. Sitzung, 21.02.1951, p. 4557). Members of the opposition were especially 
interested in adopting public hearings as they did “not want to endorse the wisdom of the 
ministers” (Der Spiegel, Wednesday, February 21st 1951, p. 5)6. The committee responsible 
                                                          
4 This section borrows from Schüttemeyer (1989) 
5 „Der nichtöffentlichen Sitzung können auf Beschluß des Ausschusses öffentliche Informationssitzungen 
vorangehen. Zu diesen sind nach Bedarf Interessenvertreter, Auskunftspersonen und Sachverständige, 
die Presse sowie sonstige Zuhörer zugelassen, soweit es die Raumverhältnisse gestatten.“ (§73, Section 2, 
GOBT) 
6 The author of that newspaper article also suggested that the governing coalition wasn’t as interested in 
adopting the instrument of public hearings since “one (the cabinet) has its own experts already in the 
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for drafting the amendments to the standing order intended to support a better relationship 
between parliament and the press by adopting public hearings in addition to raising public 
awareness and acceptance of parliamentary work in general (Deutscher Bundestag, 119. 
Sitzung, 21.02.1951, p. 7412). From the onset, public hearings were intended to generate 
publicity both to the mass media and the electorate. Adopting public hearings as an 
instrument in committees was especially endorsed by the opposition that had to cope with 
the obvious informational asymmetries between government ministers and the opposition. 
Public hearings were seen as an instrument of government control from the beginning, 
something to which we will return in the following discussion (in chapters 3 and 4).  
A parliamentary working group on “interest group representation” proposed strengthening 
public hearings as an instrument in 1965. But §73 of the GOBT remained unchanged until 
1969 (Schüttemeyer 1989, p. 1146). Only with the “small parliamentary reform” (as it has 
been called in Germany) were public hearings installed as a minority right. Since then, a 
quarter of all committee members can demand a public hearing (§ 70, Abs. 1 GOBT) on bill 
proposals delegated to the committee. According to Döring this is “in West European 
comparison an extraordinary exception” (Döring 1996, p. 51, my translation). Wolfgang 
Ismayr suggests that these public hearings on important proposals are primarily initiated by 
the opposition parties (2003, p. 67). Ismayr discusses public hearings as an instrument of 
parliamentary control of the government along with other instruments, e.g. minor and major 
questioning and concludes that “The ultimate criterion for their effectiveness is the public 
feedback they generate” (ibid. 68, my translation). Consequently, public hearings in the 
German Bundestag will also be analyzed regarding the publicity they are able to generate. To 
this I will turn in chapter 5.  
The Bundestag revised the standing orders in 1980. Public hearings are now dealt with in 
§70, but the content of the rules has not changed significantly (ibid. 1147). The wording of 
§70 specifies that “to inform about an aspect of consultation in a committee, a public 
hearing can be called for involving experts, interest groups representatives and other 
persons who can provide information” (own translation). In its initial form of 1951 creating 
publicity was paramount, while the changes of 1969 interpret public hearings mainly from 
its informational function. Accordingly, public hearings will be analyzed from both of these 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ministries” (ibid., both quotes are my translation). This argument is remarkably similar to the discussion of 
junior ministers as pre-committee control mechanism that will follow in chapter 4. 
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perspectives, i.e. if and how they effectively create publicity and if and how they help 
reducing informational asymmetries. 
There exist several, however outdated, studies on the instrument of public hearings in the 
German Bundestag (Appoldt 1971, Schüttemeyer 1989, Tenheaf 1992, Mengel 1983, Weßels 
1987, Pantle 1989, Stöhr 1989, Brenner 1993). Schüttemeyer (1998, 246) clarifies the 
functions of public hearings as information gathering, mobilization, and voice of interests. 
Backhaus-Maul sees public hearings as an arena of profiling for members of 
parliament(Backhaus-Maul 1990: 41). According to Von Beyme (1997, 234ff.) public hearings 
in the German Bundestag accomplish two goals: on the one hand they inform the members 
of parliament, on the other they serve to inform the public. As members of parliament have 
an array of instruments available to gather information apart from public hearings, it is the 
latter function that is of paramount importance (Von Beyme 1997, 234). As Von Beyme 
points out this publicity can come at a cost of efficiency (ibid. 235), e.g. by delaying decision-
making on a proposal. The attendance of legal scholars in public hearings resulted in a 
tendency to dogmatically discuss the constitutionality of proposals (ibid. 236), increasing the 
risk of constitutional review. 
Public Hearings in the German Bundestag 
Public hearings have gained importance across committee portfolios in the previous 
legislative sessions of the German Bundestag. They are not just a minor footnote in everyday 
politics in the German Bundestag. I assemble several relevant descriptive statistics that 
highlight the importance of studying public hearings in more detail. As will be shown, the 
occurrence of public hearings varies not only across time, but also across policy issues, 
initiator of a proposal and even committee chairs. Taking these observations into account is 
important for selecting appropriate theories to explain this variation. 
Since the ninth legislative period the number of public hearings has continually risen in 
Germany (Schindler 1999: 2122; Feldkamp 2005: 475), Schüttemeyer dates the rise back to 
the fifth period (Schüttemeyer 1989: 1150). Due to fears of parliamentary malpractice, 
“waste of time” (Tenhaef 1985, 26), or loss of objectivity because of interest group 
involvement (Loewenberg 1971, 338f.) public hearings were used with caution. There is a 
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significant increase from period 5 on (6 hearings in period 4, 58 in period 5) and then again 
from period 10 on (43 hearings in period 9, 159 in period 10)7.  
 
Figure 2.1 Ratio of Public Hearings to Committee Sessions (by Legislative Period) 
Public hearings are sometimes initiated formally. Mostly, the decision to hold a hearing is 
made in the “Obleute im Ausschuss” meeting (Ismayr 2012, 408)8. While the number of 
committee sessions has varied extensively (4218 in the first legislative period, 1197 in the 
sixth period, 2146 sessions on average), the ratio of public hearings to sessions has steadily 
increased from period five onwards, i.e. the time being spent in committees with hearing 
experts and interest groups has grown considerably9. Anecdotal evidence from committee 
hearing protocols suggests that hearings take up 2-3 hours of time. This would mean that 
slightly over two weeks are being spent on public hearings on average in every legislative 
period (or up to 369 hours). While the absolute number of hearings has steadily increased, 
this is not simply due to an increase in committee sessions in general. As it turns out, the 
                                                          
7 The numbers are taken from Ismayr 2012, table 7.14, p. 409 
8 “Obleute” are spokespersons for every faction in a committee. These spokespersons meet regularly to set the 
committee agenda or decide on committee procedures, e.g. public hearings. While documentation on these 
meetings does exist it is disclosed to the public (personal phone call with Brigitte Nelles, Archive of the German 
Bundestag, 11.11.2013).  
9 Data for the Figures on committee sessions and public hearings are taken from the several issues of the 
“Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages” (Schindler 1999, Feldkamp 2005 and Feldkamp 
2011 )  
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number of committee sessions with a public hearing has increased relative to the total 
number of committee sessions (Figure 2.1).   
 
Figure 2.2 Ratio of Public Hearings to Committee Sessions (by Portfolio) 
Public hearings have been established as one instrument available to the committees of the 
German Bundestag to monitor or scrutinize governmental bill proposals. Parties in 
parliament have learned how public hearings can be employed. Since legislative session 10 
at least every 1 in 10 committee sessions is a public hearing. But the use of public hearings 
isn’t evenly distributed across the committees of the German Bundestag (Figure 2.2). The 
committees for science and education, environment, labour and social affairs, and health 
make up more than half of all public hearings. Including the justice committee increases this 
share to more than two-thirds. Finally, the committee of finances and the previously 
mentioned committees account for more than 75 percent of all public hearings across 
committees in the legislative sessions 1-16 of the German Bundestag. While there has been 
one public hearing in the petitions committee in legislative sessions 1-16, on average every 7 
in hundred committee sessions across all portfolios involved a public hearing. Almost 18% of 
all committee sessions in the health committee were public hearings, while 12%-13% of all 
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committee sessions in the justice, environment, labor and social affairs, and science and 
education committees involved a public hearing. The occurrence of public hearings obviously 
varies with content. This suggests that policy conflicts within government or between 
government and opposition on proposals from certain portfolios make public hearings more 
or less likely. It could indicate that some proposals are more complex and require external 
expertise to be appropriately dealt with. The relationship between measures of party 
conflict or measures of proposal complexity and the occurrence of public hearings will 
therefore be dealt with in more detail in the following chapters. 
Policymaking has become increasingly complex, e.g. policy proposals have to consider a 
dearth of lengthy laws and court decisions. This creates a time-consuming workload both for 
the minister and the parliamentary committee mirroring a ministry in the German 
Bundestag. A considerable and increasing amount of time is spent on public hearings in the 
committees of the German Bundestag. This could be due to an increasing information gap in 
the committees that needs to be addressed by infusing external expertise. Interestingly, on 
average 676 proposals were being considered in legislative period 1-16 with a minimum of 
242 proposals in period 9 and a maximum of 923 proposals in period 13.  
Absent a bill proposal, members of a committee in the German Bundestag can call for a 
public hearing to introduce or learn something about a potentially relevant topic. But this is 
generally not the goal public hearings are used for. What matters is not just the number of 
public hearings and the total number of policy proposals but the share of policy proposals 
that were given serious discussion in a public hearing. As figure 2.3 shows, the share of 
proposals dealt with in a public hearing has continually increased. During legislative periods 
6-8, about one in ten policy proposals was scrutinized with a public hearing, in legislative 
periods 11-13 this number goes up to one in five proposals. In period 16, public hearings 
were held on about one in three (!) proposals. This suggests that public hearings are not 
simply used for parliamentary learning. Instead, they deliberately target proposals to be 
discussed and possibly amended in a committee. It should therefore matter who the 
initiator of a bill proposal is. 
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Figure 2.3 Share of Proposals considered in Public Hearings (per Legislative Period) 
Taking a closer look at the legislative period 10 to 16, 5216 policy proposals from different 
initiators were considered in the German Bundestag10. To identify whether a public or non-
public hearing occurred we need the committee protocols. For 4286 of these policy 
proposals, the database of the German Bundestag lists committee protocols and decision 
making recommendations (“Bericht und Beschlussempfehlung”). Looking at these 4286 
committee protocols enables us to analyze whether the occurrence of public hearings varies 
with the initiator of a policy proposal (Figures 2.4 and 2.5).11 We find a total of 1086 
hearings, with 36 of 1086 hearings identified as nonpublic12 and 1050 public (or 97%). Of 
                                                          
10 Data on policy proposals were taken from the GESTA research project (König and Luig 2014), which provides 
the URL addresses of the committee protocols. The committee protocols/ decision making recommendations 
were then downloaded from the database of the German Bundestag using a PERL script based on the URL 
addresses.  
11 To check whether a public hearing took place I transformed the PDF documents of the committee protocols 
for the available 4286 cases into machine-readable (utf-coded) text documents. A string search for several 
different strings yielded a total of 1050 proposals involving a public hearing.The string search was done in linux 
command line with the following strings: „öffentliche anhörung“, „nichtöffentliche anhörung“, 
„sachverständigenanhörung“, „öffentliche informationssitzung“, „nichtöffentliche informationssitzung“. 
12 Of these 36 nonpublic hearings, exactly 50% were called on government initiatives. Almost two thirds took 
place in committees with minor salience (e.g. housing, post and telecommunication, agriculture and nutrition). 
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these 1050 proposals considered in a public hearing about 2/3 (689) were initiated by either 
the cabinet (460) or government factions (229).  
In absolute terms, If public hearings are being employed they are very likely to be 
scrutinizing cabinet bills or government faction bills (Figure 2.4). This is not very surprising 
given that most of the proposals introduced into the German Bundestag are cabinet 
proposals. But in relative terms, given the total number of about 2500 cabinet bill proposals 
in legislative sessions 10-16, of all bill proposals initiated by the cabinet, only one in five has 
been dealt with in a public hearing (Figure 2.5). About one in three proposals by the 
opposition was scrutinized in a public hearing, while three out of four cross-factional 
proposals (i.e. initiated together by both government and opposition factions) were given 
special treatment in a public hearing. Public hearings dealing with cabinet proposals are 
therefore less likely than public hearings on opposition proposals or cross-factional 
proposals.  
 
Figure 2.4 Absolute Share of Public Hearings by Initiator 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
22 of 36 of these bills with nonpublic hearings passed the floor. We can reasonably assume that the exclusion 
of nonpublic hearings will not change the empirical results of the analyses in a significant way. 
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Figure 2.5 Relative Share of Public Hearings by Initiator 
 
Prima facie, government parties prefer not to hold public hearings on their proposals, while 
the opposition does. In the German Bundestag, some committees are chaired by 
government parties and some by opposition parties. Taken together, this could mean that 
public hearings occur more often in committees chaired by an opposition party. We can 
observe conflicting variation in the use of public hearings across committees with different 
chairs: While the use of public hearings in committees whose chair is held by one of the 
government parties has steadily increased from legislative session 10 to 16, committees with 
chairs from opposition parties seem to hold an equal amount of public hearings across the 
legislative sessions (Figure 2.6). Again, this may be due to intra-governmental party 
conflicts13.  
                                                          
13 According to Ismayr (2012, 408), public hearings are called for primarily by the opposition, although conflicts 
in government coalitions can also lead to a hearing. 
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Figure 2.6 Committee Chairs and Public Hearings 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
As the descriptive statistics show, public hearings have become a regularly used instrument 
in government-chaired committees dealing with cabinet and opposition bill proposals of 
public importance (e.g. Labour and Social Affairs, Health, Justice, Environment, Sience and 
Education). Thus, I suggest that public hearings are an instrument of intra-coalitional scrutiny 
and oppositional monitoring. The development of the standing orders of the German 
Bundestag (GOBT) and the contemporary discussion about public hearings in German 
parliamentary research suggest several interesting points of departure for further 
investigation: 
1. Public hearings are supposed to generate publicity and inform the public. In practice 
this means that they must create an audience to fulfill their intended function. To 
this we will turn in chapter five. 
2. Public hearings are supposed to reduce informational asymmetries between parties 
in government and parties in opposition. This assumes both variation in the 
complexity of policy proposals and variation in policy conflict between parties in 
government and parties in opposition. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
o
. o
f 
H
ea
ri
n
gs
Legislative Session
Opp. Gov.
 
21 Foundations of Public Hearings 
Public hearings are not just a theoretical option – they are actively and increasingly used in 
the German Bundestag, both regarding the number of committee sessions involving a public 
hearing and the share of bill proposals considered therein. Taking a closer look at public 
hearings is therefore not just a scientific exercise but of practical relevance to the members 
of the German Bundestag and the public. The descriptive statistics on public hearings in the 
German Bundestag sessions 10-16 suggest that the use of public hearings could be related to 
issues of government scrutiny, be it intra-coalitional scrutiny or oppositional monitoring. The 
relationship between minister and coalition cabinet resembles a conflict between an agent 
and his principal. This kind of relationship has previously been discussed within the 
framework of transaction cost theory. 
Transaction Cost Theory 
A public hearing is an institutional mechanism available to strategic political actors in 
parliament to solve dilemmas of collective decision making and reduce transaction costs of 
various kinds (information, distribution of political rents, partisan conflicts). In controlling 
government actions, both the cabinet and the parliament face a classical hold-up problem of 
“make or buy”: Should they delegate control to committees or take up the costs of 
controlling themselves? Public hearings are of course not independently used from other 
available instruments of scrutiny. Theoretically, they are part of a “governance structure”. 
In the following sections, I lay out the foundations of transaction cost theory, followed by an 
exposition of related literature on legislative organization and coalition governance. Both the 
Instrument of a hearing and its publicity have to be explained in the context of the German 
Bundestag. My explanation of why public hearings are being employed rests on the body of 
research on legislative organization (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989, Krehbiel 1991, Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987,Kiewit and McCubbins 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993). My explanation of 
how public hearings influence policy proposals extends the idea of committees as arenas of 
cabinet scrutiny, as Martin and Vanberg have proposed (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 
2011). And finally, my explanation on the publicity of public hearings builds upon audience 
cost theory imported from International Relations research. All of this serves as a 
preliminary to the central argument of this book: Public hearings serve as an institutional 
mechanism to manage partisan conflicts. 
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Initially introduced as a concept by Coase (1937, 41) it was Kenneth Arrow who coined the 
term “transaction costs“(1969, 48). Coase focused on a surprising, but intuitive question: If 
markets are an ideal instrument to coordinate individual plans, why do we have firms (cf. 
Erlei et al. 1999, 42)? His no less surprising answer: The use of markets is only available at a 
cost – transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs of gathering and processing 
information, monitoring delegation, or credibly committing to keeping a contract. 
Institutions economize on transaction costs and enable cooperation between rational actors 
by revealing otherwise unavailable information (Pollack 2003, 21). Dahlman (1979, 148) 
defines transactions costs as “search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, 
policing and enforcement costs”, but eventually reduces all of these to “resource losses 
incurred due to imperfect information”. Political markets run risk of inefficiencies, and thus 
have a tendency of generating high political transaction costs (North 1990). The importance 
of transaction costs for solving private and collective exchanges has been well researched 
(e.g. Williamson 1981, Ostrom 1990). Politics as an answer to “who gets what, when and 
how” (Harold Laswell) essentially relates to political exchanges and their problems: 
“Transaction costs often determine political outcomes. To define them is to understand their 
pivotal role, for in a political context transaction costs denote most of the costs of multi-
person political 'exchange'- more precisely, the costs of reaching and enforcing political 
agreements regarding the role and scope of government” (Twight 1994, 34, my 
highlighting).  
Transaction cost theory should best be understood as a broad framework consisting of 
several concepts, many of which have been applied extensively to parliamentary institutions 
in the political economy literature on U.S. Congress (Austen-Smith and Riker 1987, Weingast 
and Marshall 1988, Austen-Smith 1993, Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). The measurement 
costs concept tackles the question how transaction costs are to be quantified. The 
governance-structure approach focuses on the transaction itself while the principal-agent 
framework studies the relationship of actors involved in the transaction, mostly in a 
hierarchical relationship. Political actors have a (notorious) problem keeping commitments 
with exchange partners especially since political goods are difficult to quantify (Voigt 2002, 
31). Members of parliament minimize transaction costs through institutions (Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999, 34). Weingast explicitly quotes transaction cost theory: “In important 
respects, the logic of political institutions parallels that of economic institutions. To borrow 
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Williamson's phrase, the political institutions create a 'governance structure' that at once 
allows the society to deal with on-going problems as they arise and yet provides a degree of 
durability to economic and political rights. Importantly, these help limit the ability of the 
state to act opportunistically.” (Weingast 1993, 288). 
Public hearings signal the effort of cabinet members (measurement costs). Recall the 
example of the child safety bill from the introduction: The coalition partner SPD and her 
invited experts did not criticize the proposal by CDU minister von der Leyen for being too far 
of from a coalition compromise. Instead, Social Democrat Caren Marks ferociously attacked 
the minister for introducing “a torso of a law proposal without scientific analysis and 
evaluation.” According to the experts, much more effort should have gone into writing the 
proposal. Public hearings enable team members to control for credible commitment when 
contracts are incomplete. They can reduce the incentives of moral hazard (shirking). Since 
the involved actors follow strategic incentives, different institutions are set up to enable 
rational decisions through its organization. This is where comparative cost analysis kicks in: 
public hearings are used by government and opposition differently depending on the cost-
benefit-analysis. Public hearings can only be understood in relation to the use of other 
mechanisms of coalitional management (junior ministers, shadow committee chairs). It is 
therefore worthwhile to take a closer look at transaction costs and parliamentary 
governance. In the paragraphs ahead, I overview the theoretical groundwork on transaction 
cost theory and relate transaction cost theory to the literature on parliamentary governance. 
How to Measure the Costs of a Transaction 
Which team member contributes how much to generating an output? How can firms 
structure incentives to distribute the risks of production? The measurement cost concept 
deals with the costs of measuring economic activities (Erlei et al. 1999, 70). Alchian and 
Demsetz’ (1972) seminal paper defines a firm as a central agent within a network of 
contracts that are being continuously renegotiated (cf. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 39; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). The output of a firm is the result of a team production of 
contract partners. The contribution of each partner can only be approximated with indirect 
indicators. This indeterminacy creates incentives to “shirk” on other members, since none of 
them have the ability to control the input of the other team members (“hidden action”). 
Additionally, contract negotiation and compliance are associated with costs that cannot be 
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quantified at all times. Incomplete contracts are thus a consequence of imperfectly informed 
contract partners (Dahlman 1979). Since all team members have an incentive to shirk, this 
leads to “collective self-impairment” (Erlei et al. 1999, S 71, my translation). To solve this 
“self-impairment”, Alchian and Demsetz propose to appoint an actor who specializes on 
measuring and controlling the effort of each team member.  
In parliamentary systems, coalition partners are team members bound together by an 
incomplete contract, which creates incentives to free ride on the effort of the coalition 
partners. Public hearings, along with, e.g. the appointment of junior ministers and shadow 
committee chairs, can be understood as institutional solutions to the measurement problem 
of a coalitional team production. In a public hearing, the output of ministerial effort can be 
measured by having external experts comment on the quality of a bill proposal. Of course, 
public hearings are not a catch-all solution. Different institutional mechanisms will work 
better at different occasions, depending on the risk of shirking and the associated costs. This 
is exactly what the governance-structure approach deals with, to which we now turn. 
The Governance-Structure Approach 
Central to the governance-structure approach is the analysis of the transaction as 
appropriation and assignment of entitlements between economic subjects. Two or more 
subjects would like to make a transaction. As we have seen above, transaction costs occur 
because of incomplete contracts. Unfortunately, there exists no canonical definition as to 
what makes up an incomplete contract, “While one recognizes one when one sees it, 
incomplete contracts are not members of a well circumscribed family” (Tirole 1999, 743). A 
common interpretation of “incompleteness” is that at the time of signing a contract not all 
eventualities can be anticipated and many clauses are left ambiguous on purpose. 
Incomplete contracts pose a transaction cost problem due to the opportunistic behavior of 
contract partners:  
Transaction cost economics pairs the assumption of bounded rationality with a self-interest-
seeking assumption that makes allowance for guile. Specifically, economic agents are 
permitted to disclose information in a selective and distorted manner. Calculated efforts to 
mislead, disguise, obfuscate, and confuse are thus admitted. This self-interest-seeking 
attribute is variously described as “opportunism, moral hazard, and agency. (Williamson 
1996, 56).  
 
25 Foundations of Public Hearings 
Essential to a contract and an organizational structure is the so-called “hold-up problem” 
(Hart and Moore 1990, Klein et al. 1978, Williamson 1975). This problem occurs every time 
one contract partner makes highly specific investments to fulfill contractual agreements. An 
example will further clarify the problem: a firm supplies a car making company with plastics 
parts. Supplying firm and car maker decide to cooperate. To be able to produce the car 
maker’s specific parts, the supplying firm invests in a new production facility. Since the 
contracts are incomplete, the car maker can strategically exploit this situation by re-
bargaining the contract at the expense of the supplying firm. But as the supplying firm is 
anticipating the possible exploitation, it will make a lower specific investment than agreed to 
in the contract. This causes a profit setback and additional costs since available resources are 
not used optimally. These costs are called “governance costs” of market use (Erlei et al. 
1999, 183). An economic solution to this “hold-up problem” is the vertical integration 
(merger) of firms, since this can cut the transaction costs resulting from the exploitation. The 
governance-structure approach studies “...when certain transactions are made within a firm 
(make), when they are being made on the market (buy), and when joint solutions (hybrid 
organizational forms) are recommended” (Erlei et al. 1999, 175, my own translation). 
Different governance-structures are associated with different levels of transaction costs. A 
comparative institutional analysis is therefore an important aspect of transaction cost 
theory. A governance-structure should be chosen only in comparison to other solutions 
depending on the transaction at hand.  
Because public hearings can be used to gather information, monitor delegation, or credibly 
commit to keeping a contract, they are one possible institution to economize on transaction 
costs in a political market. Nonetheless, they need to be viewed in the context of other 
available instruments. In parliamentary systems, these can be ex ante selection mechanisms 
and ex post mechanisms of coalition management or interpellation in parliament. The 
empirical analysis of public hearings will therefore have to take alternative control 
mechanisms such as junior minister appointments or shadow committee chairs into account. 
Principal-Agent-Theory 
Delegation can be defined as the endowment of managerial rights by a principal to an agent 
who has the relevant information, time, or abilities. Delegation is not a technical issue in 
political science, but affects us in everyday life, “All of us delegate to banks, medical doctors, 
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lawyers, or car mechanics. We do so because we are not able or willing to perform these 
tasks ourselves” (Müller and Meyer 2010, 1068). Delegation is an elementary aspect of 
politics (StrØm 2000, StrØm et al. 2003, 2006): The chain of delegation begins with voting in 
elections, runs through the parliamentary process, and ends with the implementing 
bureaucracy. What does optimal delegation look like? Which incentives do delegates have to 
meet the demands of the delegators? How can contracts be defined to enforce compliance? 
Questions as these have led to a dearth of studies, all of which can be subsumed under the 
heading of “Principal-Agent-Model” (PAM). Originating from economics, these models have 
consistently gained prominence in political science (Miller 2005).  
Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) initiated a whole new research area that was soon extended 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). They study the case of a car 
insurance company (the principal) that cannot completely control the behavior of the car 
driver (the agent). This leads to contractual risks. An insurance covering all possible risks 
creates incentives for hazardous driving. Without the insurance, the car driver would have 
much less of an incentive to take such risks. Since the insurance firm cannot control this 
adverse behavior, such a complete insurance would create a serious venture.  
By now, there exists a “canonical principal-agent-model” with clearly defined properties 
(Miller 2005, 205f., cf. Sappington 1991, Holmstrom 1979, Shavell 1979):  
 The actions of an agent have a direct effect on the utility of the principal 
 The principal cannot monitor the behavior of the agent 
 Only the result of the agent’s action is observable to the principal 
Although a complete surveillance of the agent would remove the informational asymmetry 
between principal and agent, this would come at a very high cost, such that this form of 
control simply is not feasible for the principal. This is especially cumbersome if the interests 
and goals of principal and agent are not identical. Since a rational principal acts on the basis 
of coherent preferences he will only delegate tasks to an agent as long as the risk for deviant 
behavior is manageable. The PAM therefore models contracts between principal and agent 
under the assumption of asymmetric information (Voigt 2002, 102; Jensen and Meckling 
1976). It also covers the problem of optimal agent selection. In this sense, the PAM is an 
actor-centered extension of the general transaction cost theory introduced earlier on in this 
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chapter. The PAM enables us to study responsibilities in hierarchical relationships, where 
direct control is infeasible because of the associated monitoring costs (Miller and Whitford 
2002, 232).  
The risk of delegation has variously been described as “moral hazard” or “shirking”. The 
agent has hidden information (expertise) that can be exploited. A main goal of principal 
agent theory therefore was to set monetary incentives for the agent to fulfill the contractual 
demands of the principal in the presence of unfeasible monitoring costs (Moe 1984). 
Although such monetary incentives can reduce the informational asymmetries between 
principal and agent by aligning preferences, efficiency losses remain unavoidable under the 
assumption of risk-taking agents and risk-affine principals (Miller and Whitford 2002, 235ff.). 
Nonetheless, there are obvious advantages of delegation: 
Delegation from principals to agents is the key to the division of labor and development of 
specialization; tremendous gains accrue if tasks are delegated to those with the talent, 
training, and inclination to do them. This, when all is said and done, is what allows firms to 
profit, economies to grow, and governments to govern. (Kiewit and McCubbins 1991, 24) 
The delegation of policymaking in multiparty cabinets is, like any other principal-agent-
relationship, associated with the risk of moral hazard, especially since contracts in multiparty 
cabinets (coalition compromises) are less precise than contracts between economic actors. 
Furthermore, cooperation in multiparty coalitions entails policy conflicts across various 
ministerial portfolios. The ambiguity of coalition compromises coupled with individual party 
risk to shirk because of incentives generated by electoral competition can be countered with 
institutions that help to reduce ministerial drift ( Carroll and Cox 2012, Martin and Vanberg 
2011, Müller and Meyer 2010, Thies 2001). Public hearings are such an instrument to 
counter ministerial drift. 
Transaction Cost Theory and Public Hearings 
While (not just) politicians have constrained cognitive capacities available to solve problems, 
political institutions can reduce these individual constraints. Herbert Simon forcefully 
formulated this position: "A higher degree of integration and rationality can, however, be 
achieved, because the environment of choice itself can be chosen and deliberately modified. 
Partly this is an individual matter... To a very large extent, however, it is an organizational 
matter... organization permits the individual to approach reasonably near to objective 
rationality” (Simon 1947, 79f.) Williamson saw those organizations at an advantage, “…that 
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serve to economize on bounded rationality and safeguard transactions against the hazards 
of opportunism…” (Williamson 1996, 57, footnote 3). An effective division of labor within 
organizations furthers this rationalization process. Gary Becker makes an even stronger 
claim, that “division of labor… strongly attenuates if not eliminates any effects caused by 
bounded rationality” (Becker, quoted in Stewart 2005). This division of labor can be seen 
within cabinets (ministries) and within parliaments (committees). Therefore, the costs of a 
transaction (measuring the individual input in a team production), the governance structure 
(how the comparison of institutions constrains individual behavior), and the delegation of 
tasks (contracting between a principal and an agent) have to be accounted for when trying 
to explain public hearings in the German Bundestag. In parliamentary systems, coalition 
partners are members of a team bound together by an incomplete contract which creates 
incentives to free ride on the effort of the coalition partners. The ministers serve as agents 
of the cabinet as a whole.  
Public hearings signal effort of cabinet members (measurement costs) and at the same time 
enable team members to control for credible commitment when contracts are incomplete 
(moral hazard). Public hearings, along with, e.g. the appointment of junior ministers and 
shadow committee chairs, can be understood as institutional solutions to the measurement 
problem of a coalitional team production. Thus, public hearings are one possible institution 
to economize on transaction costs in a political market. Since political transactions take 
place within political institutions, we now extend our discussion and application of 
transaction cost theory to legislative organizations in general.  
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3. Why Use Public 
Hearings?                       
Theories of Legislative Organization 
 
If it holds true that scientific advisors are mere “pawns” or “fig leaves” for legitimizing 
already defined policies (e.g. Hoffman-Riem 1988, Böhret 1981, 306) and involved experts 
have little positive to say about their influence on policymaking (Franz 2000), then both 
experts and politicians involved strike us with a puzzle regarding political advice, “if it is not 
used, why do we produce so much of it” (Shulock 1999)? To understand public hearings in 
the German Bundestag, we need to figure out why they are used in the first place. Drawing 
from theories of legislative organization of the U.S. Congress, I address several reasons why 
public hearings may be a useful instrument: Public hearings reduce informational 
asymmetries and enable members of a committee to better comprehend complex bill 
proposals. Additionally, they signal conflict on a proposal, either between government and 
opposition or within a coalition.  
Why would members of the opposition favor a public hearing? If the opposition wants to 
delay unwanted government bill proposals, it can employ public hearings to slow down 
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policymaking or publically reveal a conflict between coalition partners. Government partners 
favor neither of both. They would rather prefer swift passage of a proposal and keeping 
conflicts between coalition partners in private. Sometimes a minister may introduce a bill 
proposal that deviates from a coalition compromise. In that case, a coalition partner may 
want to call for a public hearing to pull the minister back to the coalition compromise. I will 
dwell on these details about public hearings in much more detail in the upcoming chapters. 
At this point, I focus on the basic motives for calling for a public hearing. The challenges of 
solving problems in parliament and the difficulties in making legislation given demanding 
environments, complex proposals and potential partisan conflicts create a need for division 
of labor, i.e. the delegation of tasks within parliamentary institutions. The work on policy 
proposals in the German Bundestag is delegated to the respective committees. In these 
committees, public hearings are one tool to solve the problems and difficulties of everyday 
policymaking. 
In early 2014, increasing energy consumption costs motivated vice chancellor and minister 
for the economy Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) to propose changes to the renewable energy bill 
(“Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz”) 14 . As a combination of state-funded subsidies for 
renewable energy production, energy taxation, and energy development, the bill proposal to 
reform the “Eneuerbare Energien Gesetz” consists of about 125 pages, with almost 200 
pages of explanatory statements (BT Drs. 18/1304, 2014). After intensive intra-coalitional 
bargaining, cabinet resolved to introduce a bill proposal to parliament in early April of 
201415. Preceding the work in committee was a fierce parliamentary debate about the 
government motives for reforming the bill. Oliver Krischer, deputy whip of the Green party 
in opposition, described the proposal as an “attack on the energy transition”, arguing that it 
was a “bureaucratic monster” with “loopholes” in it for energy-consuming firms. 16 In 
committee, two public hearings were held on the proposal an June 2nd and June 4th 2014 on 
demand of the opposition parties. On these occasions, 27 experts and interest groups where 
heard. Committee chair Bärbel Höhn (The Greens) closed the session with the remark “That 
was really a lot of information…I hope, we can all draw wise consequences out of the many 
                                                          
14 http://www.manager-magazin.de/politik/deutschland/eeg-umlage-gabriel-will-oekostrom-foerderung-
kappen-a-944338.html 
15 http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-04/eeg-oekostrom-reform-einigung 
16 http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-05/eeg-gabriel-erste-lesung 
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facts we have gathered here.”17 Because of the complexity of the proposal, the opposition 
parties introduced a motion for delay to have more time working through the proposal and 
the expert’s recommendations. They demanded additional public hearings after their motion 
for delay had been voted down by the government majority in committee18. The coalition 
parties denied further public hearings with the argument that the oppositional right to call 
for public hearings had been exhausted by the two preceding ones.  
Why did the committee stage a public hearing? Since the coalition partners had bargained 
the proposal for three months, they were unlikely to favor a public hearing. If the 
“loopholes” meant distributing certain political benefits, a public hearing could potentially 
upset the coalitions’ bargaining solution as to “who gets what”, making it even less likely 
that government parties would favor a hearing in public. The vicious comments of the 
opposition suggests that at least the Greens had a pronounced interest in finding flaws in the 
proposal by having experts discuss the bill. Maybe the complexity of the proposal forced the 
committee to gather additional external expertise to reduce the informational asymmetries 
between the minister and committee. I propose that public hearings are a mechanism to 
solve these kind of problems. Partisan Conflicts, Informational asymmetries, and 
distributional issues have been developed as an explanation of the legislative organization of 
the U.S. Congress. Therefore it is useful to look at the literature on the legislative 
organization of U.S. Congress, from where hearings as an instrument were initially imported 
to the German Bundestag (Schüttemeyer 1998, 246).  
Leyden (1995) uses participation in a hearing as a measure for an interest group’s success in 
attaining access to legislators, in line with the distributional theory of legislative 
organization. The distributive theory (Shepsle 1979, Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast 
and Marshall 1988) suggests that committees exist to help politicians exchanging votes for 
“gains from trade”. Public hearings in the German Bundestag could be motivated by 
distributional goals of parties in committee. Hearings do not increase the likelihood that a 
bill will be passed during a Congress (Brasher 2006), but they are an indicator that legislation 
is being given serious consideration (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997, p. 142), echoing the 
arguments of partisan theory of legislative organization (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1992; Cox 
and McCubbins 1993, 2004). The partisan theory of legislative organization views 
                                                          
17 http://bundestag.de/blob/284392/483c2f949982fe63361d30f58b5efe29/16--protokoll-data.pdf 
18 http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/018/1801891.pdf 
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committees as an extended arm of political parties. Members of a committee benefit from 
the majority status of a political party, as it supports their own chances of reelection. 
Similarly, public hearings could be related to partisan conflicts in committees. Lastly, Epstein 
and O’Halloran (1999) consider public hearings as proxy for the complexity of a policy 
proposal, which resembles the informational theory of legislative organization. The 
informational literature on legislative organization explains the composition of committees 
by the expertise of its members (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Krehbiel 1990, 1991). Extending 
the argument to public hearings, members of a committee increase their expertise on 
difficult and large policy proposals by listening to experts and interest groups in public 
hearings. Public hearings have been heavily criticized as “window dressing” (Berry 1989) or 
“political theater” (Davidson and Oleszek 2004, p. 214). Cole and Caputo (1984) find no 
evidence that public hearings influence citizen behavior or policy choices. Overall then, there 
is little straightforward empirical evidence that public hearings serve a clear function or have 
any significant effect on policymaking. The paradox remains, “if it is not used, why do we 
produce so much of it?” (Shulock 1999). As indicated, the literature on U.S. Congress offers 
three distinct patterns for explaining public hearings. All three patterns can be related to 
public hearings as an instrument to reduce transaction costs in a principal-agent-
relationship. 
The Informational Perspective 
Lawmaking is a demanding task. Societal changes force politics to deal with incomplete 
information (Klemmer 2002, 21). Whether complex policy proposals or a complex society to 
be regulated – members of parliament differ in their willingness to take all consequences of 
a policy proposal into account. This complexity leads to scarce information processing 
capacities and assumes a constant flow of information in the political process. Parliamentary 
lawmaking has to take transaction costs into account, the cost of information gathering 
(where do I get expertise from? Who can tell me something about the proposal?), - 
processing (How do I reduce the available information to manageable chunks?), and –
interpretation (What do these numbers mean exactly?). Delegating the complexity of 
lawmaking to committees and their members leads to a more efficient division of labor 
through the aggregation of expertise in committees. But this creates the risk of “shirking”, as 
members of a committee can exploit their informational advantage by sending false 
information to the floor (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Kreps and Wilson 1982, Calvert 1985).  
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Informational models of parliamentary committees incorporate this informational 
asymmetry. At the core of these models is the relationship between a sender (e.g. a 
committee as information gatherer) and a receiver (e.g. the floor) (Krehbiel 1991; Austen-
Smith 1990; Austen-Smith 1993; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Austen-Smith and Riker 1987). 
Communication between a committee and a floor enables politicians to leverage otherwise 
missing information and connect known policies to unknown consequences. Take for 
example the German social welfare program (“Hartz IV”). Following a decision by the federal 
constitutional court the social welfare payment scheme needed a new basis for calculating 
individual payments. 19 A public hearing on the proposal introducing such a new calculation 
scheme revealed an unknown consequence of the bill: Unexpected to then minister of labor 
Ursula von der Leyen, the government proposal would have had perverse consequences, 
since the new calculation scheme would have reduced the individual payments for children 
instead of increasing them. 20 
Optimal transmission of information is only possible with similar preferences of a committee 
and the floor (Crawford and Sobel 1982). To generate the best advice, political actors should 
therefore nominate only those committee members whose preferences are identical to their 
own (“preference convergence”, Letterie and Swank 1997; Calvert 1985). Since the members 
of a committee in a German Bundestag are distributed according to the seat shares, the 
majority on the floor always has the majority in a committee. The political parties therefore 
select those members of parliament to a committee they can expect to uphold coalition 
preferences. This means: Whatever the committee learns is optimally communicated to the 
floor. In the context of the U.S. Congress the informational advantages of this division of 
labor carry with them another problem: a committee and the preferences of the median 
floor member can diverge. This complicates the use of committee expertise on the floor 
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 17), because the floor can interpret a strong signal (e.g. 
substiantial changes to a proposal) as an attempt of the committee to achieve individual 
policy goals. 
                                                          
19 http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/neuregelung-von-hartz-iv-das-soll-sich-kuenftig-aendern-
1605484.html; 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2013/1212/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a11/anhoerungen/2010/41_Sit
zung/Protokoll_41__Sitzung.pdf 
20 http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/neuregelung-der-hartz-iv-saetze-essen-fuer-euro-pro-tag-1.1060159 
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As we have seen in the introduction, the standing orders of many parliaments in Western 
European countries see public hearings distinctively as an instrument to gather information. 
The possibility of a committee to hold a public hearing creates an incentive for committees 
to specialize and reveal information simply by the decision to hold hearings (Diermeier and 
Feddersen 2000, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990, p. 541). Committees in western European 
parliaments are therefore predominantly associated with information acquisition and 
transmission (Mattson and StrØm 1995, Mattson and StrØm 2004). Talbert, Jones, and 
Baumgartner (1995) show that by holding hearings on a particular issue, committee leaders 
try to establish expertise in that policy area to have future legislation referred to them. They 
also argue that committee members are well informed already before the hearing and that 
experts are strategically selected to “stack the hearing in their favor”. This is well in line with 
a common result in cheap talk games: communication between advisors and policy makers 
usually improves when their preferences are consonant (Crawford and Sobel 1982, Calvert 
1985). Dur and Swank(2005) show that policy makers appoint advisers with less extreme 
preferences than their own, but they also face a tradeoff between acquiring information and 
providing information (Letterie and Swank 1997): To acquire information, policy makers in 
committees are well advised to select experts close to their own ideal position. But to signal 
information to the floor, policy makers are better off in choosing an advisor whose 
preferences are more in line with the preferences of the floor.  
Lupia and McCubbins(1994) offer an explanation based on the payment of observable 
opportunity costs: “…drafting legislative proposals, holding hearings and investigations, 
writing reports…all require the expenditure of valuable resources…these institutions enable 
legislative learning”(369, my own emphasis). From this point of view, public hearings 
produce scientific expertise to be used in a policy proposal. The expertise provided by 
experts in public hearings enables members of parliament to learn something about the 
policy proposal. This is the parliamentary perspective, i.e. it emphasizes the overall need for 
information about policy proposals and their possible outcomes. In this sense, public 
hearings are less of a strategic instrument within multiparty cabinets than a mechanism for 
the whole legislative body to gather information. In the empirical analysis, the occurrence of 
public hearings should thus be systematically related to the complexity of a proposal 
independent of policy conflicts within government or between government and opposition. 
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The Partisan Perspective 
The U.S. literature on parliamentary committees has made great strides focusing on their 
members and on committee organization in general. In contrast, the focus of parliamentary 
research in Western European systems has been more on political parties. Political parties 
are an important part of the democratic chain of delegation between voters and 
parliamentary governments (Müller 2000), but have only rarely been addressed in the 
context of the U.S. Congress, “Most scholars who make overall assessments of the role of 
congressional parties argue that the American political structure prevents parties from 
determining legislative outcomes[...]the classic view of parties in government suggests that 
parties are incapable of controlling the congressional decision-making process”(Meltzman 
1997, 23, c.f. Dodd and Oppenheimer 1977). One prominent exception is the work of Kiewiet 
and McCubbins (1991, KMC) and Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2004, CMC). Both KMC and CMC 
position their analytical model vis-à-vis the parsimonious informational and distributive 
models of committees. In their approach, committees are the extended arm of political 
parties. They neither serve the floor as a whole (as in the informational model) nor extra 
parliamentary interest groups (as in the distributive model). Instead, it is the political parties 
controlling the legislative agenda. A party or a coalition of parties holding the majority in 
parliament can keep divisive issues off the agenda (ex ante veto, CMC 1993, 2004). At the 
same time, a party can push preferred policies onto the agenda (c.f. Rohde 1991, Aldrich 
1995, Aldrich and Rohde 1997-1998, 2000a, b). The simple assumption underlining the 
partisan model is: Members of a committee are first and foremost interested in reelection. 
This reelection becomes more likely with the majority status of one’s own party. The 
majority status of one’s own party depends on the list of successfully passed policy 
proposals beneficial to the electorate (cf. Woon 2012). Members of a committee interested 
in reelection will therefore act in accordance with their party. Extending this argument a 
multiparty parliamentary system is straightforward: members of a committee are neither 
agent of the floor as a whole, nor of extra parliamentary interest groups, but of their own 
parties. Parties strategically employ instruments of scrutiny, e.g. public hearings in a 
committee to monitor and control government parties. This will support their chances of 
reelection21.   
                                                          
21 Essentially, public hearings as an information revealing technology in the committees of the German 
Bundestag enable government partners to effectively monitor each other’s policy proposals and detect 
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Since parties in government and parties in opposition have different strategic objectives 
(staying in government vs. getting into government), we should expect different motivations 
for using public hearings for government parties vs. opposition parties. Parties in opposition 
may want to reveal intra-coalitional conflicts, blame a coalition for failing to fulfill electoral 
promises, mark a minister as incompetent etc. A minister may want to signal commitment to 
an electoral promise by tying his hands to the experts’ evaluation of her proposal. A coalition 
partner may want to keep his partner in check if pre-committee measurements of 
monitoring and control (e.g. junior ministers, coalition committee) have been unsuccessful. 
Independent of the specific motivation, the occurrence of public hearing should vary with 
conflict in government and conflict between government and opposition. If there is nothing 
to fight over, there is no reason for going public in the first place. 
The Distributional Perspective 
With the establishment of neo-institutionalism as an independent research paradigm within 
political science, the institutional solution of Shepsle (1979) to the preference cycles 
inherent in multidimensional politics (Schofield 1978, McKelvey 1976) received widespread 
discussion. Sheplse developed the concept of “structure induced equilibrium” with regards 
to the division of labor in committees of the U.S. Congress. Specialization of committees 
breaks an otherwise unstable multidimensional voting space into manageable one-
dimensional policy dimensions. This structure supports equilibriums even with widely 
diverging preferences. So called “germaneness” rules prevent amendments that could open 
up another dimension of conflict. Shepsle and Weingast (1981, 1987) and Laver and Shepsle 
(1996) extend this argument even further by assigning committees or, in the latter case, 
ministers within a government cabinet a policy monopoly on each respective dimension. This 
assumption of “policy dictatorship” has raised criticism among more empirically oriented 
scholars in comparative politics (e.g. Dunleavy and Bastow 2001; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 
2005; Thies 2001; see also Tsebelis 2002: 106-109)22.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
deviations from coalition compromise after the cabinet stage. Available technologies at the cabinet stage 
should lead to fewer public hearings. Public hearings also allow opposition parties to delay policymaking. I will 
return to this narrative in chapter 4. 
22 In Germany only very few initiatives are referred exclusively to one committee (Mattson and StrØm 2004). 
Instead, most initiatives are referred to a leading committee (“federführender Ausschuss”) and several 
committees that are related to the initiative. Nonetheless, it is the leading committee that has to primarily bear 
out the workload associated with a proposal. 
 
37 Why Use Public Hearings?                       Theories of Legislative Organization 
Weingast and Marshall (1988) argue that the committee system in U.S. Congress “provides 
substantial protection against opportunistic behavior, thereby providing durability to policy 
bargains” (p. 144). The exchange of votes creates stability of political bargains in 
committees, as members of committee take the salience of different issues into account. 
The prime target group of committee work are therefore interest groups that could further 
the reelection chances of its members. The principal of a committee is therefore neither the 
floor nor a political party, but rather interest groups outside of parliament.  
Two theories explaining interest group influence have been intensively discussed. The theory 
of interest group pluralism supports the influence of interest groups on politics in general 
(Bentley 1908, Truman 1951, Dahl 1967), as politics are the result of bargaining between 
diverging interests. Institutional Economics has introduced the term “political market place” 
on which committees act as an auctioneer for political rents (cf. “rent-seeking behavior”, 
Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980, Stigler 1971, Becker 1983). The beneficiaries of 
committee work are interest groups. From this perspective, parliamentary committees 
further reelection chances of their members by coordinating the redistribution of political 
rents to interest groups: If representative A votes for a proposal that is in favor of interest 
groups that support representative B and representative B votes in favor of a proposal that 
is beneficial to interest groups supporting representative A, then both representatives 
increase their reelection chances. This individual rent-seeking behavior is reasonable for the 
U.S. system with single-member-districts, but it implies certain restrictive assumptions about 
committee behavior: “…members of each committee determine policy within their 
jurisdiction, irrespective of the policy preferences of the parent chamber and of parties” 
(Mattson and StrØm 1995, 255). It is less reasonable in the German Bundestag. Here, policy 
proposals (which are mostly initiated by the governing cabinet) are delegated to more than 
one committee for consideration for the majority of bills.  
The parties in government play the dominant role in formulating the cabinet proposal 
(Martin and Vanberg 2005, 2011), not individual committee members. Government bill 
proposals are introduced to (re)distribute political goods. Such a (re)distribution scheme is 
bargained in cabinet before a proposal is introduced to parliament. Consequently, 
Government parties run risk of being exposed to public scrutiny for the distribution of public 
goods in public hearings by communicating distributional signals to interest groups that 
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could be affected by policy proposals. In other words, an expert could point out that relevant 
parts of the electorate do not get a decent “piece of the cake” and interest groups might 
sound an alarm if they feel disadvantaged. Instead of supporting a proposal, experts and 
interest groups may want to change the redistribution scheme and therefore upset the 
coalition compromise. The signals of experts/ interest groups in public hearings therefore 
potentially increase the dimensionality of policy space. This comes very unhandy to the 
governing parties. Levy and Razin (2007) analytically derive that communication between 
actors may collapse because of fixed preferences and considerable levels of conflict in policy 
spaces with more than one dimension. Their results imply that “linking decisions in a 
multidimensional game may reduce the level of communication”. Thus, the bargaining 
solution of coalition partners in committees can be upset by a public hearing because of the 
many signals by experts and interest groups. Essentially, cabinet proposals with financial 
implications attached should therefore receive less scrutiny in public hearings with increasing 
intra-coalitional conflict. With increasing conflict between opposition and government, the 
opposition may deliberately want to upset existing redistribution schemes of a proposal and 
therefore call for a public hearing. 
Theories of Legislative Organization and Public Hearings 
What are the reasons for holding a public hearing in a committee? I have sketched out three 
different aspects of legislative organization, the informational approach, the distributional 
approach and the partisan approach, all of which propose complementing answers.  
From the informational point of view, the expertise provided by experts in public hearings 
enables members of parliament to learn something about the policy proposal. The driving 
motivation for calling for a public hearing then would be to gather information to 
comprehend the complexity of a bill proposal for the legislative body as a whole. This 
approach comes closest to a model of “enlightened decision-making”.  
H1 (informational hypothesis) 
The complexity of a bill proposal is related to the occurrence of public hearings. The more 
complex a proposal is the more likely are public hearings to occur. 
The partisan model supports the claim that public hearings primarily serve to advance 
reelection chances of party members. In a public hearing, coalition parties monitor their 
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partners and opposition parties monitor the government parties because of partisan 
conflicts, as this will support their chances of reelection. The partisan perspective of 
legislative organization is closely related to the promises and pitfalls of coalition government 
in parliamentary systems. To this we will turn in the subsequent chapter. 
Opposition parties can blame the coalition partners for failing to comprehend the full 
consequences of a proposal, i.e. they can signal incompetence of the government to the 
electorate. We need to take into account that “…apart from anything else, failure “looks 
bad” in front of the electorate” (Manow and Burkhart 2007, 169). With a public hearing and 
medium to high levels of conflict within a coalition, ministers responsible for a proposal run 
risk of being observed as incompetent or unfaithful, since “One can imagine that there are 
fears that open disagreements among committee members from coalition partners may 
damage the coalition more generally, and it is better that the public and the press do not 
follow the discussions directly“(Hallerberg 2004, 29). Essentially, “looking bad” in front of 
the electorate and fears of “open disagreements” damaging the coalition can be subsumed 
under the concept of “audience costs”.  
Public hearings can create audience costs. This is why conflict within coalitions should 
actually reduce the likelihood for public hearings for medium to high level disputes.23 On the 
other hand, Opposition parties will like to create publicity. This holds true especially for 
proposals that create policy conflict between government and opposition. I will explicate 
the theoretical rationale in the chapters on coalition governance and audience costs.  
H2.1 (partisan hypothesis: government) 
If governing parties are divided on an issue, government bill proposals are less likely to be 
scrutinized in a public hearing. 
H2.2 (partisan hypothesis: opposition) 
If government and opposition parties are divided on an issue, government bill proposals are 
more likely to be scrutinized in a public hearing. 
                                                          
23 Coalition conflicts could also increase the likelihood of public hearings being called by the opposition parties. 
By blaming the government of being incoherent, this would raise the audience costs for the coalition parties. 
Unfortunately, we currently have no data available on who specifically introduced the motion for a public 
hearing in a committee of the German Bundestag. Since such a relationship might actually lower the effects of 
coalition conflict on public hearings, it is certainly worthwhile investigating in the future.  
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Finally, from the distributional perspective, parliamentary committees further reelection 
chances of their members by coordinating the redistribution of political rents to interest 
groups (see above). There are several expectations following from this: As parties in a 
coalition want to break out of policy cycles, they bargain within committees and make 
compromises. Policy proposals with financial implications enable members of committees 
to bargain over “who gets what, when and how”. In this sense, public hearings are not a 
useful instrument, since they could complicate the bargaining as experts and interest group 
signals may create a new multidimensional conflict space. This makes public hearings less 
likely in the presence of financial implications and coalitional policy conflict but more likely if 
the opposition parties disagree with the cabinet proposal. 
H3.1 (distributional hypothesis: government) 
If governing parties are divided on an issue, government bill proposals with financial 
implications are less likely to be scrutinized in a public hearing. 
H3.2 (distributional hypothesis: opposition) 
If government and opposition parties are divided on an issue, government bill proposals with 
financial implications are more likely to be scrutinized in a public hearing. 
Empirical Analysis: Public Hearings and Legislative Organization 
Why are public hearings used in the committees of the German Bundestag? I suggest that 
public hearings are one of many instruments available both to government and opposition 
parties to reduce transaction costs associated with lawmaking: 
- Public hearings reduce informational asymmetries and help tackling the complexity 
of a proposal 
- They signal conflict on a proposal, either between government and opposition or 
within a coalition 
- Public hearings signal flaws in redistribution schemes of a proposal 
The object of interest is a (government) bill proposal, since the central dependent variable 
will be the occurrence of a public hearing on a specific bill proposal.  
To illuminate the proposed relationships we need a dataset covering all the quantities of 
interest, i.e. the dataset should include the occurrence of public hearings, measures of 
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complexity, financial implications and measures of partisan conflicts (both governmental and 
oppositional). In order to reduce the possibility of coding errors and other factors that could 
influence the results, the empirical analyses of this thesis are all based on one existing 
dataset and complemented by additional central variables. I apply the Martin and Vanberg 
(2005, henceforth MV) dataset, which is a good starting point for several reasons: 
- The MV dataset includes most of the necessary independent variables needed for 
studying the hypotheses: measures for conflict within government and between 
government and opposition and proposal complexity. Measures for the occurrence of 
public hearings and financial implications are taken from the protocols of the 
committee sessions. 
- MV code these central variables according to established procedures in the scientific 
field of legislative research.  
- MV focus on governmental policy proposals. This is especially beneficial to explaining 
public hearings as instruments of legislative governance and oppositional delay, 
since they represent the majority of proposals in parliament in absolute numbers.  
- MV (2004, 2005) selected those proposals that fit into one of the following 
categories: spending vs. taxes, social, decentralization, environment, urban-rural 
relations, public ownership, USSR relations, clericalism. Recall that the committees 
for science and education, environment, labor and social affairs, justice, finance, and 
health make up 75% of all public hearings of the German Bundestag. The proposals in 
the dataset are therefore a good sample for generalizing statements about public 
hearings in the German Bundestag. 
- The dataset includes governmental proposals across three legislative sessions (10-
12) of the German Bundestag. In chapter 2 we saw a substantial increase in the 
number of committee sessions with public hearings as well as the number of 
proposals considered in public hearings from period 10 onward.  
- For every one of the 147 policy proposals included for Germany it was possible to 
identify whether a public hearing was held or not.  
- Using this established dataset eases the comparability of results between the 
original analysis and the extension I propose here, especially since different results 
cannot be explained by different measurement of variables, different data or 
different statistical models. 
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The Martin and Vanberg (2005) Dataset and Variables 
As observation of interest, I use MV’s (2004, 2005) dataset covering government bill 
proposals with budgetary adjustment bills, budget bills, and bills proposing amendments to 
the constitution being excluded. According to Martin and Vanberg, the excluded proposals 
are associated with different rules of procedure. Additionally, budget bills are “normally 
omnibus proposals that do not fall neatly along a single issue-dimension”(Martin and 
Vanberg 2004, 19). Of the remaining bill proposals, they exclude all initiatives that could not 
be classified into one of the eight policy areas of the Laver and Hunt study (Martin and 
Vanberg 2004, 19; Martin and Vanberg 2005, 98), i.e. spending vs. taxes, social, 
decentralization, environment, urban-rural relations, public ownership, USSR relations, 
clericalism. Thus, the dataset also excludes bill proposals dealing with issues of law and 
order, immigration, and the European Union.   
Public hearings in committees dealing with these issues (i.e. the committee on foreign affairs 
and the committee of interior affairs) make up less than 15% of all public hearings in the 
Bundestag from 1949-2009 (see chapter 2). I therefore agree with Martin and Vanberg, that 
“by excluding bills that deal with these issues, we are presumably excluding only nonsalient 
and noncontroversial legislation; that is, we are selecting on the salience and divisions 
variables” (MV 2004, 19, footnote 20). They conclude that this may reduce the efficiency of 
the model (correctly identifying observations) but it should not lead to substantial bias. In 
total, the dataset covers 147 government bill proposals from legislative sessions 10-12.24  
As indicated above, the policy proposals from the German Bundestag included in the dataset 
span three legislative periods (10-12). This allows Martin and Vanberg to use Laver and 
Hunt’s (1992) expert survey on party policy positions and saliency weights. From this, they 
                                                          
24 The GESTA dataset on bill proposals in the German Bundestag (sessions 10-16) identifies 856 government bill 
proposals. After excluding proposals on foreign affairs issues, matters of the European Union, law and order, 
immigration, constitutional changes, and budget a total of 313 proposals remain of which 147 have been 
considered in the MV dataset. The difference in cases counted is due to the conservative classification scheme 
Martin and Vanberg applied. They selected only bills from the full set that dealt with five sorts of issues: tax 
and welfare services, industrie and markets, environment, morality/ social issues, and decentralization. Each 
bill summary was read and the bill was either fit into one of these categories or excluded from the dataset 
because it did not undoubtedly belong to one of these five categories (personal communication with Lanny 
Martin, 30.07.2014). 
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construct measures of policy conflict both for government and for opposition parties that 
include policy positions and saliencies attached to different dimensions of conflict. 
I follow Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) central claim that “as the coalition becomes more 
divided on policy, coalition partners are more likely to make use of the legislative process to 
‘correct’ government bills” (100). To evaluate this claim, I make use of an independent 
variable which they term government issue divisiveness (wdivsal). Since this measure is one 
of the essential variables for my own analysis of public hearings, I review their coding 
procedure in more detail. The motivation for this procedure is to account for party specific 
position-taking incentives by including the degree to which parties care about the issues 
tackled in a bill proposal. The construction follows several steps: 
1. Use the Laver and Hunt expert survey to calculate absolute policy distance between 
the party controlling the ministry and the coalition partner. 
2. Weight the distance between minister and a party by the proportion of legislative 
seats controlled by the party to accommodate for the availability of legislative 
resources by larger parties.25 
3. Reweight the distance measure by a measure of relative saliency attached to the 
issues of the bill by the coalition parties. This weight is calculated by first scaling the 
saliency scores to an average saliency26 for any government party of one and then 
calculating coalition-specific saliency scores on each issue.27 
Public hearings create audience costs: We expect a steady increase in the likelihood for 
public hearings if government coalitions and opposition parties are increasingly divided over 
policy issues, as the opposition can benefit from making government parties “look bad” in 
front of the electorate. In contrast, because of the audience costs we expect that for 
                                                          
25 MV (2004) introduce the weighting by legislative seats because this approach captures “…the possibility that 
larger parties may be in a better position to exercise oversight” (21). Most importantly, MV (2004) report that 
“the results… are robust to using the unweighted ideological distance scores” (21, footnote 24). 
26 An average saliency score for a coalition is calculated by weighting the party-specific saliency score by the 
proportion of levislative seats controlled by that party and then averaging across all members of a coalition 
(MV 2004, 20). In essence, large parties will generate higher average saliency scores than small parties, i.e. 
even if a proposal is highly salient to a small party the effect on the average saliency score will be less 
pronounced because of the weighting. 
27 According to Martin and Vanberg (2005), this “government saliency measure has the property that a score 
greater than one indicates a relatively more salient issue for the coalition, while a scaled score less than one 
indicates a relatively less salient issue” (100).  
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medium to high levels of government issue divisiveness we should see a decrease in the 
likelihood for a public hearing. In general, government parties have no incentive for washing 
their dirty laundry in public. To draw a complete picture both opposition and government 
measures of divisiveness have to be included in the analysis. If the opposition parties 
influence policymaking, this control should have an effect on the likelihood for public 
hearings. This will be especially relevant for bills that greatly divide opposition parties from 
the party of the minister proposing the bill.  
Additionally, I account for the existence of a junior minister from a partner party (jmpartner) 
within the ministry proposing the specific bill. Including junior ministers as control variable is 
reasonable as “it is likely that changes in proposals are also made at an earlier stage, such as 
in meetings of the cabinet or of the relevant cabinet committees, or in the originating 
government department at the earliest drafting stages” (Martin and Vanberg 2005, 100; cf. 
Thies 2001 and several contributors in Müller and StrØm 2000).  
Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Approach Observation Details 
Dependent 
Variable 
Public Hearing 
 
Dummy Variable (source: committee reports) 
Informational Complexity of a Bill Logged number of articles (source: logno_articles in 
MV 2005 Dataset) 
Partisan Conflict in Government Government Issue Divisiveness (source: wdivsal in 
MV 2005 Dataset) 
Partisan Conflict btw. Government 
and Opposition 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness (source woppdivsal in 
MV 2005 Dataset) 
Distributional Financial Implications Dummy Variable (source: bill proposal) 
Distributional Interaction term Interaction of conflict in government & financial 
implications 
Table 3.1 Variables included in the Analysis 
For the analysis at hand I assemble the dependent variable occurrence of a public hearing 
on a specific bill proposal, which is not accounted for in the MV 2005 dataset. I match the 
bill identifier with the archival codes of the German Bundestag database. For every bill 
proposal there exists a committee report and decision recommendation (“Bericht und 
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Beschlussempfehlung”). These reports include detailed information on debate, bargaining 
and changes on a proposal, e.g. the occurrence of a public hearing and the list of experts/ 
interest groups that were heard. For all of the 147 observations in the MV dataset covering 
the German Bundestag I examined the occurrence of a public hearing by reviewing the 
reports. For 144 of the 147 observations such a report could be retrieved. My main 
dependent variable is coded as 1 if there was a public hearing28. Reviewing a government bill 
in committee is a time-consuming endeavor, especially if bills are large and complex. To take 
account of the complexity of a bill, I account for the logged number of articles in a draft bill 
(logno_articles). Since it is easier to rewrite already existing articles, MV (2005) expect a 
positive relationship between the number of articles in a proposal and the number of article 
changes resulting from committee scrutiny (ibid. 101).29 With the extended MV Dataset, 
empirically analyzing the occurrence of public hearings becomes straightforward as there is a 
variable available for every theory of legislative organization (see table 3.1).  
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of a Public Hearing 
Hearing Freq. Percent 
0 65 44,22 
1 79 53,74 
N.A. 3 2,04 
Total 147 100 
Independent Variables 
 Mean SD Min/Max N.A. 
Government Issue Divisiveness .743344 .7953875 .1099922/ 3.152295 0 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness 6.736104 1.401137 1.638409/ 10.57253 0 
Number of Articles in Draft Bill (Logged) 1.925304 .7686255 .6931472/ 4.343805 0 
Financial Implications .6959459 .4615676 0/ 1 0 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics on Public Hearings 
                                                          
28 None of the hearings I retrieved from the reports were nonpublic, therefore a 0 indicates that there was no 
hearing at all and not that there was no public hearing. The relevant committee reports are available from the 
author on request. 
29 Martin and Vanberg also include as control variable the number of committees to which a bill is referred. As 
there are no theoretical expectations regarding the number of committees and the occurrence of public 
hearings, I exclude it from the empirical analysis presented here, but see Appendix 2.A for additional 
regression results.  
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Statistical Model for the Occurrence of Public Hearings 
Since the dependent variable “public hearing” is coded as a binary integer (0, 1), I apply a 
binary logistic regression analysis (Aldrich and Nelson 1984, Long 1997, Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2013). While ordinary least squares regression results in coefficients that predict 
the change in the dependent variable for a one unit change in the independent variable, 
logistic regression estimates the probability of an event occurring. We are interested in the 
probability of a public hearing occurring (1) rather than not occurring (0). We can define 
𝑦𝑖 = 1 if the i-th bill receives a public hearing and 0 if otherwise, with 𝑦𝑖 as the realization of 
a random variable 𝑌𝑖 that can take the values of one and zero with probabilities 𝜋𝑖  and 1 −
𝜋𝑖. This distribution is called a Bernoulli distribution and can be written as 
𝑃𝑟{𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖} = 𝜋𝑖
𝑦𝑖(1 − 𝜋𝑖)
1−𝑦𝑖 
for 𝑦𝑖 = 0,1. In a logistic regression the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables is not linear. A simple solution is to transform the probability and model the 
transformation as a linear function of the covariates. This link function in logistic regression 
takes the natural logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable and can be written as  
𝜂𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋𝑖) = log
𝜋𝑖
1 − 𝜋𝑖
 
The logit of the underlying probability 𝜋𝑖  is a linear function of the predictors 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋𝑖) =
𝑥𝑖
′𝛽, where 𝑥𝑖  is a vector of covariates and 𝛽 is a vector of regression coefficients.  
Results and Interpretation of Coefficients 
Table 3.3 summarizes the regression results. Since public hearings require a substantial 
amount of time for preparation, execution and post-processing, parties will be interested in 
calling for a public hearing only for those bill proposals which are of high interest to them. 
The informational approach suggests that public hearings are used to provide additional 
information to reduce the complexity of a bill proposal. With increasing complexity, the 
information that experts and interest group representatives signal in public hearings 
becomes more important. Hypothesis H1 (informational approach) is supported by the 
regression results: The independent variable complexity (logged number of articles) is 
strongly significant, indicating that increasing complexity of a bill proposal increases the odds 
for a public hearing.  
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Independent Variable Model I Model II 
(Intercept)  -3.2395*** 
(1.1431) 
-5.7780*** 
(2.0804) 
Government Issue Divisiveness   -.6417** 
(.2584) 
.32577 
(.5263) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness  .4061** 
(.1633) 
.7194** 
(.3149) 
Financial Implications  -.6989+ 
(.4323) 
2.6599 
(2.4079) 
Logged Number of Articles .8778*** 
(.2773) 
.8009*** 
(.2880) 
Government Issue Divisiveness x 
Financial Implications  
 -1.6419** 
(.6797) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness x 
Financial Implications 
 -.3452 
(.3745) 
N 143 143 
Log likelihood -88.674451 -82.952625 
Chi 2 (p<0.001) (4)= 19.71 (6)= 31.15 
AIC 187.3489 179.9052 
BIC 202.1631 200.6452 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Table 3.3 Logit Analysis of Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Public Hearings in the German Bundestag 
 
The partisan approach assumes that partisan conflicts between government partners or 
governing partners and the opposition parties influence the occurrence of public hearings. 
Theoretically, intra-coalitional conflict should reduce the occurrence of public hearings, 
while increasing conflict between opposition and government should increase the odds for a 
public hearing. The partisan hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2 both find support in model I:  
Government issue divisiveness is negatively correlated to the occurrence of of a public 
hearing, indicating that increasing levels of partisan conflict in a coalition reduce the 
likelihood for a public hearing. As expected, increasing levels of partisan conflict between 
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the opposition and the governing parties increase the odds for the occurrence of a public 
hearing.  
Lastly, the distributional approach suggests that bill proposals with financial implications are 
likely to be excluded from public hearings. The more divided government partners are on 
bills with financial implications, the less likely should public hearings be. On the other hand, 
opposition parties have an interest in upsetting the distributional schemes that governing 
parties have bargained if they disagree with the content of a bill proposal. I account for 
these two differing hypotheses of the distributional approach by including interaction terms 
of government issue divisiveness/ opposition issue divisiveness and financial implications 
attached to a bill in model II. The regression results are suggestive: With increasing 
divisiveness between coalition parties, bills with financial implications are less likely to 
occur in public hearings. Additionally, the independent variable “government issue 
divisiveness” loses its significance when controlling for the interaction term. This indicates 
that both partisan and distributional arguments motivate governing partners to reject public 
hearings. Against expectations, increasing conflict between government and opposition 
does not lead to more public hearings on bills with financial implications. Financial 
implications seem to matter primarily to coalition partners, much less to the opposition 
parties. 
The first message we can draw from the analysis is that increasing levels of conflict between 
coalition partners have an impact on the occurrence of public hearings if proposals include 
financial implications. This supports both the distributional explanation and the partisan 
explanation. Ideological divisions between government and opposition do have a 
pronounced effect30. The partisan explanation for the occurrence of public hearings holds at 
least with regard to oppositional conflict with a government coalition. Calculating the change 
in odds from the 25th to the 75th percentile of opposition issue divisiveness while holding all 
other variables at a fixed value, we see a 163% increase in the odds for a public hearing31. 
We find a large and significant impact of bill complexity on the likelihood of public hearings. 
The informational explanation therefore does have an empirical grounding, with an increase 
of 129% in the odds for a public hearing when switching from the 25th to the 75th percentile 
                                                          
30 Thankfully, postestimation procedures identify only five cases which falsely predict a public hearing. The 
model is therefore suited well to explain the hypotheses. 
31 Technically the change in odds is calculated as 
eβ0+β1(woppdivsal 75th percentile)
eβ0+β1(woppdivsal 25th percentile)
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of bill complexity. While financial implications of a proposal do not significantly influence the 
likelihood for public hearing per se, we find statistical support for a negative effect of the 
interaction term of government issue divisiveness and financial implications. Public hearings 
are almost 82% less likely to be held on proposals with financial implications than on those 
without32. That is, proposals that have financial implications are less likely to be scrutinized 
in public hearings the more divided government partners are over an issue. This is well in 
line with the distributional explanation that I have proposed previously. In short, the 
established results imply that public hearings help members of parliament to learn 
something about the policy proposal, they are less likely in the presence of financial 
implications and intra-coalitional conflict since this could complicate bargaining in a 
coalition, and they enable opposition parties to monitor government coalitions33.  
Predictive Marginal Effects for the Occurrence of Public Hearings 
Until recently, scholars would generally suffice in presenting large regression tables with 
significant coefficients as “proof” that proposed hypotheses hold true. But this could be 
misleading, especially for a nonlinear statistical model. And the above discussion of “odds 
ratios” that usually follows a logit analysis is unintuitive. Due to the nonlinearity of the logit 
model, the estimated effect of an independent variable depends on values of all the 
independent variables in the model (Greene 2003: 675), i.e. the interpretation of the 
coefficients is not as straightforward as in a standard OLS regression. Instead, the 
relationship between the change in the value of an independent variable and a change in the 
likelihood of a positive outcome in a logit regression depends on the independent variable, 
the starting value of the independent variable and the values of all other independent 
variables accounted for in the regression model (Long and Freese 2006, 171). For a more 
                                                          
32 With the interaction term of wdivsal* budget_signal, we can calculate the odds ratios (financial implications 
over no financial implications) as the exponentiated coefficient for the interaction term, eβ(wdivsal∗budgetsignal)= 
.1774. This means that proposals with financial implications are almost 82% less likely to be considered in a 
public hearing with increasing cabinet conflict compared to bills without financial implications. 
33 The number of committee referrals obviously increases the likelihood for a public hearing, since a public 
hearing can occur in more than one committee on that specific proposal. I have excluded this control since the 
complexity of a bill is correlated with the number of committee referrals (0.53). A count regression on 
committee referrals indicates that complexity is the only significant independent variable, i.e. the more 
complex a bill is the more likely it will be referred to more than one committee. Including the number of 
committee referrals would therefore only mask the explanatory power of the variable “complexity of a bill”. I 
also exclude committee size (i.e. more members of a committee could potentially scrutinize a bill better even 
without hearings, thus making hearings less likely) since it leaves the coefficients and their levels of significance 
virtually unchanged and is insignificant itself. Additional results of this regression are reported in Appendix 2.A. 
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intuitive interpretation of the regression results I thus calculate the predictive marginal 
effects to further investigate the statistically significant relationships34. Before investigating 
the interaction effect of increasing coalition conflict and financial implications in a proposal, I 
plot the predicted marginal effects of increasing opposition vs. government conflict and 
increasing proposal complexity on the probability of a public hearing (figure 3.1). Both 
covariates are highly significant, and both heavily increase the probability that a public 
hearing will be held (increasing these covariates by one unit and keeping all other covariates 
at their mean values). Partisan conflicts between government and opposition and 
parliamentary learning are important factors in explaining the occurrence of public hearings. 
 
Figure 3.1 Marginal Predicted Probability of Public Hearings: Proposal Complexity, Partisan Conflict 
How do increasing coalition conflict and financial implications of a proposal affect the 
marginal predicted probability of a public hearing occurring? In figure 3.2 I plot the adjusted 
predictions for public hearings of bills with and without financial implications for increasing 
values of coalition issue divisiveness. For medium to high levels of coalition conflict, a 
proposal that indicates financial implications is substantially less likely to be scrutinized in a 
                                                          
34 Margins are computed from predictions from a statistical model while deliberately manipulating the values 
of the covariates (Williams 2012). In Stata (from version 11 on) this can be done with the margins and 
marginsplot commands. 
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public hearing. Bills that have financial implications are less likely to be scrutinized in a public 
hearing with increasing coalition conflict, even though proposals are more likely to be 
scrutinized in a public hearing in general. We find a considerable difference between 
proposals with financial implications and proposals absent financial implications on the 
likelihood of a public hearing for a large share of coalition conflict values. “Listen carefully” 
occurs to be empirically grounded advice to coalition partners. 
 
Figure 3.2 Marginal Predicted Probability of Public Hearings by Financial Implications 
 
Summary 
Public hearings are one available mechanism for members of the German Bundestag to 
reduce the transaction costs associated with everyday legislative politics. The occurrence of 
public hearings is systematically related to the complexity of a proposal even in the presence 
of partisan conflicts in the German Bundestag. In public hearings, members of a committee 
gather, process and interpret information from scientific experts and interest group 
representatives. Public hearings are in this sense an instrument of the legislative body as a 
whole to enable members of parliament to learn something about the policy proposal.  
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But parties also employ public hearings strategically as an instrument of legislative scrutiny. 
While increasing conflict between opposition and government makes public hearings more 
likely in general, increasing conflict within government coalitions actually makes public 
hearings much less likely if the bill also has financial implications to be considered. This is 
sensible, since government partners’ bargains could be upset by the intervention or 
obstruction by experts and interest groups. So while opposition parties do strategically 
employ public hearings as an instrument of scrutiny, the publicity of hearings is a double-
edged sword for coalition partners. Having said that, we need to consider not only why 
public hearings are used in the legislative context of the German Bundestag, but also what 
they are actually good for, which will be the focus of the next chapter. As it turns, public 
hearings influence policymaking in the German Bundestag substantially. 
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4. What are Public 
Hearings good for?  
Legislative Governance and Oppositional 
Influence 
 
Neither parties in government nor opposition parties are full of “know it all” politicians. 
Rather, they frequently resort to external knowledge and expertise by listening to scholars 
and interest group representatives. Recall the findings of the previous analyses: Public 
hearings are held when opposition parties and government coalitions are divided over 
important (i.e. salient) policies. Public hearings on proposals with financial implications can 
generate interest groups signals that could potentially upset the coalition bargain. That is 
why policy proposals with financial implications are less likely to be scrutinized in public 
hearings if the government partners are already divided over the issue. Independent of 
policy conflict, public hearings occur more often with increasing complexity of a policy 
proposal.  
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While we have learned a lot about why public hearings occur in the first place and what 
makes them more (or less) likely, we still have to find out if they are effective at scrutinizing 
proposals, given that they take place. How do public hearings influence policy proposals? It 
is not enough to state that public hearings matter – we need to know how they matter in 
day-to-day politics in the German Bundestag.   
As I have pointed out in the course of the preceding discussion, (public) hearings in the 
German Bundestag can be explained with a transaction-cost-theory approach and its sub-
branches. Transaction-cost-theory can explain why public hearings are a sensible control 
mechanism within a principal-agent relationship to counter moral hazard. (Public) hearings 
signal effort of cabinet members, are one possible institution within a governance-structure 
to economize on transaction costs in a political market, and reduce the individual party risk 
to shirk within the principal-agent-relationship of cabinet and ministers as they signal 
credible commitment to the coalition compromise when contracts are incomplete. A (public) 
hearing can identify deviations from coalition compromise and is therefore an information-
revealing technology aptly suited for parliamentary scrutiny of cabinet governance. 
Moral hazard can occur because of informational asymmetries (who knows what?), 
redistributive conflicts (who gets what?), and conflicts about how to formulate appropriate 
policies (who wants what?). The three distinct patterns of legislative organization in the U.S. 
Congress (informational, distributional, partisan) shed light on the fundamental motivation 
for calling for a public hearing. Public hearings in principle follow two different goals: They 
can serve to gather information on policymaking in parliament or serve as an arena for 
partisan conflicts, both within government and between government and opposition. I 
deviate here from Martin and Vanberg (2011) in arguing that the opposition does have 
influence on policymaking in committees by significantly lengthening the time that a bill 
proposal is considered in a committee.  
I intend to show that public hearings can both serve as instrument of legislative governance 
for government coalitions and as an instrument of oppositional delay for governmental 
policymaking and thus influence both the content of a bill proposal and the time (i.e. its 
duration) that is being spent on scrutinizing the proposal in a committee. Even though public 
hearings are less likely in the event of policy conflicts between coalition partners they 
nonetheless influence policy proposals. The main goal of this chapter is to show how. I first 
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review the literature on legislative governance and highlight the results of Martin and 
Vanberg’s (2011) model of parliaments as policing institutions. If parliaments and their 
committees enable coalition partners to reliably implement coalition compromises then 
public hearings should be one feasible mechanism to reach this goal. A first step in my 
analyses will be to show that the right to hold a public hearing is one aspect of parliamentary 
committee strength. While the results indicate that public hearings do indeed strengthen 
parliamentary committees, they are just one of many possible “alternative governance 
structures”, which is why I additionally take a closer look at public hearings as an important 
aspect of strong legislatures and account for several control mechanisms (junior ministers, 
committee chairs, public hearings), both theoretically and empirically. The statistical 
analyses suggest that – depending on coalitional or oppositional levels of conflict – public 
hearings both influence the number of article changes on a proposal in committee and the 
time that is being spent on scrutinizing the bill proposal. 
Legislative Governance 
The problem of controlling cabinet ministers has been frequently addressed as a delegation 
problem within multi-party coalition governments (Andeweg 2000, Hallerberg 2000, Müller 
2000, StrØm 2000, Thies 2001, Martin and Vanberg 2005). As Hallerberg (2004) aptly states 
“agency losses can translate into lost votes” (14). It is therefore in the interest of the cabinet 
as a whole to closely monitor the behavior of individual ministers. There is growing evidence 
that coalition members can use the parliamentary process to mitigate “agency loss” that 
they incur from delegating proposal power to the others (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 
2011)35. Coalition governments face agency problems. To tackle the risk of ministerial drift, 
they install junior ministers (Thies 2001, Verzichelli 2008, Martin and Vanberg 2011). Cabinet 
governments install coalition committees, formulate policy agreements or screen ministerial 
candidates (Müller and Meyer 2010). Coalition partners successfully secure committee 
chairs to “shadow” partner ministers (Kim and Loewenberg 2005, Carroll and Cox 2012, 
Fortunato, Martin and Vanberg n.D.). Cabinet members engage in oversight activities at the 
legislative (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011). One mechanism that has not been 
                                                          
35 On the other hand, Hallerberg (2004) identifies Germany as a “delegation state”, where “parliaments have 
little power. The most important things parliaments do in these countries seemingly is to elect the government 
and then to get out of the way once the government is installed”(32). Parliaments in delegation states are 
expected to be “relatively powerless in both its ability to affect legislation that comes from the government 
and will have little ability to collect much information on that legislation.”(23) Hallerberg expects information 
collection to be severely restricted in delegation states, an argument that stands in contrast to the 
informational explanation of public hearings. 
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addressed yet in a systematic manner is public hearings at the committee stage. As I will 
argue, public hearings can be such an “oversight activity”: Hearing experts on a policy 
proposal may reduce informational asymmetries, force the proposing minister to clarify his 
position and signal policy intention through the strategic selection of experts to be heard. 
Public hearings have the potential to serve as a mechanism for legislative oversight within 
committees. But while they are a probable mechanism because they can create audience 
costs, this also makes them less likely given cabinet conflict. I draw on legislation data for the 
Bundestag to argue that public hearings are strategically used to counter ministerial drift 
only as a last resort. Public hearings are actually less likely for proposals on which the 
government is divided, but if a hearing does take place on such proposals it will generate 
more amendments. By holding a public hearing the proposing minister can be perceived as 
either unresolved or incompetent. Because public hearings can generate more media 
visibility, this furthers compliance of a minister with a coalition compromise. Public hearings 
serve as an important mechanism to create cabinet stability as these audience costs 
associated with a public hearing reduce ministerial drift. 
Public Hearings and the Strength of Committees 
What makes legislative committees strong enough to counter ministerial drift? Martin and 
Vanberg (2011) have made the commendable effort to extend the classification of weak and 
strong legislatures (e.g. Lijphart 1984) by emphasizing the significance of information 
gathering and amendment rights of ministerial proposals. Although the focus of my research 
is on the German Bundestag, I replicate and extend their analysis of different features of 
legislative committees by introducing the right to hold a public hearing as an additional 
aspect of parliamentary committee strength. By doing so, I hope to add to the knowledge we 
have on how the legislative process is beneficial to resolving coalitional conflict and 
stabilizing coalition government.  
Martin and Vanberg consider eight aspects of policing strength for sixteen West European 
parliaments (see table 4.1). They are primarily interested in one conceptual dimension of 
parliamentary strength, i.e. “the power of legislators to ‘police’ government ministers in the 
process of legislative review” (MV 2011, 47). To validate their decision to retain only one 
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dimension, MV visually inspect the Eigenvalues from a principal component factor analysis of 
these eight variables for the sixteen West European parliaments36.  
Type Feature Description 
Structural Number of Legislative 
Committees 
More committees can oversee the work of 
ministers better 
Structural Correspondence to Ministerial 
Jurisdictions 
Specialization along the jurisdictional boundaries of 
a ministry enables better scrutiny in committees 
Structural The Size of Committees Large committees discourage specialization by their 
members, thus inhibiting the ability of a committee 
to effectively scrutinize proposals 
Structural Binding Plenary Debate Deliberation and proposals for change are less likely 
if a constraining plenary debate is held before the 
committee stage 
Scrutiny Right to Compel Witnesses 
and Documents 
The ability to force ministers and civil servants to 
hold witness or deliver relevant documents is an 
advantage for committees to scrutinize legislation 
Scrutiny Rewrite Authority Committees with the ability to amend proposals are 
more powerful than committees that can only 
sponsor a amendments on the floor 
Resistance Urgency Procedure If ministers can declare proposals “urgent” and thus 
reduce the amount of time available for 
consideration, this diminishes a committee’s ability 
to scrutinize a proposal effectively 
Resistance Guillotine Procedure Ministers have an advantage against committee 
scrutiny if they can reject amendments 
Scrutiny 
(New) 
Public Hearings Committees who can call for external expertise in 
public hearings can scrutinize government 
proposals more effectively 
 
Table 4.1 Factors of Policing Strength in Western European Parliaments (MV 2011, 44-45) 
                                                          
36 The sixteen West European Countries are (in alphabetical order): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
(MV 2011, 50). 
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I replicate the inspection and include public hearings as an additional variable. The resulting 
scree plot (figure 4.1) of the extracted variance of each factor that could potentially be kept 
corroborates the initial results, i.e. a single underlying factor explains most of the variation in 
the variables, even though it explains less (almost 50 percent) compared to the original 
analysis (almost 60 percent). Nonetheless, as in the original analysis, the second factor 
explains remarkably less total variance (below 15 percent), after which it “levels off” (Cattell 
1966). The addition of public hearings therefore only strengthens the evidence that the now 
nine variables are strongly associated to a single underlying dimension (MV 2011, 49).  
The different components of MV’s measure of parliamentary policing strength are correlated 
to one underlying dimension as theoretically expected: Legislatures with strong committee 
powers have many comparably small committees corresponding to ministries and with the 
authority to rewrite proposals and demand written or oral witness. On the opposite, 
legislatures with weak committees have large committees unrelated to ministries that can 
make use of the urgency or guillotine procedure. I extend their analysis by an additional 
component, the right of a committee to hold a public hearing with external expertise 
(interest groups, scientists).  
 
Figure 4.1 Screeplot of Eigenvalues from Factor Analysis 
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As can be seen in the following table (Table 4.2), the sign of the loading for public hearings is 
as expected. Parliaments tending towards one side of the dimension have a high number of 
small permanent committees mirroring ministries, can rewrite government bills, demand 
documents and witnesses and can hold a public hearing. At the same time, parliamentary 
systems on this side of the dimension grant their ministers no urgency or guillotine 
procedure. Parliaments with the possibility to hold public hearings in committees lean to the 
policing strength side of the dimension. Public hearings are only weakly related to the 
underlying dimension (just as the authority to compel or rewrite), but “As long as ministers 
do not have the ability to curtail amendments, the ability to offer an amendment and force a 
vote should be sufficient for effective legislative scrutiny” (MV 2011, 50).  
Variables Loadings 
(MV) 
Coefficients 
(MV) 
Loadings 
(extended) 
Coefficients 
(extended) 
Number of Permanent  
Committees 
-0.886 -0.200 -0.8845 -0.20552 
Surplus of Permanent  
Committees to Ministries 
-0.839 -0.189 -0.8485 -0.19717 
Committee Size 0.820 0.185 0.8095 0.18809 
Binding Plenary Debate  
before Committee Stage 
0.666 0.150 0.4455 0.10351 
Authority to Compel -0.231 -0.052 -0.2180 -0.05065 
Rewrite Authority -0.354 -0.080 -0.3510 -0.08155 
Urgency 0.900 0.203 0.9163 0.21290 
Guillotine 0.914 0.206 0.8941 0.20774 
Public Hearing   -0.3715  -0.08631  
 
Table 4.2 Factor Analysis of Legislative Policing Strength 
In public hearings, experts’ statements help members of a committee to get a grip on 
complex bill proposals, evaluate their potential consequences and control for deviations 
from a coalition contract or compromise. As I will show in an analysis further ahead, public 
hearings increase the number of amendments to a bill if government partners are highly 
divided over an issue. The possibility to call for a public hearing increases the ability to offer 
an amendment. The results from the extended principal components factor analysis support 
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the proposed relationship between structural and procedural features and policing strength 
of parliaments (ibid.) – and most importantly, public hearings are part of these features. 
Predicting the factor scores for the sixteen European parliaments under study using the 
score coefficients from table 4.2, figure 4.2 reveals almost identical differences between 
European legislatures as the original graph (MV 2011, 50). Both the low and high ranked 
countries are identical, with Greece, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom having 
legislatures poorly equipped to monitor ministerial behavior. Interestingly, when accounting 
for public hearings, Spain turns out to be an even weaker legislature (from 8th rank to 12th 
rank), while Norway, Italy, Belgium and Portugal move one rank up. Public hearings are one 
of many instruments and mechanisms not just in the German Bundestag but in many 
Western European parliaments to enhance their policing strength. Having laid out the 
relationship between policing strength and public hearings, I now turn to the relationship of 
public hearings and cabinet scrutiny, alternative governance structures and oppositional 
delay in the German Bundestag. 
 
Figure 4.2 Ranking of Policing Strength for Sixteen European Parliaments 
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Parliaments as Policing Institutions 
Public hearings have occasionally been taken into account in the literature on the strength of 
parliamentary committees. In consensual democracies, such as Germany, the most 
important legislative work takes place in committees. Bills typically go to committees before 
being debated by the floor of the parliament. Rightly then, Martin and Vanberg locate strong 
standing committees in parliamentary systems with proportional representation rules 
(Martin and Vanberg 2005, 97, cf. Powell 2000, 34). Following Mattson and StrØm (1995) 
and Kim and Loewenberg (2005), parliamentary committees should be more effective 
controllers than the plenary due to specialization. Thus the occurrence of public hearings in 
committees may serve to counter ministerial drift. While Krehbiel (1991) expects public 
hearings to signal to other legislators the general quality of a bill, Hallerberg’s (2004) findings 
indicate that hearings rather serve as an opportunity for members of parliament to 
publically voice any disagreements they have with the government. Mattson and StrØm 
(2004) find little evidence for Krehbiel’s hypothesis, since the fate of bills is hardly correlated 
with the work of committees. Damgaard and Mattson(2004) conclude that conflict in 
committees was more likely if hearings were held.  
Public hearings can fulfill the function of scrutiny in the presence of partisan conflicts. As 
Sieberer (2011) clarifies in a factor analysis of indicators for established measures of 
legislative and control resources, Western European parliaments can independently 
influence policymaking apart from legislating. Cabinet scrutiny is such a possibility of 
influencing policymaking. In the following paragraphs I review the commendable theoretical 
and empirical advances Martin and Vanberg (2011) have made in explaining coalition 
governance. Highlighting the most important aspects of their work, I argue that public 
hearings are a promising specific mechanism that makes committees an ideal arena of 
cabinet scrutiny. Since the Martin and Vanberg (MV) model of cabinet scrutiny is the 
theoretically and analytically most advanced approach to coalition governance and 
delegation currently available, I build upon their work to analyze public hearings in the 
German Bundestag. Indeed, as I will spell out in the following paragraphs, public hearings are 
a sound example of a parliamentary institution of cabinet scrutiny. 
MV outline their approach in contrast to Laver and Shepsle’s rigorous deductive theory of 
ministerial party government (Laver and Shepsle 1996), in which ministers are such strong 
actors in their portfolios that they cannot be constrained by joint policy agreements: 
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Given the intense pressure of work and lack of access to civil service specialists in other 
departments, it seems unlikely that cabinet ministers will be able successfully to poke their 
noses very deeply into the jurisdictions of their cabinet colleagues. This implies that 
members of the cabinet will have only very limited ability to shape the substance of policy 
emanating from the department of a ministerial colleague, an assumption that has received 
empirical support from a number of country specialists (Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 32, my 
emphasis).  
Their groundbreaking parsimonious work raised criticism, especially from empirically 
oriented scholars (e.g. Dunleavy and Bastow 2001, Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, Thies 
2001). While each minister would benefit from such a “policy dictatorship”, the coalition as a 
whole would create Pareto-inefficient policy outputs (MV 2011, p. 17). As Martin and 
Vanberg concisely point out  
The key problem confronting multiparty governments is that, given the strong policy-
signaling incentives confronting ministers as they draft policies, reaping the benefits of 
mutually beneficial compromises requires mechanisms that allow parties to make reliable 
implementation of compromise possible despite the constant temptation confronting each 
coalition partner to deviate from such agreements (p. 18) 
I argue that public hearings are exactly such a mechanism that allows parties “to make 
reliable implementation of compromise possible”. Whether or not a minister deviates from 
compromise can only be identified in the presence of an information-gathering technology 
that comes at a cost to both coalition partners. By holding a public hearing, a minister can 
credibly signal his resolve to actively represent party supporter’s interests. On the other 
hand, a public hearing can signal deviation from a coalition compromise or, even worse, 
policy incompetence by the minister. Thus both minister and government partner only have 
an incentive to use public hearings as an ultima ratio, i.e. when government conflict is 
sufficiently high and policy losses loom large. Otherwise, public hearings will simply create 
audience costs bound to harm the whole coalition. Public hearings are less probable for 
proposals contested within a coalition. But when they occur they should have a pronounced 
effect both on the content and the duration of policy proposals in committee. This should be 
especially evident in the presence of partisan conflicts.  
Without addressing public hearings explicitly, MV set the stage for this instrument early on, 
as “One consequence of the growing importance of technical expertise on policymaking has 
been an increasing reliance on institutions and individuals who are able to supply specialized 
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knowledge” (MV 2011, 8f.)37. Public hearings are exactly such an institution available to 
parliamentary committees. By inviting and hearing individuals (scientists, interest groups, 
bureaucrats) members of a committee can be supplied with “specialized knowledge”. 
Cabinet delegation entails a drawback to cabinet stability as the minister can draft proposals 
with an informational advantage and other members may find it difficult to challenge these 
proposals without the relevant background knowledge (p. 10). One instrument to challenge 
these proposals is to invite experts with the relevant background knowledge to a public 
hearing who can then signal conformity or deviation from a coalition compromise or 
comment on the proposed link between a policy proposal and the intended policy output.  
As the coalition government parties play a “mixed motive” game to secure both policy gains 
and reelection chances by catering to citizen support, parties have to show their supporters 
that they are seriously considering constituents’ concerns, both during coalition negotiations 
and government participation (p. 12). Controlling the issue of moral hazard (shirking) is 
therefore paramount to the stability of a coalition cabinet, as parties have strong reasons to 
use the ministries they control “to engage in ‘policy-signaling’ by drafting and introducing 
bills that are likely to be greeted favorably by the constituents whose support they are 
attempting to win” (p. 13).  
Parliaments and Cabinet Scrutiny 
Martin and Vanberg model governance as a game between two players, a minister who can 
propose a moderate bill (in line with the coalition compromise) or a radical bill (policy 
signaling to constituencies), and a partner, who can decide to scrutinize the proposal. In 
addition to the policy payoff to the minister implementing the moderate or radical bill, MV 
allow for a “position-taking benefit” β capturing the electoral incentives confronting the 
minister. Since the minister enjoys an informational advantage, MV assume two possible 
states of the world, one in which a moderate bill is not feasible as the nature of the policy 
environment does not allow for it, and one state of the world in which the radical bill 
represents an attempt by the minister to deviate from the coalition bargain. While the 
minister can distinguish between these two states of the world, the partner cannot. 
                                                          
37 This is not to say that MV are not aware of the hearing-scrutiny nexus. With regards to committees in 
Western European parliamentary systems they state that these “typically have broad investigative powers, 
including the right to schedule hearings, call witnesses, subpoena relevant documents, and ability to propose 
amendments.” (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 16f. my emphasis) 
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Therefore, the partner has to invest in gathering further information: “Given the 
informational advantage a minister possesses, a coalition partner must expend resources to 
scrutinize ministerial policy proposals to determine the consequences the bill is likely to 
have, to identify feasible alternatives, and to draft the necessary statutory language.”(20f.)  
But this scrutiny can also impose costs on the minister, e.g. reputation costs for ineffective 
bills, the negative impact on the coalition due to the abuse of power of the minister by 
creating distrust, and opportunity costs for having spent time on a futile bill. As the authors 
state in a footnote, “The critical part of the argument we develop here is that the 
institutional structure of the policy-making process shapes these costs, and that coalition 
partners will be able to effectively scrutinize ministerial draft bills under certain 
conditions”(MV 2011, 21, Footnote 12, my emphases). Simply stated, public hearings are 
part of the institutional structure and thus (significantly) shape the costs of scrutiny and 
define the conditions under which the scrutiny of ministerial draft bills is effective. While MV 
do not explicitly relate their approach to audience-cost-theory, the “reputation costs for 
ineffective bills” can only occur in the presence of a relevant audience. Public hearings can 
create such an audience and are therefore ideally suited to scrutinize ministerial draft bills. I 
will return to this in chapter five on audience-cost-theory.  
Since the partner has to update his beliefs about the minister’s behavior in light of the 
uncertainty surrounding the state of the world, MV 2011 solve the model for Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium, i.e. the players’ beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule wherever possible 
and players’ strategies are sequentially rational given their beliefs. The ministerial 
autonomy equilibrium most closely resembles Laver and Shepsle’s Portfolio Allocation 
Model: ministers are free to propose a policy and the partner never scrutinizes the proposal. 
Naturally, this occurs only for issues with a very small preference divergence, i.e. the costs 
for scrutinizing are higher than the expected policy benefits from scrutiny. As MV remark in a 
footnote to this equilibrium, “The more resources are required to scrutinize ministerial draft 
bills, the larger preference divergence can become before ministerial autonomy can no 
longer be sustained” (22, footnote 15). The coalition squabbles equilibrium exists for 
intermediate levels of preference divergence. Ministers will sometimes use their discretion 
to deviate from coalition compromise and partners will selectively check the proposal by a 
minister. In the maximal position-taking equilibrium, the minister always prefers to 
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introduce the radical bill in order to capture the position taking benefits, even though the 
proposal will always be scrutinized by the partner. In case the moderate bill is feasible, this 
leaves the minister unable to implement the radical bill. Nonetheless, this is outweighed by 
the position-taking benefits.  
Public Hearings and Cabinet Scrutiny 
Martin and Vanberg partially test the empirical implications of their theoretical model by 
focusing on ideological divergence while leaving the importance of position-taking (the β 
capturing the electoral incentives confronting the minister) unspecified in their later 
empirics. Holding constant the importance of position-taking, they nevertheless observe an 
increase in scrutiny with growing ideological divergence, so there is some credence not to 
operationalize this aspect of the model. As I will argue later on, public hearings are a sensible 
instrument of parliamentary scrutiny not only because they introduce external expertise in 
the hearing itself, but because the publicity of the hearing creates audience costs that help 
government partners keep their coalitional promises. Interestingly, MV already argue in this 
direction: 
The policy-signaling incentives confronting ministers, coupled with the need to delegate 
drafting authority to them, generate a dynamic in which ministers will attempt to undermine 
coalition compromises by “playing to their audiences” with the draft bills they introduce. 
Where the damage of such ministerial drift is sufficiently serious, coalition partners take 
advantage of amendment opportunities to “pull back” proposals by particular ministers. (MV 
2011, 25, my emphasis) 
As I suggest later on, “playing to their audiences” resembles audience cost theory, thus an 
extension from hearings to audiences is warranted. But this uncovers an important question: 
Who would want to carry out a conflict in front of the opposition? Only if the benefits 
(position-taking) for the ministers or the benefits (policy compromise) for the partner are 
sufficiently large should we observe public hearings at all since rational actors anticipate the 
audience costs of a public hearing. Thus, they both would want to minimize the risk of 
generating these costs in the first place, unless there are electoral or policy benefits 
associated with the costs of a public hearing. In principle then, both minister and coalition 
partner can benefit from a public hearing. The minister can signal her position to her 
audience while the partner can benefit from the policy compromise they will achieve by 
scrutinizing. 
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In the ministerial autonomy and coalition squabbles equilibrium the coalition partners will 
sometimes scrutinize, sometimes not, as long as the costs for scrutiny are not overly large. 
Thus we should observe little to no effect of low to medium government issue divisiveness 
on the likelihood for public hearings. But for large levels of conflict, the costs for scrutiny 
increase substantially in public hearings for the coalition as a whole because of the audience 
costs they generate. With a public audience, ministers risk being stamped as incompetent or 
unfaithful, because “One can imagine that there are fears that open disagreements among 
committee members from coalition partners may damage the coalition more generally, and 
it is better that the public and the press do not follow the discussions directly“(Hallerberg 
2004, 29). The ministers therefore have to fear both the electoral repercussions and the 
consequences on their ministerial careers by being publically embarrassed. In general, 
disagreements among coalition partners should not increase the use of public hearings. 
Higher levels of government issue divisiveness should lead to fewer public hearings, as 
cabinet members will anticipate the associated audience costs if the coalition were to 
overtly fight over a contentious issue. At the same time, conflicts between opposition and 
government should significantly increase the likelihood of a public hearing. In chapter three, 
we already uncovered substantial support for an increase in the likelihood for a public 
hearing if oppositional conflict was present and a decrease for proposals that are contested 
within a coalition and have financial implications. 
Theoretically, public hearings are suited to address several issues surrounding parliamentary 
scrutiny: They grant coalition partners access to similar information, help evaluate the 
justifications offered by the minister for proposing a specific bill, and can translate effective 
scrutiny into policy change (see MV 2011, 27). In agreement with MV (2011, 31), I argue that 
public hearings as a strategic instrument of parliamentary committees supply parties that do 
not control a ministry with policy-relevant expertise. The invited experts (either scientific or 
interest groups) can signal the quality of particular choices embodied in a bill or inform the 
committee as a whole on the feasibility of a proposal. As MV rightly point out, “institutions 
at the legislative can provide an important substitute for, and complement to, cabinet-level 
institutions…Because legislative scrutiny and correction takes place after bill introduction, it 
does not threaten ministerial credit-claiming, and may therefore encounter less ministerial 
resistance”(33f.).  
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H4.1 (Cabinet Scrutiny) 
The more divided governing parties are on an issue, the more article changes will be made 
following a public hearing. 
While there should be fewer public hearings on policy proposals that are highly divisive for a 
cabinet – and indeed this is what we empirically find for bills with financial implications – we 
should empirically observe a relationship between the number of proposed article changes 
to a bill proposal and government issue divisiveness in the rare case a public hearing is held 
nonetheless. The interaction of divisiveness and a public hearing should be an important 
driver in explaining parliamentary scrutiny (i.e. number of amendments; duration of a 
proposal in committee). Public hearings scrutinize ministerial proposals – but only if nothing 
else works, since the cabinet as a whole has to bear out the audience costs associated with 
the publicity of the hearing. 
Alternative Governance Structures 
In order to explain the use of public hearings in the German Bundestag appropriately, we 
need to take alternative governance structures guiding coalitional conflicts into account. The 
extant literature on coalitional governance has made substantive progress in identifying 
several instruments for coalitional control and monitoring: Coalitions employ several 
“governance structures”, i.e. different instruments to tackle the difficulties of moral hazard 
associated with the division of labor in cabinet (Andeweg 2000, Hallerberg 2000, Martin and 
Vanberg 2005, Müller 2000). Established instruments are writing down extensive policy 
agreements (Müller and StrØm 2008), checking ministers in parliamentary institutions 
(Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011), or shadowing ministers with “watchdog” junior 
ministers (Thies 2001, Verzichelli 2008, Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011). Additionally, coalition 
partners can stabilize government by excluding divisive issues from the coalition’s agenda 
(Timmermans 2003, 2006) or installing shadow committee chairs (Kim and Loewenberg 
2005, Cox and Carroll, 2012, Fortunato, Martin and Vanberg n.D.). While there has been 
remarkable progress on identifying these unique control mechanisms, the transaction-cost 
approach of comparative institutional analysis for identifying the ideal combination of 
mechanisms is still open for application. I take a closer look at public hearings as an 
important aspect of strong legislatures and account for several control mechanisms (junior 
ministers, committee chairs) in my empirical analyses. 
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Committee Chairs and Public Hearings in the German Bundestag 
As Carroll and Cox (2012) show, shadow chairs are more likely to be placed opposite 
ministers from more ideologically divergent parties. This relationship intensifies with 
stronger committee systems. Fortunato, Martin and Vanberg (N.d.) suggest, this is 
“presumably where shadow chairs may be more effective in their charge.” Why may this be 
true? Because the strength of a committee could be closely connected to its possibility to 
hold a public hearing, this in turn is a precise mechanism of scrutiny at the hands of the 
committee chair. Fortunato, Martin and Vanberg (N.d.) provide evidence that when a 
coalition partner controls the chairmanship of the committee in charge of reviewing the 
proposal, more extensive changes are made to ministerial proposals than when the minister 
controls the chairmanship. If, as currently is stated in the reviewed literature, the strength of 
committees and the chairmanship of a committee both reduce ministerial drift, we are led to 
ask: why?  
Chairmanship could matter because of the ability to call for a public hearing. In that case, 
public hearings should occur more often in committees whose chair is held by a coalition 
partner to shadow a coalition minister. While there have been studies showing that the chair 
of a committee matters for mitigating ministerial drift, they do not show why the chair 
should matter. In the standing order of the German Bundestag (GOBT), the rights and duties 
of the committee chair are listed in § 59-61: 
1. Preparation and chairing of committee sessions (§ 59,1) 
2. Setting the agenda (§ 61,1) 
3. Ending of sessions (§59, 4) 
4. Timing of committee sessions (in accordance with the time schedule arranged by the 
committee of elders) (§60, 2+3; §61,1) 
Even though the committee chair may set the agenda and date for a session, he is severely 
constrained by additional rules which permit the committee as a whole to decide or even 
change the agenda by majority. Holding an extraordinary committee session can only be 
decided by the committee chair if either a faction, five percent of all members of parliament 
(currently 31), or a unanimous committee demand so and the president of parliament has 
given permission. It is therefore not at all clear, why holding a chair in committee should be 
an advantage for scrutinizing policy proposals of government partners in the German 
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Bundestag. It could be through public hearings that the partisanship of a committee chair 
matters. But a fourth of all committee members is needed for a decision to stage a public 
hearing, which denies the committee chair any pivotal role. To argue that a committee 
chair’s proposal to hold a public hearing will be granted more serious consideration and 
eventually lead to a higher likelihood of a public hearing seems farfetched given the standing 
orders. We should therefore see little to no effect of committee chair ownership on the 
occurrence of public hearings. 
H4.2.a (Public Hearings and Committee Chairs) 
Whether a committee chair is held by a governing partner or not has no influence on the 
occurrence of public hearings. 
Junior Ministers and Public Hearings in the German Bundestag 
Whereas Thies (2001) and Martin and Vanberg (2011) conclude that junior ministers reduce 
the likelihood of ministerial drift, Lipsmeyer and Pierce(2011) contend that strong 
committees significantly reduce the likelihood of junior ministers being used as a monitoring 
instrument. A strong committee system reduces the chance of an oversight junior minister 
by 13%. While this relationship is relevant for comparative analyses, this is less of an issue 
for the study at hand. Given that the German Bundestag has a strong committee system and 
that cabinet partners shadow each other’s ministerial discretion in the German Cabinet, we 
can safely assume that junior ministers, ceteris paribus, reduce the likelihood of public 
hearings, because they already reduce the likelihood for ministerial drift. The moral hazard 
associated with the discretion available to ministers in drafting bill proposals creates an 
almost inherent risk for intra-coalitional conflicts. The cabinet as a whole has a pronounced 
interest in keeping such conflicts off records. Any mechanism at the cabinet-stage to reduce 
ministerial drift will be preferred to the committee-stage instrument public hearing and 
should reduce the application of the latter. 
H4.2.b (Public Hearings and Junior Ministers) 
The presence of junior ministers controlled by a governing partner make the occurrence of 
public hearings less likely. 
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The strength of committees significantly matters in choosing institutional solutions to 
ministerial drift. In Germany, junior ministers are a pre-committee solution, while public 
hearings are an at-committee solution. While I argue that public hearings lie at the heart of 
strong committees (cf. Mattson and StrØm 2004), this will actually make their occurence less 
likely given intra-coalitional debate on a proposal.  
The time of deliberation on a bill in a committee and the use of a public hearing with regards 
to a specific bill both serve as indicators for investment in committees, implying that 
“hearings or subcommittee deliberations are presumably at least positively related with the 
seriousness of committee scrutiny” ( ibid., 105). A note of caution is warranted: The time of 
deliberation on a bill is by no means independent of the use of public hearings. Mattson and 
StrØm refer this question for future investigation, as their data does not allow for studying 
this question due to missing observations. As will be shown in the empirical analysis, public 
hearings significantly lengthen the time a bill is being processed in a committee in the 
presence of opposition conflict. In the end, it is not so much the duration of a bill in 
committee but the possibility to question experts and interest groups on a policy proposal 
that enables government partners to scrutinize each other effectively in committee. Experts 
and interest groups serve as “fire alarms”, while coalition partners can “police patrol” each 
others’ strategic statements during a public hearing. Public hearings combine both 
mechanisms effectively. Public hearings make “fire alarms” more likely (McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984, Saalfeld 2000). This is so because invited experts often advocate for a 
specific interest group. By creating strong incentives to “fire alarm” abusive proposals, 
advocacy can enhance the integrity of decision making (Dewatripont and Tirole 1999). 
Public Hearings and Oppositional Delay  
Specialization and delegation of work enable in detail advice with a large number of 
amendments both from government and opposition (Ismayr 2001: 215-290). At the same 
time, opposition parties are said to have no ability to gain position taking benefits by 
initiating proposals or scrutinizing bills in committees (Sebaldt 2001, 145), since their 
proposals or amendments are almost never accepted by the governing majority in a 
committee. Powell (2000) offers a competing view on oppositional influence: Taking into 
account StrØm's “influence of the opposition” index (StrØm 1990, 71), and relying on articles 
in Doering (ed. 1995), Powell classifies Western European parliamentary systems according 
to legislative decision rules. Germany stands out as one of the countries in the top group 
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where “the combination of many committees whose specialization corresponds to 
government departments and sharing chairs with the opposition suggests substantial 
opportunities for the opposition to influence legislation” (Powell 2000, 35). The number of 
amendments in a committee should then relate to some measure of opposition divisiveness 
as an indicator for the oppositions’ ability to influence a government policy. Martin and 
Vanberg (2011) find no evidence for a direct relationship between the number of 
amendments and opposition issue divisiveness. They conclude that opposition influence is 
modest if at all existent. Yet, as I intend to show, public hearings are related to opposition 
issue importance (i.e. saliency) and legislative delay. The opposition does have influence, 
albeit in other ways than being responsible for the number of amendments. Since 
committee members in Germany are selected according to seat share, public hearings do 
not influence the number of amendments in the presence of opposition issue divisiveness, 
because opposition parties cannot influence government proposals effectively. But they do 
influence the time a proposal is being considered in a committee. As Martin and Vanberg 
(2004, 17) point out, a study on legislative oversight might involve an analysis of hearings. 
Regarding legislative oversight, they argue that scrutiny of legislation requires time because 
of “e.g., committee hearings, contact with outside experts and interest groups, etc.”. This 
will serve as a point of departure for the following arguments relating opposition conflict to 
public hearings and legislative delay. 
Governments and their ministers usually have a strong interest in appearing successful and 
“actionable”, i.e. implementing the policy they have proposed or promised. Failing to 
implement a proposed policy can give the impression that the government or minister is 
either incompetent, unfaithful or powerless, thus “apart from anything else, failure “looks 
bad” in front of the electorate” (Manow and Burkhart 2007, 169; cf. Heller 2001, Huber 
1996). Delaying governmental lawmaking can therefore create electoral benefits for the 
parliamentary opposition, especially on issues that are highly salient to the opposition. The 
opposition has a pronounced interest in using available parliamentary instruments to extract 
information from government, but it 
…may have little incentive to pursue a competitive strategy that requires parliament to share 
information efficiently with the electorate. If the opposition can quietly exert influence on 
government policy via parliamentary committees…it may have little incentive and credibility 
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to engage in a constant parliamentary battle with the government.”(Saalfeld 2000, 367; cf. 
Saalfeld 1998: 66-67)38.   
This is the case in Germany, where committees are free to rewrite government text and 
there is a committee stage before the final plenary session on a bill proposal (Saalfeld 2000, 
368). This means that public hearings in the committees of the German Bundestag are not 
only a strategic instrument of coalition partners to monitor compliance with a coalition 
compromise but also an attractive instrument of the opposition to make government “look 
bad” in front of the electorate. As the committee seats in Germany are allocated according 
to seat share in parliament, the governmental majority always enjoys the majority of seats in 
a committee as well. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the opposition should be 
able to assemble a majority in a committee to pass oppositional amendments to a 
ministerial bill proposal. This is in line with the results of Martin and Vanberg (2005, 2011) 
who find no relationship between opposition issue divisiveness and the number of 
amendments to a bill proposal. Complementing their study on parliamentary scrutiny and 
legislative delay (Martin and Vanberg 2004) I suggest that public hearings can significantly 
delay policymaking in committees of the German Bundestag on issues that are highly 
important to the opposition. A public hearing entails meticulous preparation in committee, 
e.g. assembling questionnaires, monitoring and selecting experts and interest group 
representatives, granting experts time to answer questions related to a bill proposal, holding 
the hearing itself, evaluating the results of a public hearing. This alone should increase the 
time being spent on a proposal compared to bills where no public hearing occurs. 
Additionally, previous results (chapter 3) suggest that public hearings are more likely in the 
presence of opposition issue divisiveness, i.e. on proposals that are of importance to the 
opposition and that divide them ideologically from the government coalition. This indicates a 
relationship between public hearings, opposition issue divisiveness and legislative delay.  
H4.3 (Public Hearings and Oppositional Delay) 
With increasing policy conflict and importance of an issue to the opposition, public hearings 
increase the number of days spent on a bill in committee. 
                                                          
38 The availability of public hearings as an instrument of scrutiny in committees of a parliament should 
therefore reduce the likelihood of parliamentary modes of monitoring and control such as written and oral 
questioning or interpellation. I leave this interesting aspect to future research.  
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Indeed, public hearings may be a driving factor behind legislative delay in the German 
Bundestag. To empirically investigate this claim, I extend Martin and Vanberg’s (2004) 
analysis on the duration of draft bills in the German Bundestag. They conclude that draft bills 
with ideological divisions between coalition partners take longer to enact and that those bills 
especially important to coalition partners are likely to pass more quickly through the 
legislative process, in their own words, “the types of bills least likely to be put to a legislative 
vote on a given day are those dealing with less salient issues or with issues that divide the 
members of the coalition” (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 23). Interestingly, they find no 
evidence that bills dividing opposition and government are likely to face legislative delay, 
while bills that are highly important to the opposition are actually less likely to pass through 
legislation more swiftly. While this observation is only a side effect of their initial analysis, 
evaluating it through the lens of public hearings is one of the central tasks of the following 
empirical evaluation. If public hearings delay the legislative process this should be all the 
more visible for those proposals that are either highly important to the opposition and 
ideologically divide opposition and government.   
Empirical Analysis 
Having established the theoretical groundings for public hearings under various 
circumstances (cabinet scrutiny, alternative governance structures, and oppositional delay), I 
empirically investigate the proposed relationships. I apply the same dataset as in chapter 
three (see p. 57ff.), which covers all relevant dependent and independent variables needed. 
I compare the number of proposal changes for high and low values of government issue 
divisiveness to show that proposals with lower levels of intra-coalitional levels of conflict are 
more likely to be scrutinized in public hearings. Strikingly, a simple group t-test on article 
changes indicates that even on highly divisive proposals that are relatively less likely to be 
scrutinized in a public hearing, a public hearing on such a proposal greatly increases the 
number of article changes to a bill. These first results are corroborated by a Negative 
binomial regression on the number of article changes. The coefficients drawn from the 
regression model suggest that a one standard deviation increase in intra-coalitional conflict 
increases the number of article changes by 33.50 % in the event of a public hearing. In other 
words: If coalition parties fight over an issue and a public hearing is held, this explains a third 
of all resulting article changes to the bill proposal. I estimate a logit model on mechanisms of 
intra-coalitional scrutiny for proposals with financial implications and high government issue 
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divisiveness. The results suggest that junior ministers make public hearings significantly less 
likely, whereas committee chairs have no substantial influence on the occurence of a public 
hearing. Lastly, I evaluate the claim that conflicts between opposition and government 
significantly delay policymaking through public hearings. The estimates of a Weibull duration 
model recommend that a public hearing on proposals important to the opposition is one 
important parameter delaying policymaking in the committees of the German Bundestag. 
Public Hearings and Cabinet Scrutiny 
As a last resort, a government partner can have experts scrutinize a policy proposal by a 
minister in committee by demanding and holding a public hearing. It is very often unclear to 
the government partner whether the minister proposes a “radical” bill (in the words of 
Martin and Vanberg) because of the constrained state of the world or because of electoral 
incentives to deviate from coalition compromise. Expert signals can support the state of the 
world or signal a substantial deviation, as has been shown in the example on childcare safety 
in the introduction. Providing additional information to the government parties not in 
control of a ministry helps a government partner assess the justifications offered by a 
minister for proposing a particular piece of legislation. In theory then, public hearings are 
aptly suited for legislative oversight in committees “to make reliable implementation of 
compromise possible” by creating publicity on a proposal. At the same time, existing pre-
parliamentary control mechanisms available for intra-coalitional scrutiny of ministerial bill 
proposals such as junior ministers, make the occurrence of public hearings less likely, even 
more so for bills that are highly divisive and carry budget implications with them.  
Public Hearing Low Government  
Issue Divisiveness 
( < 50th per.) 
High Government  
Issue Divisiveness 
( ≥ 50th per.) 
TOTAL 
NO 28 (21) 37 (25) 65 (46) 
YES 43 (32) 36 (24) 79 (56) 
TOTAL 71 (53) 73 (49) 144 (102) 
 
Table 4.3 Proposals and Public Hearings (Number of Bills with Financial Implications in Parentheses) 
The standing orders of the German Bundestag heavily constrain the committee chairs in 
their actions. Public hearings have to be demanded by a fourth of all committee members to 
be held. We therefore have no expectations how government parties and/ or opposition 
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parties can benefit from solely holding a committee chair. The opposition has a pronounced 
interest in making government look like it cannot stand up to its electoral promises or 
rejecting a minister’s competence. But it cannot actively influence a policy proposal with 
amendments, as they will simply not be passed by the governmental majority in a 
committee. Instead, the opposition can delay policymaking by demanding a public hearing 
and have their experts publically scrutinize the ministerial proposal. The take-home message 
from this discussion is straightforward:  
(Public) hearings are a strategic mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny – for coalition partners 
as a last resort to stabilize coalition governance by reducing the incentives of moral hazard, 
and for opposition parties to signal incompetence of the government by deliberately delaying 
policymaking.  
Proposals that are contested within a coalition cabinet are less likely to make it into a public 
hearing, both in relative and in absolute terms (table 4.3). We can observe a public hearing 
on 32 or 60.37% of the 53 proposals with low levels of intra-coalitional conflict. Of 49 
proposals with high levels of government issue divisiveness we observe a public hearing on 
24 or 48.98% of the bill proposals. Because of the audience costs they should rarely occur in 
the presence of large conflict.  
Public  
Hearing 
Total Article 
Changes 
(Mean) 
High  
Divisiveness 
( ≥ 50th per.)  
Article 
Changes 
(Mean) 
Very High  
Divisiveness 
(≥ 90th per.) 
Article 
Changes 
(Mean) 
NO 65 2.7384 37 2.8919 7  1.1429 
YES 79 8.7468 36 9.5556 7 8.5714 
TOTAL 144 6.0347 73 6.0946 14 4.8571 
 
Table 4.4 Mean Article Changes for Proposals grouped by Levels of Conflict and the Occurrence of a Public Hearing 
Nonetheless, we theoretically expect public hearings to heavily influence a bill proposal if 
they are employed. The descriptive statistics on the mean number of article changes to a bill 
proposal grouped by levels of divisiveness and the occurrence of a public hearing (table 4.4) 
indeed suggest that public hearings make a difference: independent of conflict (the “total” 
column in table 4.4), public hearings result in a threefold increase in the average number of 
article changes.  
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Recall that public hearings are significantly more likely with increasing complexity of a 
proposal. Absent a conflict, a bill proposal will nonetheless be amended if it reaches a 
certain level of complexity. Regardless of controlling for government or opposition conflict, 
the influence of complexity on both the occurrence of a public hearing and the scrutinizing 
effects of a public hearing hold. But when there is additional conflict between coalition 
partners, public hearings enable government to introduce changes, which they have an 
incentive to do. And even though a highly divisive proposal is relatively less likely to be 
scrutinized in a public hearing, a public hearing held on such a proposal greatly increases the 
average number of article changes to the bill.  
For proposals with high government issue divisiveness (wdivsal  ≥ 50th per.), a public 
hearing occurred on 36 bills and is associated with a mean of 9.56 article changes, which 
more than triples the number of article changes to be expected for proposals without public 
hearings (table 4.4). Given very high levels of coalition conflict (wdivsal  ≥ 90th per.), only 
very few proposals (7) were debated in a public hearing. Remarkably, on average 8.57 article 
changes were made on these bill proposals, compared to 1.14 article changes in the absence 
of a public hearing! This is an almost eightfold increase in changes to a proposal. 
 Total High Government  
Issue Divisiveness 
( ≥ 50th per.)  
Very High Government  
Issue Divisiveness 
(≥ 95th per.) 
t-statistic -4.8493 -4.5114 -3.5058 
Pr (T <  t) 0.000 0.000 0.0022 
Pr(|T|> |t|) 0.000 0.000 0.0043 
Pr (T  > t) 1.000 1.000 0.9978 
 
Table 4.5 Independent Group T-tests for Proposal Changes grouped by the Occurence of a Public Hearing 
Thus, if there was a public hearing and (incidentally) intra-coalitional conflict on the proposal 
we observe substantial change. The opposition is doing well by sometimes pushing for public 
hearings because this can uncover previously unnoticed internal government strife which 
could be detrimental to the public. To support the descriptive statistics I conduct an 
independent group t-test to compare the means of article changes grouped by the 
occurrence of a public hearing for all proposals, proposals with high (≥ 50th percentile) or 
very high (≥ 90th percentile) values of intra-coalitional conflict (table 4.5). For all three 
groups of divisiveness we find that the difference of means in the number of article changes 
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for the categories “public hearings” and “no public hearings” is statistically different from 
zero (the corresponding two-tailed p-value is always less than 0.01). 39 
Statistical Model for Hearings and Legislative Governance 
I further corroborate the results by following the approach of Martin and Vanberg (2005) on 
cabinet scrutiny and policy change. I rely on their variables as they have conceptualized and 
used them previously. Their dependent variable of interest, an integer bounded from below 
by zero (for no changes), is the number of article changes, or correctly defined as “Number 
of articles altered (or deleted) in the draft version of bill + Number of new articles added to 
the draft version of bill” (Martin and Vanberg 2005, 99). With this procedure, the authors 
construct a measure of policy change independent of minor copy-editing changes (e.g. 
spelling, punctuation etc.).  
Since I am interested in the number of proposed article changes, I apply an event count 
model (Cameron and Trivedi 2013), which is the “standard approach” in political science for 
explaining such variables that “occur over a particular period of time” (MV 2005, 101)40. 
Count data such as the observed proposed article changes for a bill proposal can take only 
non-negative integer values {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} . Since standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression is designed to accommodate for continuous dependent variables it is ill suited for 
such count data. Instead, the dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution with 
parameter 𝜇 if it takes integer values 𝑦 =  1, 2, 3 … with probability 
𝑃𝑟{𝑌 = 𝑦} =
𝑒−𝜇𝜇𝑦
𝑦!
 
where 𝑦! = 𝑦(𝑦 − 1)(𝑦 − 2) … 2(1), and 𝑦 ≥ 0.  
                                                          
39 Even if we assume that the proposals are not randomly selected from the total population of proposals in the 
German Bundestag in the observed time frame (legislative sessions 10-12) and we allow for unequal variances 
in the sample of proposals with and without a public hearing, the results of the t-tests remain virtually 
unchanged.  
40 Since the number of proposed article changes should systematically vary with the occurrence of a public 
hearing, an elegant way of incorporating this additional information into a statistical model could be a finite 
mixture model, as this approach specifies a small number of different types of observations, each with their 
own Poisson equation. For example, we can have two types of bills, one where a public hearing occurs, and one 
where there is no public hearing, and the Poisson equation for the number of proposed article changes is the 
same for both types except for different intercepts (Kennedy 2008, 260). To make the results as comparable to 
MV 2005 as possible, I nonetheless replicate their model specification. 
 
78 What are Public Hearings good for?  Legislative Governance and Oppositional Influence 
As both logistic regression and Poisson regression are examples of a generalized linear 
model, the modeling process is similar to the logistic regression (cf. chap. 3, 44): 
𝑌𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛 (𝜇𝑖) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜇𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + ⋯ 
Here the link function is the natural logarithms log. By modeling 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜇𝑖), it is impossible to 
get negative estimates of the mean, which neatly fits the fact that count data have non-
negative integer values. One important property of the Poisson distribution is 
equidispersion, i.e. the Poisson distribution variance is equal to the mean. This can be quite 
limiting if the data are over-dispersed, i.e. the variance is greater than to be expected from a 
Poisson distribution. A solution to dealing with overdispersion is the use of a negative 
binomial distribution instead of a Poisson (King 1989). Incorrectly assuming equidispersion 
will lead to downward-biased standard errors. Martin and Vanberg “…expect that once party 
groups have expended the legislative resources to make one substantive change to a 
government draft bill, it is marginally less costly to make several more changes. This is 
known as positive contagion, which results in overdispersion…”(MV 2005, 101, their 
emphases). Consequently, I apply Negative Binomial regression instead of Poisson 
regression41. 
With increasing coalition conflict committee scrutiny will lead to more amendments on a 
proposal, whereas opposition issue divisiveness should have no mentionable effect on the 
number of proposal changes. I also keep several control variables that Martin and Vanberg 
initially introduced. Since a junior minister could moderate a conflict without the need to 
delegate the conflict to a committee, we might observe a decrease in amendments if a 
junior minister controlled the work of the minister. The number of committees to which a 
draft bill is referred to may generate more changes made to bills. The reason for this is 
simple: More legislators from a coalition partner who are able to scrutinize the ministerial 
bill proposal can better uncover deviations from the coalition agreement. I also include the 
complexity of a proposal, since short proposals are likely to have fewer changes made to 
while draft bills with many articles are likely to generate more changes. In line with Martin 
                                                          
41 Of the 141 observations used in the full model with interactions, only 17 are zero observations, i.e. about 
12% of the proposals have been passed without any amendments. I consequently refrain from using nested 
models covering “excess zeros” such as the zero inflated Poisson or the zero inflated negative binomial. 
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and Vanberg I include the expiration of a bill before the plenary vote as control variable and 
expect that bills that receive a full review in the legislative process will have more changes 
made to. Finally, I also incorporate separate indicators for the different issue areas that a 
proposal addresses42.  
Independent Variable  Model I 
(Germany) 
Model II 
(hearing) 
Model III 
(interactions) 
Intercept 1.3006 
(0.8170) 
0.7413 
(0.7013) 
0.9778 
(0.9043) 
Government Issue Divisiveness   .4201** 
(.1961) 
.3312* 
(.1722) 
.0432 
(.2210) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness   -.2879** 
(.1196) 
-.2460** 
(.1028) 
-.1924+ 
(.1279) 
Junior Minister Partner  -.2029 
(.2951) 
-.2158 
(.2616) 
-.2878 
(.2610) 
No. Committee Referrals  .0742** 
(.0303) 
.0518** 
(.0252) 
.0514** 
(.0251) 
Complexity  .8244*** 
(0.873) 
.7850*** 
(.0769) 
.6248*** 
(.1395) 
Expiration of Bills before Plenary Vote -1.1141** 
(.4538) 
-.2780** 
(.4897) 
-.3035 
(.4752) 
Hearing -- .5984*** 
(.1254) 
.3236 
(.7674) 
Hearing x  
Government Issue Divisiveness 
-- -- .4470** 
(.1845) 
Hearing x  
Opposition Issue Divisiveness  
-- -- -0765 
(.1047) 
Hearing x Log No. Articles  -- -- .2321+ 
(.1535) 
N= 147 143 141 
Log-Likelihood -348.3028 -331.2767 -322.4431 
Χ2 (p<0.001, two-tailed) (12)=136.22 (13)=156.26 (16)=162.22 
AIC 724.6056 692.5533 680.8861 
BIC 766.4717 736.996 733.9638 
Cell entries are unstandardized maximum-likelihood estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). 
Exposure and dispersion parameters are not displayed. 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Table 4.6 Negative Binomial Model of the Number of Article Changes in Government Bills 
                                                          
42 Martin and Vanberg suggest that “one possibility is that outside lobby groups or advisory bodies are better 
organized in some policy areas than in others, and consequently, the information provided to legislators by 
these groups will make proposing feasible changes to government bills more or less difficult to achive.” (MV 
2005, 101). I report the coefficients of the separate indicators for the particular issue area in Appendix 3.A. 
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Model I re-runs the analysis on the subset for German policy proposals43 (table 4.6). A 
positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the level of the independent variable will 
increase the number or article changes to a bill proposal, whereas a negative coefficient 
implies a reduction of the number of article changes. Contrary to the results of Martin and 
Vanberg, junior ministers never directly decrease the number of amendments to a proposal. 
Within a ministry, they can directly access background information and personnel 
(bureaucrats) and signal policy conflicts, unresolved questions etc. directly to the cabinet. 
Junior ministers help governing partners keep conflicts away from the public. Consequently, 
junior ministers leverage pre-committee influence instead of at-committee influence. Across 
all models and confirming theoretical expectations of Martin and Vanberg (2005), the more 
committees a draft bill is referred to and the more articles in the draft bill, the more changes 
we can expect to be made to a proposal. 
Model II introduces public hearings as explanatory variable, which is highly significant (at 
p=0.001). Public hearings increase the number of changes to a proposal. Since we are 
theoretically interested in the effect of public hearings given intra-coalitional conflict, model 
III includes interaction terms for public hearings and government issue divisiveness, public 
hearings with opposition issue divisiveness and bill complexity. All initial explanatory 
variables lose their significance, except for the number of committee referrals and the 
complexity of a proposal. As expected, the interaction term of public hearing and intra-
coalitional conflict is positive and highly significant (at p=0.05). In short, with increasing 
intra-coalitional conflict, public hearings lead to substantially more amendments on 
proposals than expected for bills not scrutinized in a public hearing.  
In line with Martin and Vanberg’s interpretation (MV 2005, 102) I calculate the percentage 
change in the expected number of article changes in a bill with a relative risk interpretation 
of the interaction coefficient44: For a proposal with one standard deviation increase in intra-
coalitional conflict, holding a public hearing increases the number of article changes by 
33.5% (table 4.7). In other words, public hearings account for a third of the observed article 
                                                          
43 Due to collinearity, the additional conflict dimensions “Clerical Policy” and “Environmental Policy” were 
excluded from the analyses. 
44 The calculation for the percentage change in the expected number of article changes in a bill for a δ change 
in the independent variable x is: Δ𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
[100∗(𝑒𝛽(𝑥+𝛿)−𝑒𝛽𝑥)]
𝑒𝛽𝑥
 (cf. MV 2005, 102), with δ being set to one 
standard deviation for continuous variables and one unit for dummy variables. 
 
81 What are Public Hearings good for?  Legislative Governance and Oppositional Influence 
changes. This shows that government parties can use public hearings to mitigate ministerial 
drift and ensure compromised policies by amending the initial government proposal. 
Independent of public hearings, the number amendments to ministerial proposals is heavily 
influenced by the complexity of bills. Sometimes, proposals are amendend because of policy 
conflicts. But very often, it seems, the reason for article changes is more profane: writing 
flawless policy proposals is a daunting task. Neither ministers nor their staff always know 
everything in advance to write a flawless proposal. Instead, they depend on parliamentary 
institutions to learn something about the “blind spots” of a draft bill.  
Independent Variable 
Model I 
(Germany) 
Model II 
(hearing) 
Model III 
(interactions) 
Government Issue Divisiveness 39.67** 30.14* 3.50 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness - 33.20** -29.16** -23.63+ 
Junior Minister Partner -18.37 -19.41 -25.01 
No. Committee Referrals 18.46** 12.55** 12.45** 
Complexity 88.45*** 82.83*** 61.65*** 
Expiration of Bills before Plenary Vote -67.18** -24.27** -26.18 
Hearing -- 81.92*** 38.21 
Hearing x  
Government Issue Divisiveness 
-- -- 33.50** 
Hearing x  
Opposition Issue Divisiveness  
-- -- -23.85 
Hearing x Log No. Articles  -- -- 32.46+ 
Cell entries represent the percentage change in the expected number of article changes in a bill  
proposal resulting from an increase of one standard deviation in the corresponding independent variable (or one unit  
for dichotomous indicator variables). 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2 
Table 4.7 Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Article Changes in Government Bills 
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Marginal Effects for Public Hearings and Legislative Governance 
 
Figure 4.3 Predictive Margins for Proposals: Coalition Conflict, Proposal Complexity and Public Hearings 
One graph speaks more than a thousand words – I therefore calculate the predictive 
marginal effects of government issue divisiveness and proposal complexity in the presence 
or absence of a public hearing on the expected number of article changes in government 
bills. The marginal effects of public hearings are calculated for representative values of 
coalition conflict or proposal complexity, holding all other covariates centered at their mean 
values. Up until the 90th percentile of coalition conflict (i.e. 134 of the 147 proposals in the 
dataset are members of this subset) we find a statistically significant difference (i.e. the 
confidence intervals do not overlap) when accounting for a public hearing. Public hearings 
indeed increase the expected number of article changes to a bill proposal across the 
specified values of coalition conflict. We can expect more changes to a proposal if coalition 
partners are divided over an issue. Yet we can always expect more changes to a proposal if 
the proposal itself is more complex. Either, or – public hearings increase the expected 
amount of amendments to a bill proposal. And in line with previous results, public hearings 
matter both for parliamentary learning and for dealing with partisan conflicts. 
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Public Hearings and Alternative Governance Structures 
Junior ministers, committee chairs and public hearings could be inter-related. From previous 
research (see above) we know that installing junior ministers matters for ministerial control. 
We also know that committee chairs are evidently more likely to be placed opposite 
ministers from more ideologically diverging parties. Following the previous discussion, the 
existence of junior minister should reduce the likelihood for public hearings while committee 
chair shouldn’t matter at all due to the missing rights45. Taking financial implications of a 
proposal into account is important because it creates a “smoking gun”: With financial 
implications, public hearings on issues with high government issue divisiveness are already 
very unlikely, so how in this rare instance do junior minister and committee chair play a role? 
Coalition partners fight over some proposals more intensely than on other draft bills. The 
existence of a junior minister and committee chair controlled by a government partner 
should reduce the likelihood of a hearing especially on these potentially upsetting proposals. 
The empirical test for this is not straightforward because we generally observe fewer public 
hearings with increasing government issue divisiveness. I therefore propose sub-setting the 
sample into proposals with low internal conflict and financial implications (conflict values 
below the 50th percentile, 53 proposals) and with high internal conflict and financial 
implications (conflict values above or equal to the 50th percentile, 49 proposals). Since I am 
interested solely in the interdependency of different mechanisms of intra-coalitional scrutiny 
(junior minister, committee chair, public hearing), I exclude opposition issue divisiveness 
from the analysis of the subsets. I run a simple logistic regression (table 4.8) on the 
occurrence for public hearings on proposals with financial implications for the full dataset, a 
subset with low internal government conflict (< 50th percentile), and a subset with high 
government issue divisiveness (≥ 50th percentile). 
It is important to repeat that public hearings for bills that are contested within government 
and have financial implications are already very unlikely. But even then we find that complex 
proposals make public hearings more likely (although the variable now fails to be significant, 
see table 4.8, Model II). Do junior ministers reduce the likelihood for public hearings even 
further as proposed? Yes they do: The average marginal effect for a junior minister 
                                                          
45 The data source for the committee chairs is once again the “Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag”, which 
lists the partisanship of committee chairs and vice-chairs for all committees in Germany from legislative 
sessions 1 to 16. 
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shadowing a coalition partner’s ministry, given that the proposal has financial implications 
and substantial intra-coalitional conflict, is -.4622, i.e. for this type of proposal the presence 
of a junior minister further reduces the likelihood for a public hearing by 1-.4622= 53.78%. 
As expected, we find no mentionable influence of committee chairs on the occurrence of a 
public hearing. In sum, junior ministers matter for scrutinizing proposals with financial 
implications and increasing coalition conflict in public hearings, while committee chairs do 
not46. In the analysis of the subset with intra-coalitional conflict below the 50th percentile the 
absence of a junior minister perfectly predicts the occurrence of a public hearing, while a 
committee chair held by a governing partner has no considerable effect at all. Consequently, 
Junior ministers always reduce the likelihood for a public hearing while committee chairs 
have no substantial influence whatsoever on the occurrence of public hearings. 
Independent Variable  Model I 
(Low Government  
Issue Divisiveness) 
Model II 
(High Government  
Issue Divisiveness) 
Model III 
(Full Model) 
(Intercept)  -1.5174* 
(.8995) 
-.1369 
(1.0363) 
-.7950 
(.6336) 
Bill Complexity .9032** 
(.4404) 
.2818 
(.4696) 
.5755**  
(.2977) 
Junior Minister  Omitted -2.4064*** 
(.8667) 
-1.8918*** 
(.6959) 
Committee Chair .6921 
(.7152) 
 .3198 
(.7374) 
.3356 
(.4884) 
N= 52 49 101 
Log-Likelihood -32.117559 -27.164391 -62.101459 
Χ2 (p<0.01) (2)=5.92 (3)=12.13 (3)=15.01 
AIC 70.23512 62.32878 132.2029 
BIC 76.08885 69.81359 142.6634 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Table 4.8 Logit analysis on public hearings and mechanisms of intra-coalitional scrutiny for proposals with financial 
implications 
 
                                                          
46 An additional t-test of committee chairs held by government partners on the occurrence of a public hearing 
fails to be significant even at the p=0.2 level for this subsample of proposals, further corroborating the null 
hypothesis that committee chairs do not influence the use of public hearings. 
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Public Hearings and Oppositional Delay 
I propose that public hearings related to ideological differences between the opposition and 
the minister proposing a bill are the main parameter explaining the duration of a bill 
proposal in the committees of the German Bundestag. When studying the duration of a bill 
in committee, we are specifically interested in the causes of change from being in committee 
to being relegated to the floor. This “event” of being relegated to the floor can occur at any 
given moment, i.e. we need to consider a time continuum starting once a bill is introduced 
to a committee and ending once it is transferred back to the floor. As this data is readily 
available in the MV dataset, we have no problems with left-censoring, i.e. we observe the 
bills already before they enter the time continuum. But there may be issues regarding right-
censoring, which occurs with regard to bill proposals when the legislative session ends, but 
the bill has not been passed to the floor yet. Traditional regression models fail to account for 
the difference in a bill being passed to the floor and the censoring of a bill because the 
legislative session has ended. Therefore, we need to additionally check for this type of right-
censoring. While a logit regression on an event occurring (yes/no) does not cause bias or 
inconsistency, its estimates will have larger variances relative to an event history analysis 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1417; cf. Chung, Schmidt, and Witte 1991). Event history 
(or survival) models are an established alternative in political science to explain the timing of 
an event, e.g. the termination of a coalition (King et al. 1994; Warwick 1994; Box-
Steffensmeier, Arnold and Zorn 1997).  
Survival analysis encompasses three elementary concepts, all mathematically related to each 
other, the survivor function, the occurrence of an event and the hazard rate. Since both the 
survivor function f(t) and the occurrence of an event S(t) can be derived from the hazard rate 
h(t), I only introduce the latter here specifically47. Suppose we are modeling the duration of a 
bill in committee. Then the survivor function describes the probability that the bill is still in 
committee. The occurrence of an event represents the probability density function of the 
duration and can be described as the instantaneous probability of a bill being transferred 
back to the floor. Finally, the hazard rate can best be interpreted as the “risk” of a bill being 
delegated back to floor at any given moment in time, given that it has not been delegated 
yet. A discrete time formulation is appropriate for predefined periods, e.g. the end of a 
school year, the end of a subscription etc. Political processes are more likely to be 
                                                          
47 It can be shown that ℎ(𝑡) =
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
, cf. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997 
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continuous, e.g. the end of a presidential term is not fixed to the official date but can occur 
earlier due to shocks, the end of a war is not predefined etc. Therefore, the transition from 
being in the “risk set” (i.e. not having experienced the end of something, e.g. the end of a 
term, the end of a war) to falling out of it can happen anywhere in time. Assuming a baseline 
rate, α, and a vector of covariates, β’X, the hazard rate can be expressed as 
ℎ(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚Δt→0
𝑃(𝑡 + Δ𝑡 > 𝑇 ≥ 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡; α, β’X)
Δ𝑡
 
The baseline rate α expresses the “time path” that duration will follow if all covariates are 
zero (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1427). Paramount to the estimation of the hazard 
rate is therefore the parameterization/ nonparameterization of the baseline hazard rate, i.e. 
specifying a distribution of the baseline hazard. When choosing the exponential distribution, 
for example, the assumption is being made that the hazard rate doesn’t change over time at 
all. Duration dependence on the other hand is present “…if the occurrence of an event for an 
individual (conditional on the covariates in the model) is related to how long the unit has 
been at risk” (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 21). A commonly applied distribution in political 
science event history analysis is the Weibull distribution, because it allows the hazard rate to 
vary by some specific parameter of an observation. In my analysis of factors influencing the 
delay of government bills, I follow Martin and Vanberg (2004) and employ the Weibull model 
because of its flexibility and ease of use48. The Hazard rate h(t) in the Weibull model is 
calculated as: 
ℎ(𝑡) = exp [β’X +  α ln(t)] 
Before presenting the regression results I visually inspect the duration of proposals by 
plotting the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function from the duration data on 
government bills in committees of the German Bundestag, grouped by the occurrence of a 
public hearing (figure 4.4). Kaplan-Meier estimates are a nonparametric maximum likelihood 
                                                          
48 The more flexible semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model makes no assumptions about the shape of 
the hazard rate, but has several disadvantages, as Martin and Vanberg (2004, 24, footnote 27) point out. The 
Cox regression is often difficult to interpret because of its sensitivity to individual failures (Royston 2001). In 
their analysis of the delay of government bills, Martin and Vanberg find that the Weibull model has smaller 
standard errors than the Cox regression, which is why they only report the more efficient Weibull analysis 
(Collett 1994). Yamaguchi (1991, 102-103) outlines several further disadvantages of the Cox model. Since I am 
explicitly interested in a comparison of Martin and Vanberg’s results with my own, I concentrate on the Weibull 
regression model as well. 
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estimate of the survival function S(t). The Kaplan-Meier survival curve plots the probability 
of a bill staying in committee given that a hearing has taken place (light grey) compared to 
bills with no hearings attached (dark grey).  
 
Figure 4.4 "Survival" of Proposals in Committees of the German Bundestag 
As can be seen from the rough contours of the survival curves, the Kaplan-Meier estimate is 
a step function with discontinuities at observed events. It simply estimates the proportion of 
bills still in committee at time t. Proposals scrutinized in a public hearing have been delayed 
more frequently than proposals where no public hearing occurred. The shaded areas 
surrounding the estimate resemble the 95% confidence intervals. Up to a duration of 200 
days, these do not overlap. This first graphical analysis suggests that for a substantial 
amount of bills in the dataset public hearings can in principle delay government bills in 
committees of the German Bundestag. The following Weibull analyses are intended to 
corroborate the hypothesized relationship. 
The dependent variable duration measures the length of the legislative process as the 
number of days between parliamentary introduction and final vote on a bill. The 
independent variables are chosen analogous to Martin and Vanberg’s (2004) analysis of 
legislative delay. In the presence of a public hearing, increasing coalition conflict committee 
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scrutiny should delay legislative passing of a proposal. I also expect opposition issue 
divisiveness to make enactment of a bill less likely. Thus I include both of them as 
independent variables and as interaction term. I also keep several control variables that 
Martin and Vanberg initially introduced. Since it is costly for government partners to have 
bills delayed and thus not benefit from having implemented the ministerial proposal, Martin 
and Vanberg (2004) include government issue saliency. For very important draft bills they 
expect a swift passage if the governing partners are not divided on that issue. In contrast, 
they assume that draft bills of minor importance but on which government parties are 
extremely divided take much longer to pass the parliamentary process. A similar measure for 
opposition issue saliency is included in the analysis. Finally, I also include separate indicators 
for the different issue areas that a proposal addresses and run several robustance checks: 
Neither unobserved heterogeneity nor nonproportionality in the hazard rate are an issue in 
my estimations49. 
Table 4.9 summarizes the statistical results from several Weibull regressions. Model I.A is 
estimated without interaction terms or controls for issue areas. Model I.B includes the 
interaction terms of public hearings and issue divisiveness/ issue importance. Models II.A 
and II.B include additional controls for issue areas. Both model I.A and I.B report similar 
coefficients both in magnitude and direction for public hearings. Across all model 
specifications, neither government issue divisiveness nor government issue importance 
(significantly) delay policymaking in the committees of the German Bundestag. This is a 
somewhat surprising result, contrary to Martin and Vanberg (2004), who found such a 
relationship. This finding is even more remarkable because model I.A suggests that, 
independent of public hearings, legislative proposals that are both divisive and salient to 
government partners are significantly more likely to be put to a vote (though these results 
lose their levels of significance when accounting for issue area controls).  
 
 
                                                          
49 I report the coefficients of the separate indicators for the particular issue areas in Appendix 3.B. I additionally 
explain and test the models on unobserved heterogeneity in my data estimating frailty models imposing either 
a gamma distribution or an inverse Gaussian distribution on the omitted effects. In neither of the auxiliary 
models do I find evidence of heterogeneity. Following a procedure suggested by Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 
(2001) I check the hazard of the Weibull for nonproportionality, i.e. temporal dependence in the effects of the 
covariates. I find no evidence for nonproportionality either. 
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Independent Variable 
Model I.A 
(hearing) 
Model I. B 
(hearing + 
interactions) 
Model II.A 
issue areas 
(hearing) 
Model II.B 
issue areas 
(hearing + 
interactions) 
(Intercept) -11.6106*** 
(1.8904) 
-13.6725*** 
(2.2948) 
33.3200 
(22.3120) 
31.5295 
(22.4861) 
Government Issue Divisiveness 
(GID) 
.5526***  
(.1918) 
.6284*** 
(.2343) 
.1009 
(.5758) 
-.5978 
(.53779) 
Weighted Coalition Importance 
(WCI)  
6.8870*** 
(1.4263) 
6.0522*** 
(1.9324) 
-25.0629 
(19.6040) 
-14.3677 
(19.8689) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness (OID) -.2747** 
(.1169) 
-.2148+ 
(.1412) 
.0604 
(.4093) 
.7613* 
(.3896) 
Weighted Opposition Importance .6221 
(.9914) 
2.9481** 
(1.2769) 
-10.7576+ 
(7.8980) 
-20.1469*** 
(7.7725) 
Hearing -.9350*** 
(1.8904) 
4.5404 
(3.5770) 
-.9797*** 
(.2043) 
9.8680** 
(4.8701) 
Hearing x GID  -.4192 
(.4258) 
 -.8954+ 
(.6104) 
Hearing x WCI  -.5293 
(2.9092) 
 -1.7371 
(3.7889) 
Hearing x OID   .0203 
(.2561) 
 .2555 
(.3782) 
Hearing x WOI  -4.6679** 
(2.1293) 
 -10.0053*** 
(3.1164) 
N= 137 137 137 137 
Log-Likelihood -178.58658 -174.85751 -175.42062 -167.24123 
Χ2 (p<0.001) (5)=46.05 (9)=53.51 (11)=52.38 (15)=68.74 
AIC 371.1732 371.715 376.8412 368.4825 
BIC 391.613 403.8348 414.801 418.1221 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Table 4.9 Weibull Duration Analysis of Government Bill Delay 
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As expected, the coefficients suggest that public hearings significantly delay policy proposals 
(in both models I.A and II.A p≤0.01). Excluding interaction terms for public hearings and 
government (opposition) issue divisiveness or issue saliency, we find strong support that 
public hearings delay the passing of proposals. I theoretically expect public hearings to 
delay proposals if the proposal is either important to the opposition or the opposition is 
divided on that issue with the coalition government. To accommodate for this, models I.B 
and II.B include interaction terms for public hearings and the conflict measures. Including 
these interactions, we find that a public hearing increases the likelihood that a draft bill will 
be put to a vote on any day, given that it has not been voted upon yet. But even then, public 
hearings significantly delay proposals that are relatively more important to the opposition 
but uncontroversial. Excluding the issue area controls (model I.B), bill proposals that are 
relatively important to the opposition but uncontroversial between the opposition and a 
coalition government are more likely to be put to a vote than those bills that are 
controversial but unimportant. This result does not hold when including the issue area 
controls. In the full model (II.B), which includes both interaction terms for public hearings 
and the issue area controls, the more important a proposal is to the opposition and the less 
divided it is on that issue with the government coalition the less likely the draft bill will be 
put to a vote on any given day. Nonetheless the overall argument holds: Once we account 
for public hearings as an instrument of delay we find that it is the opposition that drives 
legislative delay. Contrary to previous research I find no substantial evidence that intra-
coalitional conflict increases the number of days a draft bill takes until it is put to a vote. The 
opposition is mainly responsible for the delay of a proposal in the committees of the German 
Bundestag. Taking all these results into account, two scenarios emerge that explain 
legislative delay in the committees of the German Bundestag: 
1. Proposals that are relatively more important but uncontroversial to the opposition and 
that are not being scrutinized in a public hearing are less likely to be put to a vote. 
Conversely, draft bills that are dividing government and opposition but are relatively less 
important will more likely be put to a vote. 
2. Proposals that are relatively more important but uncontroversial to the opposition and 
that are being scrutinized in a public hearing are also less likely to be put to a vote. 
Conversely, draft bills dividing government and opposition but relatively less important 
to the opposition, will more likely be put to a vote following a public hearing. 
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Predicted Duration of Proposals in Committees of the German Bundestag 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Predicted Duration of Proposals in Committees of the German Bundestag 
Since opposition issue importance is a main cause for legislative delay both with and without 
public hearings, what difference do public hearings substantially make? I graphically 
investigate the influence of public hearings on the duration of proposals in committees of 
the German Bundestag. Figure 4.6 plots the predicted number of days a proposal is likely to 
stay in committee using fractional polynomial regression50 with duration as dependent 
variable and either weighted opposition issue importance or government issue divisiveness 
as independent variable, holding all other variables centered at their mean values. The 95% 
confidence intervals do not overlap much for weighted opposition importance, i.e. there is a 
significant difference in the effect of public hearings on the duration of proposals vs. 
proposals without a public hearing. As the interaction term of public hearing and 
government issue divisiveness is weakly significant in the Weibull regression, the confidence 
                                                          
50 The graph can be estimated with the twoway fpfitci command in Stata (version 13). I deviate here from the 
marginal effects approach: The margins command in stata calculates the standard errors from nonlinear 
predictions using the delta-method and it also uses a normal approximation for computing confidence 
intervals. Since the confidence intervals for the covariates of a Weibull regression do not follow a normal 
distribution (i.e. duration is bounded on non-negative values), the margins command misspecifies the 
confidence intervals, which greatly complicates interpretation of the marginal effects. 
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intervals heavily overlap for the predicted values. Even though we can accept the results for 
opposition issue importance with confidence this does not hold true for the interaction 
effect of public hearings and government issue divisiveness. 
Summary 
What are public hearings good for? I have argued that public hearings can fulfill the function 
of cabinet scrutiny and help government partners keep their coalition compromise. A public 
hearing can signal a deviation from such a compromise or - even more detrimental to the 
minister – reveal policy incompetence. Consequently, we observe fewer public hearings on 
issues that are highly divisive for coalition partners. As part of the “alternative governance 
structures”, public hearings need to be considered in relation to junior ministers and 
committee chairs. The presence of a junior minister as pre-committee control mechanism to 
reduce ministerial drift does reduce the occurrence of public hearings while in the German 
Bundestag committee chairs do not, which is somewhat surprising given the current 
discussion on “shadowing chairs” in the comparative research field (Kim and Loewenberg 
2005, Carroll and Cox 2012, Fortunato, Martin and Vanberg n.D). It is less startling when 
considering the constraints the standing orders of the German Bundestag impose on 
committee chairs. In light of these results, country-specific constraints should be taken into 
account more in depth when evaluating the role of committee chairs in general. Finally, with 
increasing conflict between a minister proposing a bill and the opposition, public hearings 
not only become more likely but their occurrence significantly lengthens the time that is 
being spent on a bill proposal in a committee if held on proposals relatively more important 
to the opposition. Several results stand out from the preceding analyses: 
1. Public hearings are part of the features supporting the policing strength of 
committees in Western European parliaments. They do not just matter theoretically. 
2. Even though public hearings are less likely for controversial proposals with financial 
implications, they heavily influence the number of article changes on a proposal if 
they occur.  
3. The opposition delays government proposals that are important but uncontroversial 
by forcing a public hearing on the bill in question. In doing so, the opposition can 
differentiate itself from the coalition government on issues that are less 
controversial. 
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It is worthwhile repeating: In public hearings, government partners scrutinize ministerial 
proposals – but only if nothing else works, since the cabinet has to bear out the audience 
costs associated with the publicity of the hearing. Before a public hearing occurs, junior 
ministers, among others, will try to resolve the conflict at the cabinet stage and thus reduce 
the likelihood of a public hearing. The opposition can benefit from having government “look 
bad”, and public hearings are one possibility to reach this goal by significantly delaying 
government policy making in the committees of the German Bundestag. The opposition does 
have influence on policymaking after all: Even though it cannot influence the content of a bill 
it can harm a coalition by delaying it. As it turns out, public hearings are theoretically and 
empirically a strategic mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny – for coalition partners as a last 
resort to propose amendments and for opposition parties as an instrument of delay.  
Public hearings are available to government and opposition in the German Bundestag. The 
publicity of the hearing can potentially threaten a minister’s reputation or signal his 
incompetence. Only with a public audience do the shirking ministers risk the electoral costs 
of being identified as either incompetent or unfaithful. Until now we have been able to 
identify the main causes of public hearings (conflict between opposition and government, 
proposal complexity) and the effects of public hearings (more amendments with increasing 
intra-coalitional conflict, legislative delay on issues important to the opposition). It is less 
straightforward to explain why a hearing should be public and what we are to expect from 
the publicity of a hearing. To solve this part of the puzzle, I gather insights from the 
International Relations literature on audience costs. The following chapter will lay out the 
foundations of audience cost theory and their application to public hearings in the German 
Bundestag. The publicity of a hearing can either help a minister to credibly signal his intent 
to his supporters by “tying his hands” to a proposal or help the opposition to credibly reveal 
unfavorable information. Empirically, the more important an issue is to a minister and the 
closer the legislative session is to the next elections, the more likely the occurrence of a 
public hearing should be – but strikingly we cannot confirm this relationship in the statistical 
analysis. Public hearings can serve as an informational cue for mass media outlets. 
Consequently, we should observe more articles on policy proposals if a public hearing was 
held, i.e. public hearings should increase media visibility.  
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5. Why Public?                        
An Audience Cost Theory of Public Hearings 
 
As we have seen in the previous discussion of transaction cost theory, compliance with 
coalition compromises critically depends on independent enforcement capabilities, i.e. 
“alternative governance structures” that facilitate compliance within the principal-agent-
relationship of ministers and cabinet. I have proposed that public hearings are such an 
alternative governance structure: They unveil the effort of a cabinet member to the cabinet 
and reduce the risk of shirking within the principal-agent-relationship by signaling credible 
commitment to the (necessarily incomplete) coalition contract. But why should a hearing be 
held in public? How does the “public” in public hearings encourage compliance? We can 
resolve these questions by extending the previous discussion on transaction-cost-theory, 
committee functions and coalition governance. Borrowing from the International Relations 
(IR) literature on compliance and conflict, I develop an audience cost explanation of public 
hearings in the German Bundestag. In the international context, audience costs are defined 
as the drop in public approval a national leader faces for having made a threat in a conflict 
and then backing down from it. Similarly, by holding a public hearing the proposing minister 
can be burdened with audience costs for having made a policy promise and failing to pass a 
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draft bill in accordance with this policy promise, thus being perceived as either unresolved or 
incompetent. Because public hearings can generate more media visibility, these (potential) 
audience costs further compliance of a minister with a coalition compromise. Audience Cost 
Theory (ACT) explicitly structures the relationship between leaders and their populations as 
principal-agent relationships. Uzonyi, Souva, and Golder (2012) relate ACT to the principal-
agent-framework of transaction-cost-theory. I quote their valuable discussion at length: 
Audience costs are best understood from a principal-agent perspective… delegation 
introduces the problem of moral hazard, in that it gives the leader the opportunity to take 
actions that her audience would not want her to take. Moral hazard increases as the agent 
becomes more insulated from risk…Audience costs are the mechanism through which the 
audience attempts to limit moral hazard (Fearon 1994)…Thus to reduce moral hazard, the 
audience must be able to punish the leader, exposing her to the cost associated with a poor 
foreign policy…We argue that that audience costs are primarily a function of institutions 
affecting the contestability for the head of state position. (4, my emphases) 
Audience costs arise in principal-agent relations because of the “conflict between principal 
and agent over which action should be carried out” (Laffont and Martimort 2002, 146). As 
such, audience costs are a part of the transaction costs approach to politics, the basis of this 
study of public hearings in the German Bundestag. ACT therefore relies on the same basic 
assumptions as does the existing literature on delegation and control in parliamentary 
systems and can thus serve as a natural extension of the approach chosen for this research 
question. As we have seen in the discussion of the Martin-Vanberg model (chapter 4), a 
coalition partner sometimes has the incentives to credibly commit to imposing audience 
costs on diverging partners. At the same time, due to asymmetric information between a 
minister and a coalition partner, the minister may be tempted to deviate from a coalition 
compromise, thus “audience costs can arise only if for some reason the leader is (tempted to 
be) an unfaithful agent” (Slantchev 2006, 449).  
Audience costs have been both analytically modeled and empirically tested as a key 
mechanism to signal resolve in international conflicts (Fearon 1994, Schultz 2001, Slantchev 
2006, Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). Audience costs are “an important factor in enabling 
states to learn about an opponent’s willingness to use force in a dispute” (Fearon 1994, 577). 
By publically tying his hands or “burning the bridges”, a state leader can credibly signal his 
intentions to an opponent. His credibility comes from the risk of losing office if the leader 
were to back down from his intentions to use force. The previous focus of the leadership-
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audience cost nexus has been on US presidents (Tomz 2007, Levendusky and Horowitz 
2012), even though some very recent attempts have been made to extend audience cost 
theory to other systems (e.g. Davies and Johns 2013). The next section assesses the present 
literature on audience cost theory in international relations and uncovers crucial 
components: a definition of audience costs, competence, opposition, and ministerial resolve. 
Following this literature review, I relate public hearings to audience costs in general. Then I 
offer an observational link (media visibility) between public hearings and audience costs, 
before empirically investigating if public hearings generate a public. As it turns out, public 
hearings not only increase the number of publications in the largest German daily 
newspaper for the timeframe of observation, they additionally (audience costs!) make 
articles more likely that explicitly deal with intracoalitional conflicts. 
Audience Cost Theory in International Relations 
The field of compliance has been intensely researched in the subfield of International 
Relations (IR). Keohane (1984) argues that the costliness of mutually beneficial policy 
agreements enhances the risks of noncompliance in international agreements. International 
institutions facilitate cooperation by providing a forum for sounding an alarm in case of 
noncompliance. In IR research, a growing body of literature suggests that domestic actors 
play a crucial role in imposing noncompliance (or: audience) costs on governments defecting 
from an international agreement. This literature stresses the importance of institutions in 
leveraging informational asymmetries (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2000, 2002; 
Rosendorff 2005; Carrubba 2005; Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla 2008), enabling credible 
commitment (Simmons 2000, Simmons and Danner 2010), or generating audience costs 
(Tomz 2007). A public can punish its government for noncompliance of an international 
institutional commitment because it appreciates the benefits of the institution (Carruba, 
2009) or noncompliance reveals private information of the intentions of the government 
(Fang 2008, Mansfield et al. 2002). Compliance on European Union (EU) directives has been 
extensively studied across several disciplines. One prominent approach points to fire-alarm 
mechanisms to monitor compliance, e.g. access to courts or interest group activities (Börzel 
2006, 2000). Angelova, Dannwolf and König (2012) associate public attention with higher 
audience costs in a research synthesis on compliance with European Union (EU) directives. 
Similarly, I will argue that as a precondition to induce audience costs, public hearings in the 
German Bundestag have to create public attention. 
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The audience cost argument can originally be traced back to Thomas Schelling who first 
posited that states that are better able to credibly commit to their position in international 
conflicts would generally compel or deter the adversarial state to concede (Schelling 1960, 
1966). Tomz (2007, 823) defines audience costs as “shorthand for the surge in disapproval 
that would occur if a leader made commitments and did not follow through.” In a similar 
vein, albeit more closely connected to international conflicts, Levendusky and Horowitz 
(2012, 324) propose to call audience costs “the punishments in the form of lower support, 
meted out by domestic populations against leaders that make foreign threats but then 
ultimately back down”. At the heart of the theory lies the proposition that “these threats 
have to be made in a high-profile speech that will be heard by both the domestic audience 
and the opponent on the international stage” (Davies and Johns 2013, 725f.). Slantchev 
formalizes audience costs as “a direct reduction in the leader’s reselection probability that 
occurs in equilibrium because of citizens inferring information unfavorable to the 
incumbent” (2006, 450). According to ACT, democracies are able to signal commitment more 
credibly than non-democracies because domestic political audiences highly value the 
nation’s reputation for keeping its promises. Fearon (1994, 1997) initially laid out this 
argument by proposing a link between a leader’s resolve and the nation’s reputation. In 
democracies, domestic audiences can more easily restore international reputation by 
punishing their leaders, although Weeks (2008) argues that many autocratic states are 
capable of generating these audience costs as well (cf. Brown and Marcum 2011).  
Soon after Fearon laid out his argument, the first empirical evaluation of audience cost 
theory was conducted by Eyerman and Hart (1996). Since then, empirical studies on 
audience costs have gathered momentum (Partell and Palmer 1999, Gelpi and Griesdorff 
2001, Schultz 2001, Weeks 2008, Downes and Sechser 2012, Haynes 2012), mostly 
supporting the hypotheses generated from Fearon’s original model. ACT has been employed 
for empirically investigating whether democracies are more likely to win wars they enter 
(Reiter and Stam 1998) and whether they are more reliable allies (Lipson 2003). It has also 
been extended to accommodate an explanation of the democratic peace (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 1999). Using a unique survey experiment, Tomz (2007) demonstrates that 
audience costs do exist for the US president because the public will punish a leader for 
bluffing, although his approach cannot answer the question whether audience costs would 
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make the US president more successful in an international crisis51. Davies and Johns assess 
that audience costs vary substantially depending on the type of crisis and that the potential 
for audience costs is especially pronounced among voters rather than non-voters, in sum, 
that “researchers cannot assume that governments have an across-the-board ability to 
generate audience costs” (p. 12). Weeks (2008, p. 36) makes an important point that “the 
crucial question in generating international credibility is whether the relevant domestic 
audience can and will coordinate to sanction the leader, and whether the possibility of 
coordination is observable to foreign decision makers”.  
ACT in its original formulation therefore depends on the constraining assumption that the 
domestic public always penalizes an incumbent for backing down from a threat to use force, 
even though “…resolve is ultimately a function of how salient the disputed good is to the 
domestic audience” (Clare 2007, p.732). In essence then, “…even if the leader cares more 
about foreign policy than the public does, domestic audience costs cannot arise unless the 
public actually cares more than the leader about the consequences for backing down after 
escalation” (Slantchev 2006, p.449) As Chaudoin (2012, p.3) points out, „The key assumption 
of ACT is that audiences have preferences over consistency…However, audiences also have 
preferences over policy. Audiences care about the actual policies that are being 
implemented, regardless of their consistency with past statements.” It is therefore not 
enough that an attentive audience exists, but that an attentive audience with compliance-
supporting preferences coordinates to generate audience costs which are observable to 
foreign decision makers. Brown and Marcum (2011) qualify the relevant domestic audience 
as “the winning coalition” in a state. Leaving aside institutions, the authors contend that 
“autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring 
and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coalitions.” (141). They 
suggest that “Leaders are accountable when coalition members can monitor their behavior 
and sanction them for poor performance” (146).  
In all empirical evaluations, ACT is confronted with methodological difficulties, e.g. selection 
effects (Schultz 2001) or conflating causal effects and causal mechanisms (Gartzke and Lupu 
2012). Selection effects can occur because leaders who do not want to suffer audience costs 
                                                          
51 Researchers are increasingly aware of the difficulties associated with interpreting the causal findings of 
survey experiments, e.g. Druckman and Leeper (2012), Barabas and Jerit (2010), Benz and Meier (2008), Cook, 
Shadish and Wong (2008), Levitt and List (2007)  
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will only select into those policies that do not risk generating audience costs in the first 
place. Determining audience costs in this case is almost impossible. Conflating causal effects 
of audience costs and the proposed causal mechanism of audience costs does not mean that 
researchers can “use the absence of evidence as evidence of absence” (Gartzke and Lupu 
2012, p. 392, footnote 7). Thus, an intermediate step in the empirical analysis of public 
hearings will be to show that there actually is a “public” in public hearings. 
Competence, Credibility and Audience Costs 
While Fearon (1994) was primarily concerned with a nation’s reputation in international 
bargaining if a nation would not uphold a public commitment, Smith (1998) argued that 
backing down shows a leader’s incompetence in resolving a crisis. As Clare (2007, 624) 
comments, “Since it is the least competent type of leaders who renege, broken 
commitments are a sign of incompetence which the voters punish”. In this manner a public 
hearing can generate an audience that evaluates the resolve or competence of a minister. A 
growing body of literature suggests that issue-specific perceptions of competence and 
salience influence voter’s party choices (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Green and Hobolt 2008; 
Bélanger and Gélineau 2010; de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Green and Jennings 2012a and 
2012b; Geys 2012; Spoon, de Vries and Hobolt 2013). Public hearings are an information-
revealing technology available to government and opposition in the German Bundestag. The 
audience costs associated with public hearings can therefore threaten a minister’s 
reputation and signal his incompetence. By holding a public hearing a coalition partner can 
both monitor the activity of a minister and at the same time create an arena for 
sanctioning “poor policy performance”.  
By staging public hearings, both opposition and government parties can create an arena for 
signaling the quality of government policies as the invited experts who comment on the 
proposal transmit additional information. Citizens can make use of public hearings as a cue 
for the competence or actionability of a minister. A public hearing indicates a conflict or 
complexity of a proposal thus revealing a high level of importance towards citizens. Through 
public hearings, the electorate can update its beliefs about the quality of government and, 
ultimately, hold the members of a government accountable on Election Day. This is why 
hearings are only effective in keeping tabs on cabinet members if they are public. Only with 
a public audience do the ministers risk the potential electoral repercussions for being 
stamped as incompetent or unfaithful, because “One can imagine that there are fears that 
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open disagreements among committee members from coalition partners may damage the 
coalition more generally, and it is better that the public and the press do not follow the 
discussions directly“(Hallerberg 2004, 29). Woon (2012) finds that voters view elections 
primarily as a mechanism of democratic accountability. His experimentally derived results 
indicate that “subjects’ voting behavior is consistent with a purely retrospective reward-
punishment strategy” (Woon 2012, 2). Elections hold politicians accountable for policy 
outcomes: Producing good outcomes is rewarded with staying in office, producing bad 
outcomes is punished. These results favor an audience cost theory of parliamentary politics: 
Institutional mechanisms within parliament enable coalition partners and the opposition to 
keep tabs on each other, favoring “good” outcomes over “bad” ones. 
Jacobs and Matthews (2012) experimentally study mechanisms of time discounting in the 
mass public via an on-line survey experiment in which subjects were asked to evaluate a 
proposed policy reform. Their results “…point clearly to the central role of uncertainty about 
the long term in shaping mass intertemporal policy attitudes” (904). This has substantial 
consequences for creating public policy: “The benefits of a public policy usually lie at the end 
of a long and contingent chain of delegation and causation: they depend on processes of 
elite decision making and social dynamics that are, from the citizens’ perspective, both 
remote and complex” (932). Subjects’ sensitivity to the timing of policy payoffs was “highest 
in the presence of two conditions that make the delay of benefits appear riskier: causal 
complexity and distrust in government” (933). From this point of view, public hearings 
enhance the stability of government policy output by credibly tying the hands of coalition 
partners through risking audience costs.  
Partell and Palmer (1999) argue that audience costs are a function of executive constraints. 
Similarly, Prins (2003) contends that they are a function of “the stability of domestic political 
structures”(p. 68). This again reduces distrust in government, as voters can learn that 
politicians stick to “the rules of the game”: “Politicians’ capacity to invest with electoral 
safety will depend substantially on how credible citizens find governments’ 
commitments.”(p.31) Public hearings can enhance the credibility of governmental 
commitments. This in turn can be a valuable institutional asset: It creates a greater temporal 
room for maneuver to invest in long-run goods even at short-term expenses.  
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Opposition and Audience Costs 
Schultz (2001) departs from Smith and Fearon by introducing an office-seeking opposition 
party as an important strategic actor during crisis bargaining. The gist of Schultz’ argument: 
If the opposition party can credibly threaten to impose audience costs in case of reneging, 
governments will self-select only those policies that will not have to bear out these audience 
costs. Extending this argument to public hearings in the German Bundestag is fairly 
straightforward: If the opposition can credibly threaten to call for a public hearing for 
proposals that indicate strong divisiveness between government and opposition, 
governments should only self-select those policies that will not risk being delayed too much 
by a public hearing.  
To ensure that leaders cannot cover-up their foreign-policy mistakes, “there must be 
heterogeneous and autonomous political elites in positions of power that have both 
independent access to foreign policy information and the incentive to reliably blow the 
whistle when leaders blunder” (Baum and Potter, forthcoming, 2). Baum and Potter 
(forthcoming) see oppositional parties as natural candidates for several compelling reasons: 
1. Systems with more parties create more ideologically proximate alternatives for 
voters (Downs 1957) 
2. Systems with more parties generate more competing policy frames (Milner 2002) 
3. Systems with more parties have media with more access to competing frames, 
including alternatives to the government’s preferred frame (Sheafer and Wolfsfeld 
2009). 
While Martin and Vanberg (2011) find no evidence of an influential opposition, public 
hearings theoretically bring the opposition back in: “If the opposition could credibly reveal 
unfavorable information, it could enable citizens to make the necessary inferences and 
impose costs on the leader for pursuing a bad policy” (Slantchev 2006, 451). 
(Ministerial) Resolve and Audience Costs 
Audience costs can be strategically created by an opposition to signal incompetence of a 
minister. But there is another important aspect of ACT: A strongly committed minister can 
himself call for a public hearing to “burn down the bridges”, i.e. irrevocably commit to a 
proposal by intentionally risking audience costs. As James Fearon defines it,  
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Tying hands means taking an action that increases the costs of backing down if the 
would-be challenger actually challenges but otherwise entails no costs if no challenge 
materializes… a tying-hands signal typically works by creating audience costs that the 
leadership would suffer due to the reaction of domestic political audiences to a 
perceived failure in the management of foreign policy… (Fearon 1997, 70; my 
emphases).  
This is an argument unknown to the literature on parliamentary research. In this case, a 
public hearing is not just simply cheap talk, but rather a strong bargaining statement within 
a cabinet. It is better for a minister to do nothing than to proposing a policy and not being 
able to follow through with it (Tomz 2007, 834).  
H5.1 (Ministerial Resolve and Audience Costs) 
The closer the next election is and the more important an issue is to the minister, the more 
likely are public hearings on a policy proposal. 
In Martin and Vanberg’s model of coalition governance, a minister will sometimes propose a 
radical bill because the constrained environment does not allow for a moderate bill. This is 
exactly the case where a public hearing can signal ministerial resolve. If ministers in a 
coalition government apply public hearings to credibly tie their hands to a bill because it is 
the only feasible one, the ministerial salience attached to a bill proposal should be driving 
factor for the occurrence of a public hearing. And this should be even more so in the face of 
upcoming elections.  
Public Hearings and Audience Costs 
Audience Cost Theory is aptly suited to explain various phenomena surrounding public 
hearings. For once, audience costs vary over time and across issues. Audience costs vary 
with the saliency of issues, the size of the affected audience and the level of conflict 
between government partners. Public hearings can be viewed as a parliamentary mechanism 
for having experts sound an alarm if a minister deviates from a coalition compromise or is 
considered incompetent.  
But the idea of a sounding alarm is only relevant when there is an audience whose 
preferences disfavor defection. By assumption, then, the audience and their preferences are 
important for enabling cooperation. Studying public hearings without taking their audience 
into account is therefore bound to miss relevant aspects. Public hearings encourage 
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compliance by creating an audience that could, in principle, punish a minister by denying 
previously granted approval. In a public hearing political parties and experts/ interest groups 
can both publically scrutinize a proposal for quality and commitment. While in an 
international conflict audience costs are a mechanism for a leader to credibly signal her 
commitment towards an interstate opponent, audience costs in the domestic parliamentary 
arena can be imposed by several actors as an instrument of political punishment, e.g. for not 
keeping a coalition compromise, deviating from key interest groups or failing to lead a 
ministry competently.  
A public hearing can thus signal both policy preferences and levels of competency to the 
voter. Voters can then use these informational cues to reevaluate their beliefs about 
incumbents and update their voting decisions accordingly through retrospective voting. In 
this sense, applying audience cost theory to the domestic arena is very similar to the 
international context, i.e. audience costs are a function of “the stability of domestic political 
structures” (Prins 2003, p. 68; Eichhorst 2014, 102f.). When are public hearings called? 
Simply speaking, when all the other available instruments of coalition management do not 
suffice and/ or the opposition believes that a public hearing has a large benefit to the 
opposition at that specific moment in time. In short, when the opposition believes the 
audience costs to be at their peak regarding a policy proposal, they will call for a public 
hearing.  
How do public hearings influence policymaking? Since they induce audience costs, involved 
ministers/ governments will want to alleviate these costs by moderating the bill proposal. 
This should be visible as an increase in the number of article changes, which is what we find 
for highly divisive proposals. Additionally, the opposition can attack the government’s 
actionability by delaying policymaking in committees with a public hearing, thus signaling 
incompetence of the government towards the electorate. While we have already found 
support for public hearings increasing proposal changes in the presence of coalitional 
conflict and public hearings delaying policy proposals that are important to the opposition, 
the implicit assumption that public hearings are actually “playing to an audience” still needs 
to be tested.  
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Empirical Analysis: Public Hearings, Election Timing and Ministerial 
Resolve 
Independent Variable 
Model I 
(Credible 
Commitment) 
(Intercept) -5.6213 
(5.7320) 
Government Issue Divisiveness .3534  
(.4983) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness .6360** 
(.3078) 
Financial Implications 2.5502 
(.2.3658) 
Government Issue Divisiveness x 
Financial Implications 
-1.5474** 
(.6850) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness x 
Financial Implications 
-.3626 
(.3745) 
Logged Number of Articles .7972*** 
(.2884) 
Ministerial Saliency .0234 
(.4345) 
Electoral Distance -.0027 
(0065) 
Ministerial Saliency x   
Electoral Distance 
.0002 
(0005) 
N= 140 
Log-Likelihood -80.903436 
Χ2 (p<0.01) (9)=31.24 
AIC 181.8069 
BIC 211.2233 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Table 5.1 Logit Model „Tying the Hands“ with Public Hearings 
Before proposing an empirical link between public hearings and audience cost theory (i.e. 
media visibility), it is worthwhile repeating the previous empirical results, which are all well 
in line with ACT: Public hearings are less likely in the presence of financial implications and 
increasing government conflict over the bill proposal. The mere possibility of a public 
hearing enhances the stability of government policy output by increasing the credibility of 
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governmental commitments. Additionally, we have observed that the opposition can and 
does make use of public hearings to delay government bills. The opposition can reveal 
unfavorable information in public hearings and help citizens to make the necessary 
inferences to impose audience costs on the minister. One aspect of ACT that we have not yet 
considered in the empirical analyses on public hearings is the link between ministerial 
resolve and the use of public hearings. To repeat, if ministers in a coalition government 
want to publically tie their hands to a bill, then the ministerial salience attached to the 
proposal should influence the occurrence of public hearings, especially with elections ahead. 
I therefore extend the previous logit model (chap. 3). The dataset already includes a variable 
for ministerial salience. To account for the timing until the next election, I include the date of 
the next election to each bill proposal in the dataset and generate a new variable that 
measures the distance (in days) from the referral of a proposal to a committee and the next 
election.  
Are public hearings a means for ministers to credibly tie their hands to a bill? For this 
argument to have some empirical foundation the more important an issue is to a minister 
and the closer the legislative session is to the next elections, the more likely the occurrence 
of a public hearing should be. The statistical results (table 5.1) do not support this 
hypothesis: Neither does ministerial saliency itself influence the likelihood for public 
hearings, nor does a bill that is salient to the proposing minister and is timed adjacent to the 
end of the legislative session (i.e. the interaction term of ministerial salience and number of 
days until election) have any considerable and significant effect. Regarding the timing of a 
public hearing in general, the inclusion of the distance to the next election has no substantial 
effect. Not only is the coefficient negligible in size, but it never reaches any mentionable 
level of significance. All the initial results still hold true: Public hearings are more likely with 
increasing opposition issue divisiveness, they are more likely with increasing complexity of a 
proposal, and they occur less likely with increasing conflict in a coalition on a draft bill that 
has financial implications. We currently lack any evidence that ministers use public 
hearings to credibly commit to implementing a policy proposal at the expense of audience 
costs. Rather, public hearings are an ultima ratio to punish a minister to reduce the moral 
hazards associated with the delegation of legislative tasks to her52. For now I focus on the 
                                                          
52 I leave to future research to take a more detailed look at the strategic timing of hearings. Nonetheless, in a 
separate regression not reported here, I also included interactions of opposition issue divisiveness, weighted 
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“publicity” of public hearings, leaving aside the link between a public and their promise-
keeping preferences. This clearly is a shortcoming that should be alleviated with further 
research in future. However, if public hearings do not generate publicity in the first place 
there is little justification in studying this link further. Accordingly, the goal of the next 
paragraphs is to find a relationship between public hearings and publicity. For this I turn to 
mass media communication. 
Looking for an Audience: Public Hearings and Mass Media 
Communication 
Public hearings cannot impose audience costs for the simple reason that they are public. It is 
not enough to argue that the few citizens that attend such a hearing would suffice as a 
reckonable audience. Although a number of scholars have found that elite actions do 
influence mass opinion (Gaines et al. 2007, Jacobs and Page 2005, Zaller 1992), a precise 
information transmission mechanism has seldom been specified. Potter and Baum (2010) 
and Baum and Potter (2008) focus on the hitherto neglected role of mass media as such a 
mechanism. The argument that domestic political elites play a key role in modifying 
audience costs (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012) critically depends on an independent media 
landscape paying attention to political elite behavior (Slantchev 2006, Potter and Baum 
2010). This means that public hearings can only burden ministers with audience costs if the 
audience is informed about the political setting surrounding the public hearing. On the other 
hand, the threat of audience costs and the associated uncertainty of whether these costs do 
occur may serve as an incentive to keep ministers in check.  
The accountability of a minister influences the patterns of coalition governance. If public 
hearings can make ministers truly accountable, this should stabilize coalition governments 
(c.f. McGillivray and Smith 2000 on the link between agent-specific punishments and 
cooperation). It is sufficient for the minister to believe that he could incur these costs to 
change his behavior accordingly. This means that public hearings do not always need to 
effectively create real audience costs, they just have to occur often enough to change the 
minister’s belief about their likelihood of occurring and thus incurring audience costs, since 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
opposition saliency and electoral distance as there could be an electoral component attached to the timing of 
public hearings (cf. Martin 2004, Huber 1996). With regards to the proposals of the German Bundestag, the 
results do not change in direction or significance. The opposition does not seem to strategically time public 
hearings, which could be due to procedural aspects of holding a public hearing, e.g. parliament shutdown 
during electoral campaigning etc.  
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“the theory requires only that leaders instinctively identify a connection between their 
words, deeds, and the repercussions of public perceptions” (Gartzke and Lupu 2012, 395). 
A free press is crucial in informing domestic audiences about the behavior of their leaders in 
international conflicts, it is “the ultimate source of audience costs” (Baum and Potter 2008, 
57). According to Matthew Baum, a free press is “the single most important factor in 
determining which issues and attitudes become highly accessible to the mass public” (Baum 
2003, 31). Complicating an analysis of audience costs are two recent results in political 
communication research: 
1. The media filter and distort the information that elites would want to transmit to the 
public (Baum and Groeling 2010, Groeling 2010) 
2. The public does not equally pay attention to every political message that is being 
transmitted (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, Popkin 1993). 
Fortunately, audience cost theory does not presuppose a perfectly informed public, but 
rather  
…that the public engages with [foreign] policy enough to be both aware of the commitments 
leaders have made and consistent enough in its judgment of success and failure to punish 
failure at the ballot box. Obviously, such a process is contingent on the public’s capacity to 
gather and retain information and to then use that information to formulate coherent 
opinions about the performance of leaders. (Baum and Potter 2014: 3, my own emphasis). 
How does the public engage with policy issues in general? Does the public have the capacity 
to gather and interpret the relevant information? Available research draws a nuanced 
picture of citizen’s abilities: 
1. Voters can use informational shortcuts to make rational decisions even with 
relatively little information available (Sniderman et al. 1991, Popkin 1993) 
2. Voters rely on the opinions of trusted political elites (Larson 2000, Krosnick and 
Kinder 1990, Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  
Signaling the opinions of political elites (politicians, scientists, interest group representatives, 
voters can use the occurrence of a public hearing as an informational shortcut to evaluate 
government behavior. For ACT to explain the publicity of hearings, hearings have to generate 
an audience, e.g. increase media turnout on the bargaining issue of a public hearing. But why 
should public hearings be associated with media turnout at all?  
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1. Newsworthiness in mass media is evidently associated to negativity across a wide 
range of subjects (Soroka 2012, Altheide 1997, Harrington 1989, Iyengar and Reeves 
1997, Patterson 1994, Shoemaker, Change and Bredlinger 1987, Soroka 2006).  
2. Studies in such diverse fields as psychology, economics, evolutionary biology and 
neurology suggest that negative information is being given more weight than 
existing positive information on the same issue (Vonk 1996, Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, McDermott, Fowler and Smirnov 2008, Herwig et al. 2007). “Bad news is good 
news” seems to have some empirical grounding after all.  
3. Politically interested participants are more likely to select negative stories in 
experiments regardless of what they say they prefer (Trussler and Soroka 2014). 
Mass media are more likely to select negative over positive stories. The publicity of public 
hearings can therefore have a detrimental effect to voter’s evaluations of ministerial 
competence or coalitional commitment since an incompetent minister or a minister 
unfaithful to a coalition compromise is much more likely to fall under “bad news”. As 
previously stated, public hearings signal conflict and/ or complexity on a bill proposal. 
Therefore, public hearings can serve as an informational cue for mass media outlets and 
consequently influence their gate keeping decisions. We should thus find support for the 
following hypothesis: 
H5.1 (Public Hearings and Media Turnout) 
Bill proposals on which a public hearing was held are associated with more media visibility, 
e.g. newspaper articles.  
This hypothesis is a necessary preliminary for observing “audience costs”. Unless we are able 
to find support for this hypothesis, we cannot reasonably expect public hearings to create 
audience costs. But if mass media are biased towards negative news and policy conflicts 
within a coalition are “bad news”, then any publication mentioning government partners 
discussing a policy proposal is the closest we can currently get to an empirical evaluation of 
“audience costs”. 53 
                                                          
53 Unfortunately, we currently have no knowledge on the number of faz publications specifically indicating 
coalition conflict but only the total number of articles on a proposal. This is a shortcoming that lends itself to 
further research because newspaper articles explicitly indicating conflict between coalition partners are the 
essence of “audience costs”. 
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Empirical Analysis: Public Hearings and Media Turnout 
To empirically investigate whether proposals with public hearings do have an audience, i.e. 
increased media turnout, I gather several media related variables. Each policy initiative in 
the dataset is complemented by an extensive media analysis of the largest German Daily 
Newspaper, the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”54. Specifically, I investigate the occurrence 
of articles, reports, op-eds and letters to the editor, since it is not so much of interest in 
which form policy proposals are being discussed but that they are being mentioned at all. I 
set the time frame for the media analysis to one year before the date of the committee’s 
report and decision recommendation until one month after this date. To assemble the media 
data, I conducted an online search in the archival database of the FAZ (http://faz-archiv-
approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/FAZ.ein). For the specified time frame I 
searched the database for occurrences of the preliminary title of the proposed law. For 
example, the committee report on the proposal with the internal reference number 12/6719 
was passed and published on April 13th 199455. The time frame for searching the database 
was therefore set to a period ranging from April 13th 1993 to May 13th 1994. The Committee 
report and the proposal mention the preliminary titles of the law by different parties, 
“Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz” or “Arbeitsförderungsgesetz”. These preliminary titles 
were taken as search phrases.   
As table 5.2 shows, 116 of the 148 proposals in the MV dataset have been discussed in some 
manner in the FAZ. Of the 116 proposals cited in an FAZ publication during the specified time 
frame, 66 have been scrutinized in a public hearing. On 86 of these proposals mentioned 
there is additional information available in the FAZ coverage on partisan conflict. Thus, 
partisan conflict seems to increase media visibility in general. Additionally I checked whether 
the citation of a proposal includes a reference to a partisan conflict (in government, between 
opposition and government, both). Most of the partisan conflicts identified this way deal 
                                                          
54For the time frame of this study (10th to 12th legislative session) I do not expect the FAZ to be negatively 
biased against coalition behavior. This cannot necessarily be said of more left-leaning newspaper outlets such 
as Frankfurter Rundschau or Süddeutsche Zeitung. If there is indeed a positivity bias evident in the ensuing 
analyses, the results can be accepted with greater confidence. 
55 The original MV Dataset does not include the internal reference number of the committee protocols. These 
could easily be retrieved from the database of the German Bundestag by searching for the complete legislative 
procedure on the proposal’s internal reference number. I have included this additional information in the 
variable “internrefg”. 
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with policy conflicts both between government parties and government and opposition (49). 
Only four FAZ publications mention a purely governmental conflict.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Media Coverage of Proposals (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) 
 
While these descriptive statistics are by no means conclusive, they reveal a possible 
“publicity” link between public hearings and media visibility. Proposals with a public hearing 
and proposals with both coalitional and oppositional conflict attached are referred to 
frequently. A summary statistic on the average number of FAZ articles mentioning a proposal 
grouped by the occurrence of a public hearing strengthens this first impression (table 5.3): 
On average, almost twice as many publications discussed a proposal in some manner if a 
public hearing was held on this proposal compared to proposals with no public hearing. A 
closer look at the relationship between public hearings and media visibility is therefore 
warranted.  
Public Hearing Average Number of FAZ Publications on Proposal 
NO 4.7 
YES 8.65 
 
Table 5.3 Avg. No. of FAZ Articles on Proposals, grouped by the Occurrence of a Public Hearing 
Statistical Model for Public Hearings and Media Turnout 
The model specification for explaining media turnout on a bill is similar to modeling the 
number of article changes to a bill (cf. 76f. of this dissertation). Because the dependent 
Media Coverage of Proposals in MV Dataset  
Proposals 148 
Proposals mentioned in FAZ Coverage 116 
FAZ Coverage mentioning Partisan Conflict 86 
FAZ Coverage mentioning Oppositional Conflict 33 
FAZ Coverage mentioning Governmental Conflict 4 
FAZ Coverage mentioning Oppositional  
and Governmental Conflict 
49 
Proposals mentioned in FAZ with a Public Hearing 66 
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variable is a count (number of FAZ articles mentioning a policy proposal), an event count 
model is suitable. Both dependent variables (number of article changes, number of FAZ 
articles) are count variables with means larger than their variance (overdispersion), 
therefore a negative binomial model may be superior to the Poisson model, especially since 
the count variable includes many very small values (see figure 5.1)56.  
 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of FAZ Articles on Policy Proposals 
Overdispersion in the data may be “caused” by excessive zeros, i.e. more zeros than would 
be expected from a Poisson or Negative binomial distribution. Unobserved heterogeneity 
can also produce both overdispersion and “excess zeros”. As the overdispersion can be a 
result of more zeros than to be expected from a Poisson a zero-inflated Poisson model could 
be a feasible alternative. If the data generation process does not provide a natural limit (i.e. 
it is not based on a number of independent trials) the standard model should either be a 
Poisson or its overdispersed generalization instead of a Negative Binomial (Gelman and Hill 
2007, 112). On the other hand, if there are theoretical reasons to assume two different data 
generation processes for zeros and non-zeros, three solutions to this problem can be 
                                                          
56 Overdispersion can be a result of more zeros than to be expected from a Poisson, thus a zero-inflated 
Poisson model could be a feasible alternative. If the data generation process does not provide a natural limit 
(i.e. it is not based on a number of independent trials) the standard model should either be a Poisson or its 
overdispersed generalization instead of a Negative Binomial (Gelman and Hill 2007, 112).  
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applied, a zero inflated poisson (ZIP), a zero inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) or a 
“hurdle” model. These models estimate a nested model assuming different data generating 
processes for zeroes and non-zeros in the data. But there are theoretical differences: While 
the ZIP/ ZINB models 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 etc. and accounts for two probabilities (p=0 and 1-p=count 
data including 0), the “hurdle” model assumes one model explaining 0 vs. 1 and a count 
model constrained on values > 0. The ZIP/ ZINB assumes that the observation is simply a rare 
event that can but doesn’t need to occur under certain circumstances (Lampert 1992), while 
the “hurdle” model assumes that there is indeed a “hurdle” that needs to be crossed first 
(King 1989).57 The ZIP/ ZINB estimates the zeros through a logit model nested within a 
Poisson or negative binomial model. Nonetheless, the zeros can come from either the logit 
or the Poisson/ negative binomial, i.e. the data generating process is not as constrained as in 
the “hurdle” model. Choosing the model should consequently not depend on evaluating 
model fits (log-likelihood, Akaike Information Criterion, Bayesian Information Criterion, 
Vuong test) but rather on theoretical appropriateness regarding the presupposed data 
generating process.  
The FAZ covers German legislation among many topics in the “politics” section, which can be 
overwhelmingly packed with international relations, political affairs, issues within the 
German Bundesländer, judicial decisions etc. Within other sections (economics, sports, 
culture etc.) coverage of a draft bill is even less frequent. Theoretically, no FAZ publication 
on a draft bill follows the same data generating process as one or more FAZ publications. 
Additionally, less than twenty percent of all observations of the relevant dependent variable 
are zeros. The standard negative binomial models between-subject (in our case between-
proposals) heterogeneity, while the zero-inflated models have different probability models 
for zeros and nonzero counts. With the exception of the constraining “hurdle” model, the 
ZIP, ZINB and standard negative binomial are reasonable model choices: 
1. “Excess zeros” may be taken too seriously (less than 20% of the observations are 
zeros). Nonetheless there is overdispersion in the dependent variable, which would 
be indicative of a negative binomial model. The negative binomial places fever 
restrictions on the data generation process than the zero inflated variants. 
                                                          
57 But see Zorn (1998) who argues that both models basically are special cases of a more generalized model for 
count data. 
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2. Overdispersion in the data could be due to “excess zeros” for a Poisson distributed 
dependent variable. The data generation process for FAZ publications is more likely 
to be following a Poisson (because there is no natural limit to the number of 
publications) than a negative binomial. This would stand in favor of a zero inflated 
Poisson model. 
3. Overdispersion in the data could be due to “excess zeros” and unobserved between-
subject heterogeneity, favoring a zero inflated negative binomial over a zero inflated 
Poisson. 
As a conservative approach, I estimate all three models, even though the data generation 
process for the dependent variable suggests a zero-inflated Poisson. Regardless of model 
specification, we should observe that public hearings on proposals that divide governing 
partners increase media visibility at a standard level of significance.  
Variables for Public Hearings and Media Turnout 
To reiterate, a necessary condition for audience cost theory to hold regarding public 
hearings is that we have an increased publicity on policy proposals if a public hearing took 
place. This holds especially for bills on which government partners are divided. Theoretically, 
audience costs will be highest for government partners if they are divided on an issue and 
this is made public through a public hearing (negativity bias for newsworthiness). I therefore 
include variables measuring government or opposition divisiveness. I also account for the 
occurrence of a public hearing and interaction terms of hearings and divisiveness (both 
government and opposition). 
There could be several other reasons explaining the number of FAZ publications on a bill 
proposal that I control for: The complexity of a bill may indicate increased importance to the 
public. Upcoming elections may enhance awareness of a newspaper about draft bills, i.e. the 
closer an election is, the more likely it could be that draft proposals are increasingly covered 
(a negative coefficient would indicate this relationship). Additionally, some issue areas may 
be of more interest to the readers of the FAZ or to the FAZ newspaper itself. I therefore also 
include issue area controls (tax, foreign affairs, industry, social issues, clerical issues, 
agriculture, regional policy, environmental policy).  
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Results and Interpretation 
I estimate several event count models (negative binomial, zero inflated negative binomial, 
zero inflated Poisson) which include all proposals on which data were available for the 
independent and dependent variables (table 5.4). The results establish a robust relationship 
between public hearings, government conflict and media visibility. Somewhat surprising, 
especially with the negativity bias of newsworthiness in mind, with increasing government 
issue divisiveness proposals are actually less likely to be given increasing attention in more 
than one FAZ publication during the research time period, ceteris paribus. This may indicate 
that the FAZ newspaper is biased towards government policy during the time frame under 
consideration. Such a result actually strengthens our confidence in the results regarding the 
effect of public hearings in the presence of coalitional conflict. Independent of coalition 
conflict, public hearings have no visible influence on media visibility: Across all models the 
variable fails to reach any mentionable significance. In support of the theoretical argument, 
public hearings on proposals with intra-coalitional conflict increase the number of FAZ 
publications dealing with the proposal across all models.  
Even though divisiveness for the coalition decreases the expected number of FAZ articles 
substantially, a one standard deviation increase in issue divisiveness for the coalition 
increases the expected number of all FAZ articles on a proposal by 41.72% (for the zero 
inflated Poisson), given that a public hearing occurred58. The preferred zero inflated 
Poisson59 reveals additional interesting results (though the corresponding coefficients are 
only significant in the ZIP): Proposals that ideologically divide government and opposition 
parties are likely to be given more media visibility: conflict sells, or in the words of the media 
landscape “if it bleeds, it leads.” With increasing complexity of a proposal we also observe 
substantially more FAZ publications on the draft bill in question. The complexity of a 
proposal could thus indicate enhanced importance to the media. Strikingly, even though 
public hearings are called by parties in parliament to reduce the lack of information on 
complex bills (cf. chapter 3), this significantly decreases media visibility on a proposal. 
 
 
                                                          
58 The marginal effects are calculated with the formula mentioned in footnote 27.  
59 A comparison of observed and predicted values of the count models favors the zero inflated Poisson, cf. 
Appendix 4.A. 
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Independent Variable 
Model I 
NB 
Model II 
ZINB 
Model III 
ZIP 
(Intercept) .7531 
(2.0874) 
.6719 
(2.0079) 
1.4781*** 
(.4520) 
Government Issue Divisiveness  -.8305**  
(.4035)  
-.8708**  
(.3893)  
-.7212***  
(.0956)  
Opposition Issue Divisiveness .2540 
(.2933) 
.2768 
(.2815) 
.1396** 
(.0619) 
Complexity .2183 
(.3508) 
.2034 
(.3454) 
.2880*** 
(.07575) 
Hearing  .7494  
(2.002)  
.6579  
(1.9196)  
.3595  
(.4102)  
Hearing x Government Issue Divsiveness  .6546*  
(.3499)  
.5803*  
(.3345)  
.5395***  
(.0850)  
Hearing x Opposition Issue Divisiveness -.0957 
(.2710) 
-.0570 
(.2591) 
-.0023 
(.0537) 
Hearing x Complexity -.1880 
(.3830) 
-.2429 
(.3723) 
-.3167*** 
(.0827) 
Electoral Distance -.0004 
(.0004) 
-.0004 
(.0004) 
-.0001* 
(.0001) 
Inflation    
Hearing x Government Issue Divsiveness  -6.6028 
(14.8549) 
-.2216 
(.5219) 
Hearing x Opposition Issue Divisiveness  1.3425 
(1.7891) 
.2513 
(.1710) 
Hearing x Complexity  -4.7689 
(6.8360) 
-1.1905** 
(.6157) 
intercept  -2.9374** 
(1.3831) 
-1.4528*** 
(.3449) 
N= 134 134 134 
Log-Likelihood -465.45241 -463.3601 -1261.657 
Χ2 (14)=23.09 
(p<0.1) 
(14)=24.55 
(p<0.05) 
 
(14)=346.96 
(p<0.001) 
AIC 962.905 966.720 2561.314 
BIC 1009.270 1024.677 2616.373 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Table 5.4 Event Count Models on the Number of FAZ Articles on Government Bills 
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One reasonable interpretation is parliamentary learning: A public hearing on a complex bill 
not only reduces the informational asymmetries in committee but also signals sensible 
policymaking to the media, which is the opposite of what media with a negativity bias would 
generally take as a headline. Finally, the closer elections are up ahead, the more FAZ 
publications can be observed on a policy proposal (though this relationship is only weakly 
significant and has a very small marginal effect). 
Independent Variable 
Model I 
NB 
Model II 
ZINB 
Model III 
ZIP 
Government Issue Divisiveness  -48.67**  -49.97**  -43.65***  
Opposition Issue Divisiveness 42.74 47.38 21.60** 
Complexity 18.27 16.92 24.78*** 
Hearing  111.57  93.07  43.26  
Hearing x Government Issue Divisiveness  52.67*  45.51*  41.72***  
Hearing x Opposition Issue Divisiveness -28.88 -18.37 -0.82 
Hearing x Complexity -20.37 -25.49 -31-86*** 
Electoral Distance -13.58 -13.58 3.71* 
 
Cell entries represent the percentage change in the expected number of FAZ publications on a bill proposal resulting from an increase of 
one standard deviation in the corresponding independent variable (or one unit  for dichotomous indicator variables). 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2 
Table 5.5 Percentage Change in the Number of FAZ Articles on Government Bills 
 
Predictions of Public Hearings and Media Visibility 
From a glance at the percentage change in the expected number of FAZ newspaper articles 
on a proposal (table 5.5) we find that, in conjunction with coalition conflict, public hearings 
make a difference. As with all interaction effects though, the analysis should not confine 
itself to the coefficients. This is especially important for the analysis of public hearings and 
media turnout, since coalition conflict substantially decreases the number of newspaper 
articles dealing with a bill, ceteris paribus. Even though increasing coalition conflict strikingly 
reduces the expected number of FAZ publications, we observe a remarkable difference for 
those proposals that were scrutinized in a public hearing. With public hearings, policy 
proposals always generate more media visibility, but how does the effect play out? Keep in 
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mind that the conditional distribution of the dependent variable “FAZ publications” is from 
the exponential family of distributions. Thus, for the executed negative binomial, the mean 
response is related to the independent variables through a link function, which is a logit in 
this instance. Consequently, the estimated effect of an independent variable depends on 
values of all the independent variables in the model (Greene 2003: 675, Long and Freese 
2006, 171). I therefore graphically invest the predictive margins of a public hearing on the 
expected number of FAZ newspaper publications with regard to representative values of 
coalition conflict (figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2 Predicted Marginal Effects for Public Hearings on Media Visibility 
For proposals with coalition conflict levels above mean, the difference in expected FAZ 
publications is significant. The average number of newspaper articles on a proposal is about 
three times higher for those proposals scrutinized in public hearing compared to proposals 
not publically discussed in such a hearing. Nonetheless, there indeed seems to be a specific 
policy bias present in the newspaper articles of the FAZ considered in this analysis. Even 
though coalition conflict should be related to more media visibility following a negativity bias 
of popular media outlets, for those proposals considered in the legislative sessions 10 to 12, 
this result does not hold for the studied newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. But 
 
118 Why Public?                        An Audience Cost Theory of Public Hearings 
even then, public hearings hurt governing partners by substantially increasing the number of 
expected newspaper articles on a proposal. Indeed, public hearings create “audience costs”. 
Summary 
Both opposition and government parties can create an arena for signaling the quality of 
government policies – by holding a public hearing. I have argued that hearings can only be 
an effective control mechanism against ministerial drift if they are public. Only a public can 
create audience costs. Ministers deviating from coalition compromise risk being stamped as 
incompetent or unfaithful. The risk of audience costs credibly ties the hands of coalition 
partners. Yet this is only part of the story. Public hearings bring the opposition back in: 
Audience costs are strategically created by an opposition by delaying governmental policy 
proposals. In contrast, and against theoretical expectations, ministers do not use public 
hearings to “burn down the bridges”: We currently have no evidence that ministers credibly 
commit to a proposal at the risk of audience costs. Instead, public hearings are a 
parliamentary mechanism for having experts sound an alarm if a minister deviates from a 
coalition compromise or is considered incompetent – and this alarm creates an audience by 
increasing the media visibility of a proposal and related coalition cabinet conflicts. Public 
hearings as a signal of partisan conflict or proposal complexity influence the gate keeping 
decisions of mass media outlets. As expected, public hearings are especially detrimental to 
government partners because they make it substantially more likely that a newspaper article 
will deal not only with the relevant policy proposal but rather with the governmental conflict 
on that proposal. This is what audience costs are all about.  
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6. Listen Carefully – Public 
Hearings in the German 
Bundestag 
 
At the heart of modern parliamentary democracies lies the concept of public discussion 
about political goals and means to reach these goals. The parliamentary arena in this sense 
represents the ideal of a public justification of political power. But does the political 
discussion in this arena entail publicity? At the center of the preceding research has been the 
question how elected officials in a parliamentary democracy utilize public hearings to further 
political goals. The time being spent in committees with hearing experts and interest groups 
has grown considerably in the German Bundestag over the legislative sessions 1-16. If a 
public hearing occurs, it will most likely be on cabinet bills or government faction bills.  
 
120 Listen Carefully – Public Hearings in the German Bundestag 
The central argument of this thesis was straightforward: public hearings serve as a 
mechanism within parliamentary committees of the German Bundestag to monitor and 
scrutinize ministerial bill proposals. To support this argument, several questions had to be 
answered: 
- Why are public hearings called for in the first place?  
- How do public hearings affect the policy proposals involved, i.e. do they influence the 
duration of a proposal in a committee or the number of article changes?  
- Do public hearings generate publicity for a relevant audience? 
The discussion of transaction cost theory specified public hearings as one possible solution 
to economize on transaction costs in a political market. Consequently, we found strong 
empirical support that the occurrence of public hearings is systematically related to the 
complexity of a proposal even in the presence of partisan conflicts in the German 
Bundestag. In this sense, public hearings help all members of parliament to reduce 
transaction costs. But that is just part of a larger story, since public hearings support the 
policing strength of committees in Western European parliaments. Germany belongs to the 
group of Western European parliaments with strong policing powers of its committees. 
Public hearings are part of the structural and procedural features that influence the policing 
strength of parliaments. Parliaments that feature strong committee systems mirroring 
ministerial jurisdictions, that have public hearings as investigative mechanism available, and 
that allow members to propose amendments without restriction are better able to counter 
the threat of ministerial drift. 
We currently have no evidence that ministers use public hearings to credibly commit to a 
proposal by risking audience costs. In public hearings, government partners scrutinize 
ministerial proposals only if nothing else works, because the cabinet has to bear out the 
audience costs associated with the publicity of the hearing. That public hearings create 
audience costs is evident when considering the increased number of newspaper articles on 
proposals that were scrutinized in a public hearing.  
 
 
121 Listen Carefully – Public Hearings in the German Bundestag 
Kill Bill Revisited: Public Hearings and Coalition Conflict 
With increasing conflict within a coalition, public hearings become less likely, especially if a 
proposal has financial implications. A public hearing can signal a deviation from a coalition 
compromise or reveal policy incompetence of the minister. As a result, we observe fewer 
public hearings on highly divisive issues. The presence of junior ministers makes public 
hearings even less likely. This is sensible, as junior ministers can try to solve policy conflicts 
behind closed doors instead of blowing a whistle to the public. Interestingly, committee 
chairs in the German Bundestag have no influence on public hearings whatsoever, even 
though previous research has generated this expectation. While intra-coalitional conflict 
makes public hearings less likely, if highly divisive proposals are being discussed in a public 
hearing, this substantially increases the number of article changes. Thus while public 
hearings on coalitional conflicts turn out to be a rare species, they tend to have a strong bite 
on policy proposals. Public hearings are strategically employed to mitigate partisan conflicts. 
But they are also called upon if policy proposals become increasingly complex for members 
of the German Bundestag.  
There is no reason to be pessimistic about public hearings as “window dressing” (Berry 1989) 
or “political theater” (Davidson and Oleszek 2004, p. 214). Instead, public hearings are one 
instrument available to government partners to help them “stick” to a coalition compromise. 
Recall the proposal to tighten a law on child safety from the introduction. The public hearing 
revealed substantial policy differences between the coalition partners. While the experts 
invited by the CDU commended the proposal, the SPD selected those experts that would 
consequently criticize the proposal by the governing partner. Ekin Deligöz (Greens), vice 
chair of the committee closed the public hearing with the ironic words ”We will discuss the 
results of the hearing now and then we will have to see how it goes.” As a matter of fact, the 
minister withdrew the bill.  
Django Unchained Revisited: Public Hearings and Opposition Conflict 
Parties employ public hearings strategically as an instrument of legislative scrutiny. With 
increasing conflict between opposition and government, public hearings become more 
likely. The opposition can benefit from having government “look bad” by significantly 
delaying government policymaking through public hearings. Even though the opposition 
cannot influence the content of proposals, it can harm a coalition by delaying bills.  
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Recall the package of economic instruments initiated by the CDU/CSU-FDP government at 
the end of 2009. Although heavily scrutinized at the committee stage, the bill was passed 
and enforced on January 1st 2010. Only two weeks later, news came out that a hotel chain 
had made a donation of more than one million Euros to the FDP. While the FDP denied 
having received the donation in relation to the bill, this detail added to the critique of the bill 
and created a chorus of public outrage. By June, the German government was publically 
talking about plans to back down from the reduction of vat60. The government had no 
incentive to publically scrutinize a bill that was in line with the coalition contract. Instead, 
the opposition parties were the driving force behind the public hearing. Originally intended 
to reduce the informational asymmetries between government ministers and the 
opposition, public hearings are by now a strategic instrument for opposition parties to 
generate electoral benefits. 
Extensions and Open Questions 
In favor of maximal comparability and in relation to existing research on coalition 
governance and parliamentary scrutiny I opted for using an existing dataset with predefined 
variables that where measured according to current scholarly standards in the field of 
political science. Necessarily, this can only be a first start for investigating public hearings in 
the German Bundestag. As the descriptive statistics have shown, considerable variation 
exists for the use of public hearings across time and issues (committee portfolios) that 
regrettably could not be addressed with this approach. One possible and certainly rewarding 
addition would be to extend the dataset to include public hearings before legislative session 
10 and after legislative session 12. Doing this involves intricate measurement and coding of 
central variables (number of article changes to a bill proposal, government and opposition 
issue divisiveness etc.) not easily available for the complete period of observations. The task 
at hand instead focused on gathering insights about the causes and effects of public hearings 
in the German Bundestag. We already know that public hearings matter for the ability of 
Western European parliaments to scrutinize governmental bill proposals. Further research 
could therefore analyze public hearings as an instrument in Western European parliaments 
in comparative perspective.    
                                                          
60 Spiegel Online, 29.06.2010, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/steuerdebatte-in-der-koalition-
merkel-ruegt-lindners-hotel-volte-a-703619.html, (retrieved July 2014) 
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Naturally, many aspects of public hearings could not be further investigated in the course of 
this project. The results presented in the preceding chapters represent only a beginning and 
future work should explore public hearings in greater detail. For example, legislative 
debates of members of parliament have been somewhat understudied until now (but see 
Proksch and Slapin 2012). If public hearings generate additional knowledge on policy 
proposals, this should influence legislative debate. Future research could study the referral 
to public hearings in legislative speeches. How do members of parliament strategically 
communicate in favor or against a proposal by referring to public hearings? In this sense, 
public hearings could be a rhetorical instrument to members of parliament. 
Central to Georg Vanberg’s (2005) study of the German Federal Court of Constitutional 
Review is “transparency”, defined as opinion leadership/ media coverage, the presence of an 
organized interest and complexity of the issue at hand. Audience features affect judicial 
behavior (Vanberg 2001, 2005), an argument that is closely aligned to audience cost theory 
and public hearings. For example, Chaudoin argues, “If the audience does not support 
adherence to a particular judicial ruling, or if the informational setting is such that audiences 
are unlikely to learn about policymaker disobedience even when it does result in judicial 
scrutiny, then policymakers are more free to choose policies to their liking and courts are 
less likely to rule against those policies.” (Chaudoin 2012, 14, my emphasis). In public 
hearings, political actors signal opinions towards organized interests given complex issues, so 
by definition public hearings should have an impact on the likelihood of constitutional 
review. In the present study, public hearings are associated with higher media visibility. This 
implies a larger impact on public awareness and opinion (Vanberg 2005, 45). As Vanberg 
proposes, “The greater the likelihood that the environment in which the FCC is acting is 
transparent, the less deferential to legislative majorities the court will be“(ibid. 100). This 
clearly means that public hearings increase the likelihood of constitutional review on cases 
for which potential or actual public awareness is higher, when outside groups that provide 
political support for an annulment are present, and the less complex a policy area is. It 
would be interesting to further investigate whether public hearings signal constitutionality 
or quality of a bill proposal to the FCC in Germany.  
Esterling (2007) contends that interest groups and experts signal uncertainty and ambiguity 
in policy proposals. The composition of public hearings is likely to influence the ability of 
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public hearings to scrutinize ministerial bills. An in depth analysis of the expert statements in 
public hearings could clarify if more certain and less ambiguous signals in hearings by invited 
experts and interest groups reduce the number of amendments or duration of a proposal in 
committee. A more diverse group of interest groups could potentially increase audience 
costs. Furthermore, we currently know only very little about the impact of scientific 
expertise on policy proposals (but see König, Luig and Solomon 2010). 
Broader Normative Implications 
Rawls (1993) and Habermas(1994) share the idea that the publicity of political discussion 
enhances the quality of the “good of the public”. I intended to show that political discussions 
in public hearings indeed create publicity. As a last resort to keep ministers in check and 
government partners from wandering too far off a coalition compromise, public hearings are 
powerful instruments. They create a potentially critical audience and substantially influence 
policymaking by increasing the number of amendments to a proposal. Filtered through 
public hearings, policy proposals will not only be considered more seriously if they are 
complex, but they are likely to be more closely aligned to the electoral promises and 
coalition agreements the governing parties have made previously. Public hearings stabilize 
coalition government, alongside the presence of junior ministers and other “alternative 
governance structures” at the cabinet stage and in the parliamentary arena. Contrary to 
contemporary fears that scientific advisors are mere “pawns” or “fig leaves” for legitimizing 
already defined policies (Scharpf 2006, Patzelt 2003, Wewer 2003, Hoffman-Riem 1988, 
Böhret 1981), they help governing partners keep their promises and thus generate cabinet 
stability by inducing potentially damaging audience costs.  
Public hearings also reestablish the opposition as a serious player in parliament. By staging 
public hearings, the opposition not only reduces informational asymmetries vis-à-vis 
government but it sometimes reveals otherwise unnoticed intra-coalitional conflicts and 
ministerial drift. Supported by expert and interest group signals, opposition parties force 
ministers to reveal their preferences and motivation for a proposal in public hearings. The 
opposition can better fulfill its task to create transparency in governmental policymaking by 
holding public hearings and thus informing a larger audience. In this sense, public hearings 
are indeed for “the good of the public”. 
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Finally, public hearings create feedback-loops from government through parliament back to 
the electorate. By increasing media visibility on important policy proposals and related 
partisan conflicts, public hearings signal important information to the electorate to update 
its beliefs on governmental behavior. They “enable citizens to make the necessary inferences 
and impose costs […] for pursuing a bad policy” (Slantchev 2006, 451). Martin and Vanberg 
(2011) have vigorously argued that “the relevant juxtaposition is not between the cabinet 
and the parliament that holds ‘the government’ accountable. Rather it is between coalition 
parties that use legislative institutions to contain threats posed by the discretionary powers 
of ministers” (157). The discussion of public hearings, audience costs and media visibility 
touches a crucial normative question, posed by Powell (2000, 51): 
…because the parties [in a coalition] ran against each other and made individual policy 
proposals before forming a government, it may be difficult to attribute responsibility within a 
government made up of competitors, who can blame each other for failures. 
If public hearings indeed generate a larger audience through increased media turnout on 
ministerial proposals and related intra-coalitional conflicts, they can help increase the 
“clarity of responsibility” for coalition governments. Because public hearings entail audience 
costs, governing parties will only call for public hearings as a last resort to challenge and 
change the proposals of their partners. As Martin and Vanberg point out, “Voters elect 
legislators who have a central role in policymaking, and this influence extends to policy areas 
beyond the immediate ministerial control of their parties” (MV 2011, 165). Moderated by 
partisan conflicts, public hearings markedly influence content and duration of a government 
law proposal in the committees of the German Bundestag. Public hearings create an 
audience by increasing media visibility. If you don’t want to listen, find out the hard way - 
governing partners are well advised to “listen carefully”. 
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Appendix 1.A 
Information on the availability of public hearings for Western European parliaments was assembled 
from the standing orders or current parliamentary websites. 
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Independent Variable Model I Model II Model III 
(Intercept)  -3.2395*** 
(1.1431) 
-5.777934*** 
(2.080402) 
-4.5265** 
(2.4329) 
Government Issue Divisiveness   -.6417** 
(.2584) 
.3257717 
(.5263032) 
.4681 
(.5526) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness  .4061** 
(.1633) 
.7194438** 
(.3148478) 
.6661** 
(.3288) 
Financial Implications  -.6989+ 
(.4323) 
2.659903 
(2.407851) 
2.7328 
(2.5673) 
Logged Number of Articles .8778*** 
(.2773) 
.8008939*** 
(.28796) 
.4100 
(.3383) 
Government Issue Divisiveness x 
Financial Implications  
 -1.641917** 
(.6797339) 
-1.8793** 
(.7539) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness x 
Financial Implications 
 -.345159 
(.3744918) 
-.3295 
(.3958) 
Number of Committee Referrals -- -- .3371*** 
(.1242) 
Committee Size (# of members) -- -- -.0524 
(.0429) 
Log likelihood -88.674451   -82.952625    -78.007655 
Chi 2 (p<0.01) (4)= 19.71 (6)= 31.15 (8)=41.04 
N 143 143 143 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2 
Table Appendix 2.A.1 Logit Model Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Public Hearings 
I here conduct additional regressions on the occurrence of public hearings including two 
theoretically minor variables, the number of committee referrals and the size of a 
committee (# of members). Note that the central result holds regardless of additional 
control variables: With increasing intra-coalitional conflict on a proposal it becomes 
increasingly less likely that a public hearing will be held if the proposal also has financial 
implications. Independent of financial implications and the additional control variables, 
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public hearings always become more likely with increasing policy conflict between 
government and opposition.  
Independent Variable Model I 
(Intercept)  .4908 
(.3987) 
Committee Size   .0099 
(.0085) 
Logged Number of Articles .3013*** 
(.0493) 
Financial Implications  .0139 
(.0970) 
Government Issue Divisiveness  
 
-.0309 
(.0724) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness  
 
.0144 
(.0347) 
Junior Minister -.1341 
(.1380) 
Log likelihood -287.11788   
Chi 2 (p<0.01) (6)= 48.97 
N 146 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2 
Table Appendix 2.A.2 Negative Binomial Model for the Number of Committee Referrals 
As I have previously mentioned (p. 49, footnote 33), the complexity of a bill proposal (logged 
number of articles) and the number of committee referrals are correlated (0.53). The more 
complex a bill is the more likely it will be referred to more than one committee. Since the 
complexity of a bill proposal causally precedes a committee referral, including the number of 
committee referrals would only mask the explanatory power of the variable “complexity of a 
bill”. The following negative binomial regression (due to overdispersion) on the number of 
committee referrals corroborates this finding. The only significant variable (at p=0.000) on 
explaining the number of committee referrals is the complexity of a bill proposal measured 
as logged number of articles. 
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Independent Variable 
Model I 
(Germany) 
Model II 
(hearing) 
Model III 
(interactions) 
Government Issue Divisiveness   .4201** 
(.1961) 
.3312* 
(.1722) 
.0432 
(.2210) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness   -.2879** 
(.1196) 
-.2460** 
(.1028) 
-.1924+ 
(.1279) 
Junior Minister Partner  -.2029 
(.2951) 
-.2158 
(.2616) 
-.2878 
(.2610) 
No. Committee Referrals  .0742** 
(.0303) 
.0518** 
(.0252) 
.0514** 
(.0251) 
Log No. Articles  .8244*** 
(0.873) 
.7850*** 
(.0769) 
.6248*** 
(.1395) 
Expiration of Bills before Plenary Vote -1.1141** 
(.4538) 
-.2780** 
(.4897) 
-.3035 
(.4752) 
Tax Policy  .1653 
(.2504) 
.2360 
(.2244) 
.1571 
(.2213) 
Foreign Policy  -3.6529** 
(1.5019) 
-2.7960** 
(1.3730) 
-2.037+ 
(1.4739) 
Industrial Policy  -.6460* 
(.3618) 
-.3687* 
(.3155) 
-.4380* 
(.3118) 
Social Policy  .6136 
(.5368) 
.7521+ 
(.4765) 
.6632 
(.4709) 
Agricultural Policy  -.8264* 
(.4332) 
-.2709 
(.3808) 
-.2216 
(.3919) 
Regional Policy  -1.9578+ 
(1.2944) 
-1.3633 
(1.2944) 
-1.4595 
(1.2638) 
Hearing -- -.5984*** 
(.1254) 
.3236 
(.7674) 
Hearing x  
Government Issue Divisiveness 
-- -- .4470** 
(.1845) 
Hearing x  
Opposition Issue Divisiveness  
-- -- -0765 
(.1047) 
Hearing x Log No. Articles  -- -- .2321+ 
(.1535) 
N= 147 143 141 
Log-Likelihood -348.3028 -331.2767 -322.4431 
Χ2 (p<0.001, two-tailed) (12)=136.22 (13)=156.26 (16)=162.22 
AIC    
BIC    
Cell entries are unstandardized maximum-likelihood estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). 
Exposure and dispersion parameters are not displayed. 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2 
Table Appendix 3.A.1 Full Negative Binomial Model of the Number of Article Changes in Government Bills  
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Independent Variable Model I 
 
Model II 
(Hearing) 
Model IV 
(Interactions) 
Constant -9.1464*** 
(1.8416) 
-11.6106*** 
(1.8904) 
-13.6725*** 
(2.2948) 
Government Issue Divisiveness (GID) .4757**  
(.2078) 
.5526***  
(.1918) 
.6284*** 
(.2343) 
Weighted Coalition Importance (WCI) 5.5429*** 
(1.4354) 
6.8870*** 
(1.4263) 
6.0522*** 
(1.9324) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness (OID) -.2837** 
(.1283) 
-.2747** 
(.1169) 
-.2148+ 
(.1412) 
Weighted Opposition Importance (WOI) -.4072 
(1.0360) 
.6221 
(.9914) 
2.9481** 
(1.2769) 
Hearing  -.9350*** 
(1.8904) 
4.5404 
(3.5770) 
Hearing x GID   -.4192 
(.4258) 
Hearing x WCI   -.5293 
(2.9092) 
Hearing x OID    .0203 
(.2561) 
Hearing x WOI   -4.6679** 
(2.1293) 
N= 138 137 137 
Log-Likelihood -191.36255 -178.58658 -174.85751 
Χ2 (p<0.001) (4)=23.34 (5)=46.05 (9)=53.51 
AIC 394.7251 371.1732 371.715 
BIC 412.2886 391.613 403.8348 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2 
Table Appendix 3.B.1 Full Weibull Model on the Duration of Proposals, excluding Issue Areas  
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Independent Variable Model I 
 
Model II 
(Hearing) 
Model IV 
(Interactions) 
Constant 30.9413 
(22.4327) 
33.3200 
(22.3120) 
31.5295 
(22.4861) 
Government Issue Divisiveness (GID) .3920 
(.6256 
.1009 
(.5758) 
-.5978 
(.53779) 
Weighted Coalition Importance (WCI) -28.8921 + 
(19.9724) 
-25.0629 
(19.6040) 
-14.3677 
(19.8689) 
Opposition Issue Divisiveness (OID) -.1927 
(.4395) 
.0604 
(.4093) 
.7613* 
(.3896) 
Weighted Opposition Importance  -5.0070 
(8.2748) 
 -10.7576+ 
(7.8980) 
 -20.1469*** 
(7.7725) 
Foreign Policy  -2.5221 
(5.2825) 
-.2875 
(4.8694) 
-4.9078 
(3.8512) 
Industrial Policy  -8.0761* 
(4.7931) 
-7.3450+ 
(4.6597) 
2.0625 
(2.3079) 
Social Policy  -2.0335 
(.2.2457) 
-.8771 
(2.1993) 
-9.2175*** 
(3.0119) 
Agricultural Policy   -6.4488+ 
(4.0569) 
 -6.4467+  
(3.9407) 
-2.8970+ 
(1.838436) 
Regional Policy  -8.8390+ 
(6.5893) 
-7.5809 
(6.3383) 
-8.7740*** 
(2.9936) 
Environmental Policy  -4.0259 
(3.9837) 
-1.5819 
(3.7706) 
-6.4361+ 
(3.9912) 
Hearing  -.9797*** 
(.2043) 
9.8680** 
(4.8701) 
Hearing x GID   -.8954+ 
(.6104) 
Hearing x WCI   -1.7371 
(3.7889) 
Hearing x OID    .2555 
(.3782) 
Hearing x WOI   -10.0053*** 
(3.1164) 
N= 138 137 137 
Log-Likelihood -187.36168 -175.42062 -167.24123 
Χ2 (p<0.001) (10)=31.34 (11)=52.38 (15)=68.74 
AIC 398.7234 376.8412 368.4825 
BIC 433.8504 414.801 418.1221 
 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05 * p≤0.1 + p≤0.2 
Table Appendix 3.B.2 Full Weibull Model on the Duration of Proposals, including Issue Areas  
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Robustance Checks for the Weibull Duration Model 
In auxiliary tests of the Weibull duration model, I investigate the possibility of unobserved 
heterogeneity in my data and nonproportionality in the Weibull model. Heterogeneity refers 
to a condition in which subpopulations in the data vary in ways not captured by the 
covariates in the model (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 1999). Nonproportionality deals with 
coefficients in the Weibull model whose hazard is not proportional, which can lead to 
temporally dependent effects of the covariates. 
Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Contrary to medical or biological data where a failure (e.g. an infection or disease) can occur 
several times on one individual, a bill proposal can receive only one failure, i.e. vote in a 
committee. While there is no theoretical justification for assuming this type of individual 
frailty, individual bills proposed in either the same legislative period or committee or 
proposed by the same ministry could be prone to shared frailty. This could be due to a 
changing composition of parliament or committees, grown experience in later legislative 
periods and other unobserved influences. To test for shared fraility, I estimate three frailty 
models which provide for direct estimation of omitted group specific (session, committee, 
ministry) effects in the form of a single random-effect variable (theta). I run the models with 
either a gamma distribution on the omitted effects or an inverse-Gaussian distribution 
imposed. In no case do I find evidence of heterogeneity, i.e. the single random-effect 
variable (theta) fails to be significant.  
Shared Frailty Number of Groups Obs. Per Group  
(Min/ Max/ Avg.) 
Theta Χ-bar-2 Prob >= Χ-bar-2 
Session 3 38 / 53 / 45.67 0.0000 0.0000 1.000 
Ministry 15 1 / 44 / 9.13 0.0000 0.0000 1.000 
Committee 17 1 / 44 / 8.06 0.0000 0.0000 1.000 
 
Table Appendix 3.B.3 Shared Frailty Models: Test of Unobserved Heterogeneity in the Weibull Model  
A simpler approach to correct for coincidental dependence among observations (i.e. if 
dependence among observations is mainly regarded as a nuisance) is robust variance 
estimation using Huber’s (1967) method. But since robust estimation already assumes 
misspecification of the model, using this approach is not advised. Although applying the 
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Huber-White Sandwich estimator yields asymptotically correct variances for the maximum-
likelihood-estimation, due to misspecification of the model the likelihood function itself 
remains incorrect (Freedman 2006, unpublished).  
Nonproportionality 
Some variables might not be proportional in the Weibull model, even though the model 
imposes this assumption. This may result in temporal dependence in the effects of the 
covariates, “If unaccounted for nonproportionality exists in the Weibull model then the 
estimates of the influences of the covariates are likely to be distorted” (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Zorn 2001, 986). Following their approach to check the Weibull for nonproportionality I 
calculate two models for subsamples of the data with either a duration below or above/ 
equal to the mean duration of the complete sample to account for possible 
nonproportionality in the data. Twice the difference of the sum for the log-likelihoods of the 
full model and the two models for the subsamples follows a chi-squared distribution with (g-
1)*k degrees of freedom, where g refers to the number of subsamples and k to the number 
of variables used in the model.  
Log-Likelihood Full Model -167.24123 
Log-Likelihood Partial Model  
(duration < mean(duration) 
-72.873523 
Log-Likelihood Partial Model  
(duration > = mean (duration) 
-2.3472246 
LR X2 (DF=15) 184.04096 
Prob > X2 1.000 
 
Table Appendix 3.B.4 Nonproportionality Test Weibull Model 
From this I can calculate the chi-square statistics, i.e. the probability of getting a likelihood 
ratio equal or larger than the observed under the null hypothesis, “Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis can be taken as evidence that the assumption of proportional hazards is justified” 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001, 986)61. Since the probability of Chi2 is 1.000 we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. I interpret this as evidence that the assumption of proportional 
hazards is justified for my analyses. 
                                                          
61 This calculation was done with http://stattrek.com/online-calculator/chi-square.aspx. 
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Table Appendix 4.A Comparison of Observed and Predicted Values for the Event Count Models 
 
Following Long and Freese (2014), I compare the observed and predicted values for the 
event count models. Overall, the zero inflated Poisson slightly underpredicts the number of 
FAZ publications on a proposal, while both the negative binomial and its zero inflated variant 
slightly overpredict the count. In addition to model fit statistics (AIC and BIC) and theoretical 
reasons (the data generation process), choosing the zero inflated Poisson seems most 
reasonable because of this tendency to underpredict, i.e. the model is more conservative 
regarding its coefficients. 
 
 
136 Appendix 4.A 
  
 
137 Bibliography 
Bibliography 
Ai, C.R. / E.C. Norton. 2003. “Interaction terms in logit and probit models.” Economics 
Letters 80 (1): 123-129 
Alchian, A. A. / H. Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization.” The American Economic Review 62 (5): 777-795. 
Aldrich J. H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in 
America. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
Aldrich, J.H. / D. Rohde. 1997-1998. “The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: 
Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics.” Political Science Quarterly 112: 541-567  
Aldrich, J.H. / D. Rohde. 2000a. “The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: 
The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government.” In: Bond, J. 
/ R. Fleisher (eds.). Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era. 
Washington: CQ Press: 31-72. 
Aldrich, J.H. / D. Rohde. 2000b. “The Republican Revolution and the House 
Appropriations Committee.” Journal of Politics 62: 1-33. 
Aldrich, J.H. / F.D. Nelson. 1984. Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models. Beverly 
Hills: Sage 
Altheide, D. L. 1997. “The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear.” 
Sociological Quarterly 38 (4): 647-668. 
Andeweg, R. B. 2000. “Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between 
cabinet and ministers.” European Journal of Political Research 37: 377-395. 
Angelova, M. / T. Dannwolf/ T. König. 2012. “How Robust are Compliance Findings? A 
Research Synthesis.“ Journal of European Public Policy 19 (8): 1269-1291. 
Appoldt, F. W. 1971. Die öffentlichen Anhörungen („Hearings”) des Deutschen 
Bundestages. Ein Beitrag zur Beobachtung der Entfaltung eines lebendigen 
Verfassungssystems an Hand von organisatorischen und geschäftsordnungsmäßigen 
Entwicklungen eines obersten Staatsorgans. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 
 
138 Bibliography 
Arrow, K.J. 1969. “The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice 
of market versus nonmarket allocation.” The analysis and evaluation of public expenditure: 
The PPB System 1: 59-73. 
Austen-Smith, D. / W.H. Riker. 1987. “Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of 
Legislation.” American Political Science Review 83 (1): 897-918. 
Austen-Smith, D. 1990. “Information Transmission in Debate.” American Journal of 
Political Science 34 (1): 124-152. 
Austen-Smith, D. 1993. “Information Acquisition and Orthogonal Argument.” In: M. 
Hinich/ N.J. Schofield/ W. Barnett (eds.). Political Economy. Institutions, Competition and 
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 407-436. 
Backhaus-Maul, Holger (1990): „Die Organisation der Wissensvermittlung beim 
Deutschen Bundestag. Am Beispiel der Wissenschaftlichen Dienste.“ In: Petermann, T. (ed.). 
Das wohlberatene Parlament. Orte und Prozesse der Politikberatung beim Deutschen 
Bundestag. Berlin: Edition Sigma Bohn, 19-63 
Barabas, J. / J. Jerit. 2010. “Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?” American Political 
Science Review 104 (2): 226-242. 
Battaglini, M. 2002. “Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk.” 
Econometrica 70 (4): 1379-1401. 
Baum, M. / T. J. Groeling. 2010. War Stories. The Causes and Consequences of Public 
Views of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Baum, M. A. 2003. Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy 
in the New Media Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Baum, M.A. / P. Potter. 2008. “The Relationships between Mass Media, Public Opinion, 
and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis.” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 
39-65. 
Baum, M.A. / P. Potter. 2014. “Looking for Audience Costs in all the Wrong Places: 
Electoral Institutions, Media Access, and Dispute Resolution.” Journal of Politics 76: 167-181. 
 
139 Bibliography 
Becker, G. S. 1983. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371-400. 
Bélanger, E. / B. Meguid. 2008. “Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and Issue-based Vote 
Choice.” Electoral Studies 27: 477-491.  
Bélanger, E. / F. Gélineau. 2010. “Does Perceived Competence Matter? Political Parties 
and Economic Voting in Canadian Federal Elections.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and 
Parties 20 (1): 83-101., 
Bentley, A. F. 1908. The Process of Government. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Benz, M. / S. Meier. 2008. “Do People Behave in Experiments as in the Field? Evidence 
from Donations.” Experimental Economics 11(3):268-281. 
Berry, J. M. 1989. The Interest Group Society. 2. Edition. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Böhret, C. 1981. “Politikberatung.” In: Greiffenhagen, M. (ed.). Handwörterbuch zur 
politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag: 305-
308. 
Böhret, C. 2004. “Hofnarren, Denkfabriken, Politik-Coach: Chancen und Schwierigkeiten 
der Politikberatung damals und heute.” In: Fisch, S. / W. Rudloff (eds.). Experten und Politik. 
Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung in geschichtlicher Perspektive. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot: 
369-380 
 Börzel, T. 2000. “Why there is no ‘southern problem’. On environmental leaders and 
laggards in the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy 7(1): 141-162. 
Börzel, T. 2006. “Participation through law enforcement–the case of the European 
Union.” Comparative Political Studies 39 (1): 128–52. 
Boswell, C. 2009. The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge: Immigration Policy and Social 
Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Box-Steffensmeier, J. M./ B. S. Jones. 1997. "Time is of the Essence: Event History 
Models in Political Science." American Journal of Political Science 41 (4): 336-83.  
 
140 Bibliography 
Box-Steffensmeier, J.M./ L.W. Arnold/ C.J.W. Zorn. 1997. "The Strategic Timing of 
Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement."American Political Science Review 91 (2): 324-38.  
Brasher, H. 2006. “Listening to Hearings: Legislative Hearings and Legislative Outcomes.” 
American Politics Research 34 (5): 583-604. 
Brenner, M. 1993. "Interessenverbände und öffentliche Anhörungen“ Zeitschrift für 
Gesetzgebung 8(1): 35-51. 
Brown, J. M. / A. S. Marcum. 2011. “Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political 
Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy.” Security Studies 20: 141-170. 
Buchanan, J. / R. Tollison/ G. Tullock (eds.). 1980. Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking 
Society. College Station: Texas A&M Press. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B. / J. Morrow/ R. Siverson/ A. Smith. 1999. ‘‘An Institutional 
Explanation of the Democratic Peace.’’ American Political Science Review 93 (4): 791–807. 
Calvert, R.L. 1985. “The value of biased information: A rational choice model of political 
advice.” The Journal of Politics 47 (2): 530-555. 
Cameron, A.C. / P.K. Trivedi. 2013. Regression Analysis of Count Data. 2nd Edition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Carroll, R. / G. W. Cox. 2012. “Shadowing Ministers. Monitoring Partners in Coalition 
Governments.” Comparative Political Studies 45 (2): 220-236. 
Carrubba, C. J. /M. Gabel / C. Hankla. 2008. “Judicial Behavior under Political 
Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice.” American Political Science Review 
102(04):435–452. 
Carrubba, C. J. 2005. “Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes.” The 
Journal of Politics 67(3):669–689. 
Carrubba, C. J. 2009. “A Model of the Endogenous Development of Judicial Institutions 
in Federal and International Systems.” The Journal of Politics 71(01):55–69. 
 
141 Bibliography 
Cattell, Raymond B. 1966: “The Scree Test For the Number of Factors.” Multivariate 
Behavioral Research 1 (2): 245-276. 
Chakraborty, A. / R. Harbaugh. 2007. “Comparative Cheap Talk.” Journal of Economic 
Theory 132: 70-94. 
Chaudoin, S. 2012. Who’s Listening? Audiences, Alarms, And International Cooperation. 
A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Princeton University in Candidacy for the Degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Chung, C.-F./ P. Schmidt/ A. D. Witte. 1991. “Survival Analysis: A Survey.” Journal of 
Quantitative Criminology 7 (1): 59-98. 
Clare, J. 2007. “Domestic Audiences and Strategic Interests.” Journal of Politics 69 (3): 
732-745.  
Coase, R.H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4: 386-405. 
Cole, R. L., / D. A. Caputo. 1984. “The public hearing as an effective citizen participation 
mechanism: A case study of the general revenue sharing program.” American Political 
Science Review 78: 404–416. 
Collett, D. 1994. Modeling Survival Data in Medical Research. London: Chapman & Hall. 
Cook, T. D. / W. Shadish / V. C. Wong. 2008. “Three conditions under which 
observational studies produce the same results as experiments.” Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management 274: 724–50. 
Cox, G. W. / M. D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Cox, G. W. / M. D. McCubbins. 2004.Setting the Agenda. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Crawford, V. P. und J. Sobel. 1982. „Strategic Information Transmission.” Econometrica 
50 (6): 1431-1451. 
Dahl, R. A. 1967. Pluralist Democracy in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
 
142 Bibliography 
Dahlman, C. 1979. “The Problem of Externality.” Journal of Law and Economics 22: 141-
162. 
Davidson, R. H. / W. J. Oleszek. 2004. Congress and its members. 9. Edition. Washington, 
DC: CQ Press. 
Davies, G.A.M. / R. Johns. 2013. “Audience Costs among the British Public: The Impact of 
Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric.” International Studies Quarterly 57 
(4): 725-737. 
De Vries, C. / S. Hobolt. 2012. “When Dimensions Collide: The Electoral Success of Issue 
Entrepreneurs.” European Union Politics, 13, 246-268. 
Der Spiegel, Wednesday, February 21st 1951, p. 5 
Deutscher Bundestag, 119. Sitzung, 21.02.1951, p. 4557 
Deutscher Bundestag, 119. Sitzung, 21.02.1951, p. 7412 
Deutscher Bundestag. 2013. Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundstages und 
Geschäftsordnung des Vermittlungsausschusses. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag. 
Dewatripont, M. / J. Tirole. 1999. “Advocates.” Journal of Political Economy 107 (1): 1-
39. 
Diermeier, D. / T. F. Feddersen. 2000. „Information and Congressional Hearings.” 
American Journal of Political Science 44(1): 51-65. 
Dodd, L. / B.Oppenheimer. 1977. ‘‘The House in Transition”. In: Dodd, L. / 
B.Oppenheimer (eds.). Congress Reconsidered. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers: 21-53. 
Döring, H. (ed.). 1995. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt, New 
York: Campus/ St. Martin’s Press. 
Döring, H. 1996. ‘‘Parlamentarische Kontrolle in Westeuropa.” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte 27: 42-54. 
Downes, A. B., / T. S. Sechser. 2012. ‘‘The Illusion of Democratic Credibility.’’ 
International Organization 66 (03): 457–89. 
 
143 Bibliography 
Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. 
Dror, Y. 1987. “Conclusions.” In: Plowden, W. (ed.). Advising the Rulers. Oxford: 
Blackwell: 185-215. 
Druckman, J.N. / T. J. Leeper. 2012. “Learning More from Political Communication 
Experiments: Pretreatment and Its Effects.” American Journal of Political Science 56 (4): 875-
896. 
Dunleavy, P. / S. Bastow. 2001. “Modelling coalitions that cannot coalesce: A critique of 
the Laver-Shepsle approach.” West European Politics 24 (1): 1-26. 
Dur, R. / O.H. Swank. 2005. “Producing and Manipulating Information.” The Economic 
Journal 115: 185-199. 
Edwards, G. C. III / A. Barrett/ J. Peake. 1997. “The Legislative Impact of Divided 
Government.” American Journal of Political Science 41(2): 545-563. 
Eggers, J. 1969. Die Rechtsstellung von Ausschüssen, Beiräten und anderen kollegialen 
Einrichtungen im Bereich der vollziehenden Gewalt. Dissertation: Universität Kiel. 
Eichhorst, J. 2014. “Explaining Variation in Coalition Agreements: The Electoral and 
Policy Motivations for Drafting Agreements.” European Journal of Political Research 53 (1): 
98-115. 
Epstein, D. / S. O'Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers. A Transaction Cost Politics 
Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Erlei, M. / M. Leschke/ D. Sauerland. 1999. Neue Institutionenökonomik. Stuttgart: 
Schäffer-Poeschel. 
Esterling, K.M. 2007. “Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy 
Analysis in Congressional Committees.” American Political Science Review 101 (1): 93-109. 
Eyerman, J. /R. Hart. 1996. ‘‘An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: 
Democracy Speaks Louder than Words.’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (4): 597–616. 
 
144 Bibliography 
Fama, E.F./ M. Jensen. 1983. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law 
and Economics 26: 327-349. 
Fang, S. 2008. “The informational role of international institutions and domestic 
politics.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (2): 304-321. 
Fearon, J. D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences annd the Escalation of International 
Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88 (3): 577-592.   
Fearon, J. D. 1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1): 68-90. 
Feldkamp, M.F. 2005. Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1994-
2003. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Feldkamp, M.F. 2011. Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1990 
bis 2010. Eine Veröffentlichung des Archivs des Deutschen Bundestages. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos. 
Fortunato, D. / L.W. Martin/ G. Vanberg. N.d. “Executive Coalitions, Shadow Chairs, and 
Legislative Review.” 
Freedman, D. A. (2006). On the So-Called “Huber Sandwich Estimator” and “Robust 
Standard Errors”, http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~census/mlesan.pdf  
Gaines, B. J. / J.H. Kuklinksi/ P.J. Quirk. 2007. “The Logic of the Survey Experiment 
Reexamined.” Political Analysis 15 (1): 1-20. 
Gartzke, E./ Y. Lupu. 2012. “Still Looking for Audience Costs.” Security Studies 21 (3): 
391-397. 
Gelman, A./ J. Hill. 2007. Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical 
Models. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Gelpi, C. F., / M. Griesdorf. 2001. ‘‘Winners or Losers? Democracies in International 
Crisis, 1918–94.’’ American Political Science Review 95 (3): 633–47. 
Geys, B. 2012. “Success and Failure in Electoral Competition: Selective Emphasis Under 
Incomplete Issue Ownership.” Electoral Studies 31: 406-412. 
 
145 Bibliography 
Gilligan, T. W. / K. Krehbiel. 1989. “Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a 
Heterogeneous Committee.” American Journal of Political Science 33 (2): 459-490. 
Gilligan, T. W. / K. Krehbiel. 1990. “Organization of Informative Committees by a 
Rational Legislature.” American Journal of Political Science 34 (2): 531-564. 
Green, J. / S. Hobolt. 2008. “Owning the Issue Agenda: Party Strategies and Vote Choices 
in British Elections.” Electoral Studies 27: 460-476. 30  
Green, J. / W. Jennings. 2012a. “The Dynamics of Issue Competence and Vote for Parties 
In and Out of Power: An analysis of Valence in Britain, 1979-1997.” European Journal of 
Political Research 51: 469-503.  
Green, J. / W. Jennings. 2012b. “Valence as Macro-Competence: An Analysis of Mood in 
Party Competence Evaluations in Britain.” British Journal of Political Science 42:311-343. 
Greene, W.H. 2003. Econometric Analysis. 5th Edition. Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, 
N.J. 
Groeling, T. 2010. When Politicians Attack! Party Cohesion in the Media. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Habermas, J. 1994: Three Normative Models of Democracy, Constellations, 1/1, 1 – 10  
Hallerberg, M. 2000. “The role of parliamentary committees in the budgetary process 
within Europe.” In: Strauch, R. / J. V. Hagen (eds.). Institutions, politics, and fiscal policy. New 
York, NY: Springer: 87-106. 
Hallerberg, M. 2004. “Electoral Laws, Government, and Parliament.” In: Döring, H. / M. 
Hallerberg (eds.). Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior. Passage of Legislation Across Western 
Europe. London: Ashgate: 11-33. 
Harrington, D. E. 1989. ‘‘Economic News on Television: The Determinants of Coverage.’’ 
Public Opinion Quarterly 53 (1): 566–74. 
Hart, O. / J. Moore. 1990. “Property Rights and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of 
Political Economy 98 (6): 1119-1158. 
 
146 Bibliography 
Haynes, K. 2012. “Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy: Do Executive Term Limits 
Reduce the Effectiveness of Democratic Threats?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (5): 771-
798. 
Heller, W.B. 2001. „Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in 
Multiparty Parliaments.” American Journal of Political Science. 
Herwig, U./ T. Kaffenberger/ T. Baumgartner/ L. Jancke. 2007. ‘‘Neural Correlates of a 
‘Pessimistic’ Attitude when Anticipating Events of Unknown Emotional Valence.’’ 
NeuroImage 34: 848–58. 
Hoffman-Riem, W. 1988. “Schleichwege zur Nicht-Entscheidung. Fallanalyse zum 
Scheitern der Enquetekommission ‚Neue Informations- und Kommunikationstechniken‘.“ 
Politische Vierteljahresschrift 29: 58-84. 
Holmstrom, B. 1979. „Moral Hazard and observability.“ Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-
91. 
Hosmer, D.W: and S. Lemeshow (2013): Applied Logistic Regression, 3rd Edition. New 
York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Huang, C. / T.G. Shields. 2000. “Interpretation of interaction effects in logit and probit 
analyses: reconsidering the relationship between registration laws, education, and voter 
turnout.” American Politics Quarterly 28 (1): 80-95. 
Huber, J.D. 1996. Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in 
France. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Imai, K. / G. King/ O. Lau. 2007. „Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software.“ 
http://GKing.harvard.edu/zelig. 
Imai, K. / G. King/ O. Lau. 2008. “Toward A Common Framework for Statistical Analysis 
and Development.” Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 17 (4): 892-913 
Ismayr, W. 2001. Der Deutsche Bundestag im politischen System der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. 2. Edition. Opladen: UTB. 
 
147 Bibliography 
Ismayr, W. 2003. “Der Deutsche Bundestag.“ In: Breit,G. / P. Massing (eds.). 
Parlamentarismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Einführung. Schwalbach: 
Wochenschau Verlag: 45-76. 
Ismayr, W. 2012. Der Deutsche Bundestag. 3. Edition. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.   
Iyengar, S. / D. R. Kinder. 1987. News that Matters. Chicago, Illinois: University of 
Chicago Press 
Iyengar, S. / R. Reeves. 1997. Do the Media Govern? Politicians, Voters and Reporters in 
America. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Jacobs, A.M. / J.S. Matthews. 2012. “Why Do Citizens Discount the Future? Public 
Opinion and the Timing of Policy Consequences.” British Journal of Political Science 42 (2): 
903-935. 
Jacobs, L.R. / B.I. Page. 2005. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” American Political 
Science Review 99 (1): 107-123 
Jann, W. 1985 . “Policy-Forschung als angewandte Sozialforschung.” In: Klages, H. (ed.). 
Arbeitsperspektiven angewandter Sozialwissenschaft. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag: 64-
111. 
Jensen, M.C. / W.H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360. 
Kahneman, D./ A. Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” 
Econometrica 47 (2): 263-292. 
Kennedy, P. 2008. A Guide to Econometrics. 6. Edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Keohane, R. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Kiewiet, D. R. / M. D. McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation. Congressional Parties 
and the Appropriation Process. Chicago und London: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
148 Bibliography 
Kim, D. / G. Loewenberg. 2005. “The role of parliamentary committees in coalition 
governments: Keeping tabs on coalition partners in the German Bundestag.“ Comparative 
Political Studies 38: 1104-1129. 
King, G. / R.O. Keohane/ S. Verba. 1994. Designing Social Enquiry. Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
King, G. 1989. Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical 
Inference. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
King, G. 1989. “Event count models for international relations: Generalizations and 
applications.” International Studies Quarterly, 33(2):123–147.  
King, G; / M. Tomz / J. Wittenberg. 2000. “Making the most of statistical analyses: 
improving interpretation and presentation. “ American Journal of Political Science 44 (2): 
347-361 
Klein, B. / R. Crawford / A. Alchian. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and 
the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and Economics 21: 279-326.  
Klemmer, P. 2002. “Wirtschafts- und Umweltforschung und die politischen 
Realisierungschancen.“ In: Jens, U. / H. Rohman (eds.). Der Einfluss der Wissenschaft auf die 
Politik. Marburg: Metropolis 23-34. 
König, T. / B. Luig/ S. Solomon. 2010. “Sachverständige und der Einfluss von Expertise 
auf Reformen: eine räumliche Analyse der Föderalismusreform II.“ Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik 11(3): 307-323. 
König, Thomas & Bernd Luig (2014): Datensatz zur Gesetzgebung des Bundes. 10. bis 16. 
Legislaturperiode des Deutschen Bundestages. 
Krehbiel, K. 1990. “Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?” 
American Political Science Review 84 (1): 149-163. 
Krehbiel, K. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
149 Bibliography 
Kreps, D. M. / R. Wilson. 1982. “Reputation and Imperfect Information.” Journal of 
Economic Theory 27 (2): 253-279. 
Krosnick, J. A., / D. R. Kinder. 1990. ‘‘Altering the Foundations of Support for the 
President through Priming.’’ AmericanPolitical Science Review 84 (2): 497–512. 
Kusche, I. 2008. Politikberatung und die Herstellung von Entscheidungssicherheit im 
politischen System. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Laffont, J.J. / D. Martimort. 2002. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Lampert, D. 1992. “Zero-inflated poisson regression, with an application to defects in 
manufacturing.” Technometrics, 34(1):1–14.  
Landfried, C. 1986. “Politikwissenschaft und Politikberatung“. In: Beyme, Klaus von (ed.). 
Politikwissenschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Entwicklungsprobleme einer Disziplin. 
PVS Sonderheft 17: 100-115. 
Larson, E. V. 2000. ‘‘Putting Theory to Work: Diagnosing Public Opinion on the US 
Intervention in Bosnia.’’ In: Nincic, M. / J. Lepgold (eds.). Being Useful: Policy Relevance and 
International Relations Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 174–233. 
Laver, M. / K. Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and 
Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Laver, M. / W.B. Hunt. 1992. Policy and Party Competition. New York: Routledge. 
Letterie, W. / O. H. Swank. 1997. “Learning and Signalling by Advisor Selection.” Public 
Choice 92: 353-367. 
Levendusky, M. S. / M. C. Horowitz. 2012. “When Backing Down is the Right Decision: 
Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs.” Journal of Politics 74 (2): 323-338 
Levitt, S.D. / J.A. List. 2007. “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social 
Preferences Reveal About the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (2): 153-
174. 
 
150 Bibliography 
Levy, G. / R. Razin. 2007. “On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap 
Talk: A Comment.” Econometrica 75 (3): 885-893. 
Leyden, K.M. 1995. “Interest Group Resources and Testimony at Congressional 
Hearings.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (3): 431-439. 
Lijphart, A. 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-One Countries. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Lipsmeyer, C. S./ H.N. Pierce. 2011. “The Eyes that Bind: Junior Ministers as Oversight 
Mechanisms in Coalition Governments.” Journal of Politics 73 (4): 1152-64. 
Lipson, C. 2003. Reliable Partners: How Democracies have made a Separate Peace. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Lipson, C. 2003. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Loewenberg, G. 1971. Modern Parliaments. Change or Decline? Chicago/New York: 
Aldine-Atherton. 
Long J.S. / J. Freese. 2006. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables using 
Stata. College Station, TX: StataCorp. 
Long J.S. / J. Freese. 2014. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables using 
Stata. 3rd Edition. College Station, TX: StataCorp. 
Long, J.S. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. 
Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage 
Lupia, A. / M.D. McCubbins.1994. “Who Controls? Information and the Structure of 
Legislative Decision Making.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (3): 361-384. 
Lupia, A., / M. D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn what 
They Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Manow, P./ S. Burkhart. 2007. “Government’s Legislative Self-Restraint under Divided 
Government: Evidence from the German Case, 1976-2002.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32: 
167-191. 
 
151 Bibliography 
Mansfield, E.D./ H.V. Milner/ B.P. Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, 
Autocracies, and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 94 (2): 305-321. 
Mansfield, E.D./ H.V. Milner/ B.P. Rosendorff. 2002. “Why democracies cooperate more: 
Electoral control and international trade agreements.” International Organization 56 (3): 
477-513. 
Martin, L. W. / G. Vanberg. 2011. Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative 
Institutions in Multiparty Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Martin, L.W. / G. Vanberg. 2004. “Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and 
Parliamentary Scrutiny.” American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 13–27. 
Martin, L.W. / G. Vanberg. 2005. “Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review.” 
American Political Science Review 99(1): 93–106. 
Martin, L.W. 2004. “The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies.” American 
Journal of Political Science 48(3): 445–61. 
Mattson, I. / K. StrØm. 1995. “Parliamentary Committees.” In: Döring, H. (ed.): 
Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt, New York: Campus/St. Martin's 
Press: 249–307. 
Mattson, I. / K. StrØm. 2004. "Committee Effects On Legislation." In: Döring, H. / M. 
Hallerberg (eds.): Patterns of Parliamentary Behaviour: Passage of Legislation Across 
Western Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate: 91-111.  
Mayntz, R. 1987. “West Germany”. In: Plowden, W. (ed.). Advising the Rulers. Oxford: 
Blackwell: 3-18. 
McCarthy, T. 1994. “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism. Rawls and Habermas 
in Dialogue.” Ethics 105 (1): 44 – 63.  
McCubbins, M.D. / T. Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 165-179. 
McDermott, R. / J.H. Fowler/ O. Smirnov. 2008. “On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect 
Theory Preferences.” Journal of Politics 70 (2): 335-350. 
McGillivray, F. / A. Smith. 2000. “Trust and Cooperation through Agent-Specific 
Punishments.” International Organization 54 (4): 809-824. 
 
152 Bibliography 
McKelvey, R. D. 1976. “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some 
Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472-482. 
Meltzman, F. 1997. Competing Principals. Committees, Parties, and the Organization of 
Congress. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 Mengel, H.-J. 1983. “Die Funktion der parlamentarischen Anhörung im 
Gesetzgebungsprozess.“ Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 6: 226-233. 
Miller, G.J. / A.B. Whitford. 2002. “Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent Negotiations: 
The ‘Insurance/ Incentive Trade-Off’.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 14 (2): 231-267. 
Miller, G.J. 2005. “The political evolution of principal-agent models.” Annual Reviewof 
Political Science 8: 203-205. 
Milner, H. 2002. Civic Literacy. Hanover, NH: Tufts University Press. 
Moe, T.M. 1984. “The New Economics of Organization.” American Journal of Political 
Science 28(4): 739-777. 
Müller, W. C. / T. M. Meyer. 2010. “Meeting the Challenges of Representation and 
Accountability in Multi-party Governments.” West European Politics 33 (5): 1065-1092. 
Müller, W. C. 2000. “Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation 
and accountability work.” European Journal of Political Research 37: 309-333. 
Müller-Rommel, F. 1984. “Sozialwissenschaftliche Politikberatung.” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte 25: 26-39. 
North, D. 1990. “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2 
(4): 355-367. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pantle, N. 1989. “Die Anhörung des Sachverständigen.“ Monatszeitschrift für deutsches 
Recht 4: 312-316. 
 
153 Bibliography 
Partell, P. /G. Palmer. 1999. ‘‘Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical 
Assessment of Fearon’s Model of Dispute Outcomes.’’ International Studies Quarterly 43(2): 
389–405. 
Patterson, T. 1994. Out of Order. New York: Vintage. 
Patzelt, W. 2003. Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft. Grundriss des Faches und 
studiumbegleitende Orientierung. 5. Edition. Passau: Wissenschaftsverlag Werner Rohe 
Pollack, M.A. 2003. The Engines of European Integration. Delegation, Agency and 
Agenda Setting in the EU. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Popkin, S. L. 1993. ‘‘Information Shortcuts and the Reasoning Voter.’’ In: Grofman, B. 
(ed.). Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in 
Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 17–36. 
Potter, P. B. / M. A. Baum. 2010. “Democratic Peace, Domestic Audience Costs, and 
Political Communication.” Political Communication 27 (4): 453-470. 
Powell, G.B. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional 
Views. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Prins, B. 2003. “Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs: Political 
Participation and Interstate Crisis Bargaining, 1816-1992.” Journal of Peace Research 40 (1): 
67-84. 
Proksch, S.-O. / J.B. Slapin. 2012. “Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech.” 
American Journal of Political Science 56 (3): 520-537 
Quong, J. 2014. “On The Idea of Public Reason.” In: Mandle, J. / D.A. Reidy (eds.): A 
Companion to Rawls. Chichester, West Sussex :Wiley-Blackwell: 265-280. 
Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press 
Reiter, D. / A. C. Stam III. 1998. “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory.” American 
Political Science Review 92 (2): 377-389. 
Rohde. D. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago, Illinois: University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
154 Bibliography 
Rosendorff, B.P. 2005. “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Procedure.” American Political Science Review 99(3): 389-400. 
Royston, P. 2001. “Flexible Alternatives to the Cox Model, and More.” Stata Journal 
(1):1–28. 
Saalfeld, T. 1998. “The German Bundestag: Influence and Accountability in a Complex 
Environment.” In: Norton, P. (ed.). Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe. 
London: Cass: 44-72. 
Saalfeld, T. 2000. “Members of Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency 
Relations and Problems of Oversight.” European Journal of Political Research 37: 353-376. 
Sappington, D.E. 1991. “Incentives in principal-agent relationships.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 5: 45-66. 
Scharpf, F. 2006. “Föderalismusreform: Weshalb wurde so wenig erreicht?” Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte 50: 6-11- 
Schelling, T. C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Schelling, T. C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
Schindler, P. 1999. Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-
1999. Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Schneider, W.L. 1989. “Kooperation als strategischer Prozess. Administrative 
Auftragsforschung im Spannungsfeld zwischen professionellem Interesse und politischer 
Instrumentalisierung.“ In: Beck, U. / W. Bonß (eds.): Weder Sozialtechnologie noch 
Aufklärung? Analysen zur Verwendung sozialwissenschaftlichen Wissens. Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp: 302-331. 
Schofield, N. 1978. “Instability of Simple Dynamic Games.” The Review of Economic 
Studies 45 (3): 575-594. 
Schultz, K. 2001. “Looking for Audience Costs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (1): 32-
60. 
Schüttemeyer, S. 1989. “Öffentliche Anhörungen.“ In: Zeh, W. (ed.). Parlamentsrecht 
und Parlamentspraxis. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 1145 – 1159. 
 
155 Bibliography 
Schüttemeyer, S. 1998. “Hearing.“ In: Nohlen, D. / R. - O. Schultze/ S. S. Schüttemeyer 
(eds.). Lexikon der Politik. Band 7. Politische Begriffe. München: C.H. Beck: 246 
Sebaldt, M. 2001. “Oppositionsstrategien im Vergleich: Der Anteil der 
parlamentarischen Minderheit am Machtwechsel in Großbritannien und Deutschland.“ In: 
Hirscher, G. / K.-R. Korte (eds.). Aufstieg und Fall von Regierungen. Machterwerb und 
Machterosionen in westlichen Demokratien. München: Olzog: 113-146. 
Shavell, S. 1979. “Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship.” 
Bell Journal of Economics 10: 55-73. 
Sheafer, T., / G. Wolfsfeld. 2009. “Party Systems and Oppositional Voices in the News 
Media: A Study of the Contest over Political Waves in the United States and Israel.“ 
International Journal of Press/Politics 14 (2): 146–65. 
Shepsle, K.A. / B.A. Weingast. 1981. “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative 
Choice.” Public Choice 37: 503-519. 
Shepsle, K.A. / B.A. Weingast. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee 
Power.” American Political Science Review 81 (1): 85-104. 
Shepsle, K.A. 1979. “Instititutional arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional 
Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23 (1): 27-59. 
Shoemaker, P. J. / T. Change / N. Bredlinger. 1987. “Deviance as a Predictor of 
Newsworthiness.” In: McLaughlin, M. (ed.). Communication Yearbook 10. Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage: 348-365. 
Shulock, N. 1999. “The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If it is not used, why do we produce so 
much of it?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 18 (2): 226-244. 
Sieberer, U. 2011. “The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A 
Multidimensional Analysis.” West European Politics 34 (4): 731-754. 
Siefken, S.T. 2003. “Expertengremien der Bundesregierung – Fakten, Fiktionen, 
Forschungsbedarf.” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 34 (3): 483-504. 
 
156 Bibliography 
Simmons, B.A. / A. Danner. 2010. “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal 
Court.” International Organization 64 (2): 225-256. 
Simmons, B.A. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and 
Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review 94 (4): 
819-835. 
Simon, H. 1947. Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-Making in Administrative 
Organization. New York: Macmillan. 
Slantchev, B. L. 2006. “Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs.” 
International Studies Quarterly 50 (2): 445-477. 
Sniderman, P.M. / R.A. Brody / P.E. Tetlock. 1991. Reasoning and Choice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Soroka, S. 2006. “Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Responses to Economic 
Information.” The Journal of Politics 68 (2): 372-385. 
Soroka, S. 2012. “The Gatekeeping Function: Distributions of Information in Media and 
the Real World.” The Journal of Politics 74 (2): 514-528. 
Spence, M. / R. Zeckhauser. 1971. “Insurance, information, and individual action.” The 
American Economic Review 61 (2): 380-387. 
Spiegel Online, 24.02.2011, „Umstrittene Subvention: FDP will Hotelsteuer-Privileg 
wieder abschaffen“, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/umstrittene-subvention-fdp-
will-hotelsteuer-privileg-wieder-abschaffen-a-747388.html, retrieved July 2014 
Spiegel Online, 29.06.2010, “Steuerdebatte in der Koalition: Merkel rügt Lindners Hotel-
Volte“, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/steuerdebatte-in-der-koalition-merkel-
ruegt-lindners-hotel-volte-a-703619.html, retrieved July 2014 
Spoon, Jae-Jae, Catherine de Vries and Sarah Hobolt. 2013. “Going Green: Explaining 
Issue Competition on the Environment.” Paper Presented at the Elections, Public Opinion 
Parties (EPOP) Conference, Oxford, UK September 2012.  
 
157 Bibliography 
Stewart, S. A. 2005. “Can Behavioral Economics Save Us from Ourselves?” University of 
Chicago Magazine 97 (3). 
Stigler, G. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.“ Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 2: 3-21. 
Stöhr, C. 1989. “Anhörungen vor dem Petitionsausschuss als Kontrollinstrument der 
Opposition?“ Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 20(1), 87-94. 
StrØm, K. 1990. Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
StrØm, K. 1998. “Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies.” Journal of 
Legislative Studies 4 (1): 21-59. 
StrØm, K. 2000. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” 
European Journal of Political Research 37 (3): 261-289. 
StrØm, K./ W. C. Müller/ T. Bergman. 2003. “Dimensions of Citizen Control.” In: StrØm, 
K./ W. C. Müller/ T. Bergman (eds.). Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary 
Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 651-706. 
StrØm, K./ W. C. Müller/ T. Bergman. 2006. “The (Moral) Hazards of Parliamentary 
Democracy.” In: D. Braun/ F. Gilardi (eds.): Delegation in Contemporary Democracies. 
London: Routledge: 27-51. 
Talbert, J.C. / B.D. Jones/ F.R. Baumgartner. 1995. “Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy 
Change in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 39 (2): 383-405. 
Tenhaef, R. 1985. Die öffentlichen Anhörungen der Ausschüsse des Deutschen 
Bundestages im parlamentarischen Entscheidungsprozess. Magisterarbeit, Bonn: Universität 
Bonn 
Tenhaef, R. 1992. Öffentliche Anhörungen der Fachausschüsse des Deutschen 
Bundestages im parlamentarischen Entscheidungsprozess bis zur 10. Wahlperiode. 
Universität Bonn: Dissertation 
 
158 Bibliography 
Thies, M.F. 2001. “Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition 
Governments” American Journal of Political Science 45 (3): 580-98. 
Timmermans, A. 2003. High Politics in the Low Countries. An Empirical Study of Coalition 
Agreements in Belgium and The Netherlands. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Timmermans, A. 2006. “Standing Apart and Sitting Together: Enforcing Coalition 
Agreements in Multiparty Systems.” European Journal of Political Research 45 (2): 263-83. 
Tirole, J. 1999. “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?” Econometrica 67 (4): 741-
781. 
Tomz, M. 2007. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental 
Approach.” International Organization 61 (4): 821-840. 
Truman, D. B. 1951. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. 
New York: Knopf. 
Trussler, M./ S. Soroka. 2014. “Consumer Demand for Cynical and Negative News 
Frames.” International Journal of Press/Politics: first published online. 
doi:10.1177/194016121452483 
Tsebelis, G. 2002. Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Twight, C. 1994. “Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation: An Integrating Theory.” 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (2): 189-216. 
Uzonyi, G. / M. Souva/ S. Goulder. 2012. “Domestic Institutions and Credible Signals.” 
International Studies Quarterly 56 (4): 765-776. 
Vanberg, G. 2001. „Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to 
Constitutional Review.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (2): 346-361. 
Vanberg, G. 2005. The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
159 Bibliography 
Verzichelli, L. 2008. “Portfolio Allocation.” In: StrØm, K./ W. C. Müller/ T. Bergman (eds.). 
Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 237-267. 
Voigt, S. 2002. Institutionenökonomik. Neue Ökonomische Bibliothek UTB. 
Von Beyme, K. 1997. Der Gesetzgeber. Der Bundestag als Entscheidungszentrum. 
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Von Thienen, V. 1990. “Beratungswelt und Methode. Parlamentarische Politikberatung 
in der Perspektive unterschiedlicher Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung.” In: 
Petermann, T. (eds.). Orte und Prozesse der Politikberatung beim Deutschen Bundestag. 
Berlin: Edition Sigma Bohn: 171-216. 
Vonk, R. 1996. “Negativity and Potency Effects in Impression Formation.“ European 
Journal of Social Psychology 26: 851-865. 
Warwick, P.V. 1994. Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Weeks, J. L. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” 
International Organization 62 (1): 35-64. 
Weingast, B. 1993. “Constitutions as Governance Structures.” Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics 149: 286-311. 
Weingast, B. R. / W. J. Marshall. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why 
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (1): 
132-163. 
Weßels, B. 1987. “Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft: 
Öffentliche Anhörungen, informelle Kontakte und innere Lobby in wirtschafts- und 
sozialpolitischen Parlamentsausschüssen.” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 18 (2): 285-311. 
Wewer, G. 2003. “Politikberatung und Politikgestaltung.” In: Schubert, K./ N. C. 
Bandelow (eds.). Politikfeldanalyse. Eine Einführung. München: Oldenbourg: 361-390. 
 
160 Bibliography 
Williams, R. 2001. “Using the margins command to estimate and interpret adjusted 
predictions and marginal effects.” The Stata Journal 12(2):308-331. 
Wiliamson, O. E. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Willems, H./ M. Wolf/ R. Eckert. 1993. Soziale Unruhen und Politikberatung. Funktion, 
Arbeitsweise und Auswirkungen von Untersuchungskommissionen in den USA, 
Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien 
Williamson, O.E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. 
New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E. 1981. “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost 
Approach.” American Journal of Sociology 87 (3): 548-577. 
Woon, J. 2012. “Democratic Accountability and Retrospective Voting: a Laboratory 
Experiment.” American Journal of Political Science 56 (4): 913-930. 
Yamaguchi, K. 1991. Event History Analysis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 
Zaller, J. 1992. The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinions. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Zelner, B. A. 2009. “Using simulation to interpret results from logit, probit, and other 
nonlinear models.” Strategic Management Journal 30: 1335-1348 
Zorn, C. J. W. 1998. “An analytic and empirical examination of zero-inflated and hurdle 
poisson specifications.” Sociological Methods & Research, 26(3):368–400. 
 
 
 
